CYPRUS: G/C OPPOSITION LEADER FRUSTRATED WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000317

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: G/C OPPOSITION LEADER FRUSTRATED WITH
CHRISTOFIAS

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(
d)


1. (C) Summary: "Demetris Christofias is focusing on the
(anti-solution) minority, not the (pro-solution) majority,"
DISY Chairman Nikos Anastassiades bitterly complained to the
Ambassador on May 11. Anastassiades said that President
Christofias was overly solicitous of his two hard-line
coalition partners, Socialist EDEK and centrist DIKO, and
failed to embrace or appreciate DISY's strong support for the
ongoing UN-brokered peace process. He criticized Christofias
for the slow pace of negotiations and for the latter's
penchant of seeking petty tactical (vice strategic) victories
over the Turkish Cypriots. The DISY leader also said that he
was trying to meet with Turkish PM Erdogan (they met in 2005)
to set up a channel of communication with AKP. Anastassiades
claimed he still hoped to form a common pro-solution front
with Christofias and his Communist AKEL party, but hinted
that his patience and ability to do so was limited by AKEL's
hostility -- which in turn fueled his own internal party
opposition within DISY. End Summary.

"We are building psychological walls"


2. (C) Anastassiades expressed dismay over the tactics of
both President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot (T/C) Leader
Mehmet Ali Talat, especially their habit of launching verbal
brickbats at each other via the press. "We are building
psychological walls," he complained, pointing out that
Christofias's repeated public rejection of any continuation
of Turkish guarantor powers in a reunified Cyprus, combined
with Talat's insistence on them, made it nearly impossible to
sell a compromise deal to the public. Anastassiades said
that he had, to no avail, implored each leader to reserve
such battles for the negotiating table, not the press.
However, he criticized Christofias particularly strongly for
the slow pace of the process. Christofias seemed to be
slowing down the process on account of Turkey's EU accession
review at the end of 2009, when he ought to be speeding the
process up.


3. (C) The DISY leader was especially vexed over
Christofias's inability to hammer out a deal with Talat to
open the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point in western
Cyprus, a long-time G/C demand and key confidence-building
measure. Anastassiades, who had spoken recently with UN
Special Adviser Alexander Downer on the matter, said that he
fully supported the UN plan to run electricity to the T/C
enclave/military base of Kokkina (instead of allowing the
T/Cs to transport fuel for generators) in exchange for
opening the new crossing. "We supplied free electricity to
all of the north for twenty years, even to the army," he
added. Christofias had told Anastassiades that he still
needed more time to sell the compromise to his
solution-skeptical coalition partners EDEK and DIKO, however.


4. (C) In response to Anastassiades's question, the
Ambassador said that he believed Turkey and the Turkish
Cypriots were ready to do a deal on Limnitis/Yesilirmak along
the lines of the electricity proposal, although the sides
still had to hammer out the details. Turkish Cypriots were
waiting for a detailed G/C offer, he added. Anastassiades
replied that opening this crossing point, as well as
conducting a technical infrastructure survey of the abandoned
G/C city of Varosha, were key to "breathing new life into the
process." (Comment: The survey, a pet project of
DISY-affiliated "exile" G/C Mayor of Famagusta Alexis
Galanos, is a red flag for the Turkish military, which
controls the abandoned city. Galanos and other G/C mayors of
the "occupied areas" will be in the Department shortly for
CyProb-related meetings and likely will raise the matter.)
The Ambassador told Anastassiades that we believed opening
the crossing should now be only a question of finding the
political will to do it. The international community had
weighed in with the Turks and gotten the answer from them
that we wanted. Varosha would be much more difficult,
however.

"Let's find a way to join forces"


5. (C) Anastassiades said that his party still wanted to make
common cause with the pro-solution AKEL in order to build the

public momentum necessary to achieve a "yes" vote in a future
referendum. He said that he had even suggested to AKEL to
"join forces" in explaining to the Greek Cypriots the
benefits of a solution and the steps, often painful, they
would need to take to reunify the island. Unfortunately, he
griped, AKEL was not reaching out to DISY; rather, the
hard-left party was gripped by an "anti-DISY" complex.
Anastassiades warned that he could not continue to pretend
that AKEL was not staffing the bureaucracy with party hacks
and conducting domestic policy anathema to DISY's free market
principles. He hinted that his own internal party opposition
made his unrequited support of Christofias and AKEL's
moderate Cyprus Problem approach increasingly untenable.

Wants to Meet PM Erdogan


6. (C) Anastassiades, who had met the Russian Ambassador
earlier that morning, said he was trying, with the help of
the Swedish Embassy, to meet Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in
Turkey in the near future, a follow-up to their 2005
encounter. He noted that he used to meet with Erdogan and
other AKP officials at gatherings of the European Peoples
Party (EPP) political grouping, and he hoped to reestablish
this contact after Erdogan stopped attending EPP events in

2007. AKP and DISY had agreed to exchange delegations,
Anastassiades added, but were still working to "set up a
channel." The Ambassador said he would pass on this
information to Embassy Ankara.

Comment


7. (C) Anastassiades' frustration with President Christofias
over the latter's inability (or refusal) to toe a bolder line
in reunification talks for fear of alienating his
anti-solution coalition partners is clearly growing. The
opposition leader's agitation during the meeting was
noticeable; perhaps for dramatic effect, he even stopped
mid-way to pour himself a large scotch (at noon, no less).
Anastassiades's ability to encourage AKEL and Christofias to
adopt a bolder approach appears extremely limited, however,
absent a change of heart on the part of the President's
erstwhile, nationalist "allies" EDEK and DIKO -- or major
stiffening of Christofias's own political backbone.
Urbancic