CYPRUS: UNFICYP CHIEF POSITIVELY GRADES SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000306

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP UN CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UNFICYP CHIEF POSITIVELY GRADES SECURITY

COUNCIL BRIEFING

REF: A. NICOSIA 301

B. NAMI CABLES

C. NICOSIA 257

D. EMBASSY-EUR/SE-USUN EMAIL OF 5/4/09

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Readouts of UN Special Adviser Alexander
Downer's April 30 briefing of the Security Council and of the
May 5 meeting of Cypriot leaders Demetris Christofias and
Mehmet Ali Talat dominated the Ambassador's May 6 tour
d'horizon with UNFICYP chief Taye-Brook Zerihoun. The
Council had welcomed Downer's report on his Good Offices
mission, Zerihoun reported, which presented a cautiously
optimistic picture of progress achieved so far in the
negotiations. UNFICYP would offer a more detailed accounting
of the settlement talks in its regular report, whose
submission had been advanced to mid-May so as not to fall
during the Turkish UNSC presidency. While the report would
cite prior instructions from the Security Council to keep
UNFICYP's size and structure in line with developments on the
ground, it would not send a "stronger message" on the mandate
so as not to alarm Greek Cypriots during this key phase of
negotiations. Positive atmospherics and continued
determination to remain at the table had characterized the
latest leaders meeting, Zerihoun stated, a welcome
development in the highly-charged aftermath of the April 28
Orams verdict from the European Court of Justice. The
UNFICYP leader discredited recent claims by the G/C
negotiator that the proposed opening of the Limnitis Buffer
Zone crossing was unrelated to a UN-proposed plan that
envisaged Greek Cypriots providing electricity to the Turkish
Cypriot military enclave in Kokkina. Progress on Limnitis
and other CBMs remained slow in coming, due mainly to G/C
fears of "upgrading the TRNC." On a positive note, Turkish
and Turkish Cypriot military forces have softened
restrictions on UNFICYP movement in the north. END SUMMARY.

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Secretariat, P-5 Praise Good Offices Effort
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2. (C) Mention of "cautious optimism" and "slow and steady
progress" featured in each of Downer's New York briefings,
Zerihoun offered. While difficult issues remained, the
Australian envoy had explained that the Cypriot leaders "were
up to the task." He had been careful not to push the
Secretariat or Security Council for fixed negotiations
timetables, considering them a distraction to the leaders and
their constituencies and ultimately counterproductive. That
said, Downer had acknowledged that political "milestones"
existed that would affect both the pace and substance of the
talks, from the November/December Turkish EU accession review
to T/C "presidential" elections in April 2010. Zerihoun
mentioned that Greek Cypriots continued to balk at
"asphyxiating timetables," but even they recognized that
talks could not continue forever.


3. (C) Downer's presentations had gone over well with all
involved, including the U.S. PermRep, Zerihoun gauged. While
Zerihoun approved of the final text, he was frustrated with
Turkey's attempts to alter its language in the deliberations
period. Even after its passage, the GoT PermRep had told him
Turkey considered the text unbalanced, but had decided to
support it in order to strengthen Downer's hand in the
negotiations.

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Reporting Plan Stipulates Second Good Offices Brief
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4. (C) Not having cleared the content of his UNSC briefing
with the sides, Downer had felt compelled to stick with
generalities, and the Council posed few questions in
response. The Good Offices mission would have a second
chance to inform the international community of its progress
in the upcoming UNFICYP report. Zerihoun confirmed the
report would be delivered to the Secretariat for clearances
earlier than normal (his assistant later told us he intended
to transmit the first draft on May 6). Council consideration
of the UNFICYP product, as well as deliberations over the
UNSCR to roll over the mission's mandate, would occur
on/about May 22 -- during the Russian Council presidency, at
the behest of both Cyprus and Turkey. The effective date for
the roll-over would remain as before, however: June 16.


5. (C) Downer planned to present a follow-up Good Offices
oral briefing to the Council in September, timing it to

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coincide with the anniversary of this round of Cyprus
negotiations (September 3). Zerihoun hoped that by then, the
sides would have completed the first pass through the core
issues, made progress in bridging differences, and generally
passed a "point of no return" in the process.

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Reviewing Mandate and Force Structure a Constant
-------------- ---


6. (C) The Ambassador queried whether Downer sought a purely
technical rollover or wished to send a message with the
language that the status quo -- including UNFICYP's continued
presence on the island, in its current guise -- was untenable
long-term. Zerihoun reacted somewhat defensively, lending
credence to rumors that he and Downer differ on this point.
The UN Secretary General had standing orders, most recently
codified in a 2005 UNSCR, to review UNFICYP's mandate and
force structure "in consultation with the parties, and based
on observations from the field." That said, Zerihoun
contended it was dangerous to craft direct links between the
Good Offices mission observations and the status of the
peacekeeping force. The fact that negotiations were
proceeding apace did not relieve UNFICYP of its three-pillar
mandate to prevent a recurrence of conflict, return the
Buffer Zone to productive use, and foster a positive
environment for settlement discussions. An abrupt withdrawal
of the blue helmets conceivably could trigger a collapse in
all three pillars, he thought. Further, DPKO planners in New
York were actually deliberating a possible UNFICYP plus-up in
the event of a settlement, in hopes of providing stability
during the key transition period.


7. (C) Greek Cypriots would react negatively to changes in
UNFICYP's force structure and/or mandate, Zerihoun reckoned.
They would argue, rightly or wrongly, that the massive
presence of Turkish troops on the island was the overriding
reason for UNFICYP's presence; unless the Turks pulled out,
the UN should stay. At some future point, Zerihoun could
envision a drastically-reduced UN presence on Cyprus and/or a
change to a military observer mission. In his upcoming
report to the Council, he intended to parrot language from
UNSCR 1642 (December 2005) that instructed the Secretary
General to continue to assess mission requirements and report
back to the Council with "recommendations as appropriate for
further adjustments to UNFICYP's mandate, force levels, and
concept of operations." Such a tack should not spook the
G/Cs much, he thought.

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T/C Tempers Cooler in Latest Leaders Meeting
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8. (C) Zerihoun had yet to receive a complete readout of the
leaders' May 5 meeting, which, unlike most earlier
gatherings, occurred without UN staff at the table. He
understood the atmosphere in the room was less tense than
expected, however, and agreed with the Ambassador that T/C
fury over the April 28 Orams verdict (Refs A, B) was
diminishing. As reported in the press, Talat had sought
Christofias's buy-in for a joint statement assuring that only
a political settlement (and not a legal one like Orams) could
resolve the complex property issue comprehensively. The
Greek Cypriot leader had refused, citing his own domestic
audience. Christofias was cognizant, however, that the
Orams-related damage done to the T/C side could ricochet
against Greek Cypriots and the settlement process if it led
to hard-liner new "TRNC PM" Dervis Eroglu winning the
"presidency" in 2010. Christofias also had agreed on May 5
to a more robust negotiating schedule, at least in the
short-term. Before the next leaders meeting (May 14),which
Zerihoun hoped UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer would
attend, negotiators George Iacovou and Ozdil Nami would meet
at least three times to tackle economic issues.


9. (C) Despite the positive atmospherics on May 5, Turkish
Cypriots continued to display a near-complete lack of trust
in their G/C counterparts, Zerihoun lamented. Their fear of
eventual absorption by the more-numerous G/Cs continued to
dictate their negotiating positions, which often stipulated a
need for formal agreements, EU Acquis derogations, or MOUs
between the communities on various negotiating topics. If
anything, the recent Orams verdict and T/Cs' resultant
heartburn that G/Cs were prepared to challenge elements of
the solution in international courts would create even deeper
suspicions.

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Limnitis Opening and Kokkina Compromise Always Linked
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10. (C) The Ambassador next raised the proposed Limnitis
Buffer Zone crossing, noting incredulously that G/C
negotiator Iacovou two days earlier had insisted that the
crossing's opening and a UN-brokered compromise on
electricity for the Kokkina military enclave were not linked
(Ref D). Christofias had offered the electrical hook-up to
the T/Cs as an unrelated "humanitarian gesture," Iacovou had
explained, that was currently under debate in the RoC
National Council (NC). Zerihoun believed that Christofias
had accepted the Limnitis-Kokkina arrangement in principle,
but for domestic political reasons could not allow it to be
portrayed as quid-pro-quo or another G/C concession. In the
UN's eyes, the two had always been linked. Further, the
Greek Cypriot leader -- whose political courage Zerihoun
continued to question -- likely wanted to absolve himself of
responsibility for the decision by punting it to the NC.

-------------- --
CBMs Still Stalled, Recognition Issues to Blame
-------------- --


11. (C) Despite a gaudy public announcement three weeks
earlier, Zerihoun admitted that progress was scant on
implementation of other confidence-building measures that
were first envisioned in July/August 2008. Ambulances had
not begun to transit the Green Line unencumbered; G/Cs
ambulance owners were refusing to obtain T/C insurance to
travel north, and the RoC was insisting that not only
ambulance drivers but EMTs as well be "true Turkish Cypriots"
(and not mainland "settlers.") Zerihoun considered these
explanations window-dressing, however, with the actual
hold-up stemming from G/C fears that the RoC could not
implement CBMs without engaging "official" T/Cs, which they
considered tantamount to recognizing the "TRNC."

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Building Support for Solution Requires Grass Roots Feeding
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12. (C) Zerihoun next raised a pet project, which he
admitted remained a work-in-progress: improving Greek
Cypriots' perception of Ankara and Turks in general. G/Cs
viewed Turkey as the source of all evil in Cyprus, he
explained; without greater trust between the two peoples,
long-term success of any settlement looked doomed. Zerihoun
sought to establish a type of "Track II" diplomacy on the
island, perhaps as an offshoot of the bi-communal (T/C and
G/C) programming the UN and others in the international
community conducted. These programs held "psychological
value," he explained, and had delivered positive results in
other conflict zones where he had served, such as Rwanda and
Mozambique. Acknowledging the Ambassador's concern that
efforts to bring Turks and G/Cs together should not bypass
Turkish Cypriots -- a deeply-held T/C fear, since G/Cs openly
claim their true interlocutor on many elements of the CyProb
is Ankara -- Zerihoun agreed that the campaign would require
judicious stewardship so as not to become counter-productive.

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Turkish Restrictions on UNFICYP Movement Diminish
-------------- --------------


13. (C) Turkish Army and Turkish Cypriot Security Forces
restrictions over UNFICYP movement in the north had become so
problematic (Ref C) that Zerihoun sought New York's
assistance, he confided, with the UN Political Undersecretary
subsequently summoning the Turkish PermRep for discussions;
news of the meeting had reached the north and had angered
Turks and T/Cs alike. T/C negotiator and Talat confidant
Nami recently had assured Zerihoun that "matters are now
resolved," and UNFICYP had noticed an improvement in their
freedom of movement. Zerihoun worried, however, that the
local Turkish commander had ordered more lenient treatment
solely to obtain more favorable mention in the upcoming
UNFICYP report. An account would be made of the numerous
restrictions, the UN diplomat assured, although the report's
observations section might take note of the recently-improved
climate.
Urbancic