CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER SHAKEN BY ECJ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000301

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER SHAKEN BY ECJ
DECISION

REF: A. 08 NICOSIA 985

B. MACRIS-NETOS APRIL 28 E-MAIL

C. PANICO-FITZPATRICK APRIL 30 E-MAIL

D. MONTREAL 128

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(
d)


1. (C) Summary: "The European Court of Justice (ECJ) broke
our hands and legs with the Orams decision," Turkish Cypriot
leader Mehmet Ali Talat told the Ambassador on May 4. A
demoralized Talat complained that the April 28 ECJ ruling
(Ref B) had strengthened the Greek Cypriot (G/C) negotiating
position that the original, legal owner has the ultimate
right to enjoy the property as he chooses. Talat argued that
the decision blindly had ignored the need to find a political
solution at the negotiating table, not in the courts. He
feared that Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias would
now be loath to make concessions on his position on property,
fearing a backlash from his own populace and fractious
government. The T/C leader confided to the Ambassador that
he was still evaluating his next steps, but warned he could
not continue with the negotiations "as if nothing had
happened." The Ambassador urged Talat to stay engaged,
adding it would be a huge mistake not to continue with the
present UN-brokered talks. He also told Talat that he would
urge the Greek Cypriots to redouble their efforts to find a
political, not legal, solution to the property question. End
Summary.

"EU threw a bomb in the negotiating room"
--------------


2. (C) In the aftermath of the landmark Orams decision, the
Ambassador met Talat to gauge the T/C leader's bearing and
ping him on next steps. A downbeat Talat allowed that the
long-feared April 28 ECJ ruling was "very damaging." Its
provision effectively allowing thousands of Greek Cypriot
property owners to seize the non-Cyprus-based assets of EU
citizens who own property in the north with "TRNC" title
deeds had strengthened the G/C negotiating position on
property, which calls for the original owners to use the
property as they see fit. The ruling would undermine the
fundamental Turkish Cypriot (T/C) demand for a mixed property
regime (return, exchange, and compensation) crucial to
prevent the numerically smaller Turkish Cypriot community
from being swamped by a flood of Greek Cypriot returnees.
Talat also predicted that the UK High Court -- which still
must issue a decision, based partially on the ECJ input --
would ultimately rule in favor of the Greek Cypriot plaintiff
Apostolides, although he hoped it might postpone the decision.


3. (C) The T/C leader expressed anger that EU member states
showed little concern for the political repercussions the
case would have on the negotiations. Further, the ECJ had
ignored the intervention of the European Commission, which
had tried to highlight the political fallout to the peace
process a solely law-based decision might generate. The EU,
Talat griped, "had thrown a bomb in the negotiating room."
He also expressed anger at the British government over the
process that had led to the Orams verdict -- despite
high-ranking UK officials, including the High Commissioner in
Nicosia, having announced that the Cyprus problem could only
be solved through the present negotiating process.

"ECJ will make Christofias even more intransigent on property"
-------------- --------------


4. (C) The ECJ decision, Talat said, would make Christofias
"even more intransigent." He feared the G/C leader would not
be able to show the flexibility needed to hammer out a
property regime acceptable to T/Cs, i.e., one that contained
a mix of return, exchange, and compensation. Talat said that
Christofias and his team were already gloating that the
rights of the original property owner had been vindicated.
Hereafter, the G/Cs would simply table proposals in line with
the Orams ruling.

"I can't continue to negotiatie as if nothing has changed."
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Talat told the Ambassador he was still evaluating his
next steps in light of the ruling, although he repeatedly
acknowledged that negotiations were the only manner of
reuniting the divided island. He bluntly stated he could not
continue as if nothing had happened, however. Talat said he
had spoken by telephone with UNSG Special Adviser Alexander
Downer, who is away the island until May 18. Downer had
expressed sympathy and, according to Talat, understood the
damage done to the process by Orams. (Note: T/C lead
negotiator Ozdil Nami canceled an April 30 meeting with his
G/C counterpart George Iacovou, claiming that the Turkish
Cypriots needed to develop a new policy post-Orams. Talat
and Christofias did meet on May 5, but instead of discussing
economic issues as planned, they focused on the repercussions
of the Orams case and on an overview of the work done so far
in their talks. Septel will report Nami's readout of the May
5 leaders meeting.)


6. (C) Turning to domestic politics, Talat said the five
political parties represented in the T/C "parliament" were
"suspect" regarding the negotiations. Right-wing parties
such as UBP (currently forming a "government") wanted to
suspend or end the present process entirely. While the left
wanted to continue, all had lost faith in the negotiations.

"Keep Moving Forward!"
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged the setback the Turkish
Cypriots had suffered but underscored the U.S. belief that
the negotiating process must continue; he urged Talat to
"keep moving forward." The Ambassador promised Talat that he
would deliver the same message to the Greek Cypriots and
would urge the UN and the UK to do the same. Talat
acknowledged the fundamental need for negotiations, but would
not comment on his immediate strategy.


8. (C) The Ambassador took advantage of the call to press
Talat on a civil aviation matter that potentially threatens
the safety of American citizens, raising the International
Civil Aviation Organization's recent recommendation (Ref D)
to establish a communications link between Larnaca and Ercan
Airports' air traffic control centers in hopes of preventing
cross-chatter and reducing the possibility of mid-air
collisions. Talat was skeptical of the compromise plan. He
claimed that the proposed routing of communications via
Eurocontrol and Ankara would effectively imply that northern
Cyprus was a "province" of Turkey.


9. (C) Comment: While Talat is clearly demoralized, we do
not think he will leave the talks given a dearth of other
positive options (our May 5 meeting with Nami bears this
out.) Given that Ankara supports the present round of
negotiations, Talat likely will take no action more drastic
than a tactical protest maneuver, largely to calm his own
public. We cannot discount the T/C leader's fear, however,
that the Orams decision has limited Christofias's flexibility
to deal on property; G/C hard-liners will protest loudly
against any regime that radically differs from the precedent
suggested by the ECJ ruling.
Urbancic