Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NICOSIA28
2009-01-21 04:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

CYPRUS: UN ENVOY CRITIQUES SETTLEMENT TALKS

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1040
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0028/01 0210459
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 210459Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9499
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1309
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000028 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UN ENVOY CRITIQUES SETTLEMENT TALKS

REF: NICOSIA 7

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000028

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UN ENVOY CRITIQUES SETTLEMENT TALKS

REF: NICOSIA 7

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a spirited and friendly exchange of
views, UN Special Envoy Alexander Downer on January 14 told
visiting EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza that
Cypriot leaders Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat had
made measurable progress in settlement discussions, although
they had not made a major breakthrough. Downer believed the
talks were picking up momentum, with Talat needing to
demonstrate progress by April,s "parliamentary" elections
and a settlement by "presidential" elections in spring 2010.
Christofias, as well, would need to secure a settlement, or
risk losing the support that had won him the presidency. The
Governance chapter had proven more difficult than expected,
Downer conceded, which he attributed to the sides' unhelpful
practice of splitting hairs on semantics. Looking forward,
the UN envoy considered the Property discussion a tough nut,
but Territory reasonably straightforward; movement on both
could be affected by Talat's political troubles, however.
The Annan Plan remained a useful benchmark for the UN team,
although it could never become a basis for the negotiations
because of continued G/C heartburn toward it. Downer
reported considerable movement on the possible opening of a
Buffer Zone crossing at Limnitis, and thought a deal on
improving the Ledra Street crossing would follow thereafter.
As to how the U.S. might best spur the process, he thought a
push in Ankara, especially via military-to-military contacts,
the best avenue. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Reasonably Pleased, Guardedly Optimistic
--------------


2. (C) At an Ambassador-hosted lunch in honor of visiting
DAS Bryza and attended by the local UN brain trust, Special
Envoy Alexander Downer recounted progress earned since the
September 3 start of full-fledged Cyprus negotiations and the
challenges that lay ahead. While neither the leaders nor the
United Nations were chilling champagne, they had reached
convergence on a number of sub-chapters of the Governance
topic, and relations between Talat, Christofias, and their

negotiators remained constructive. Downer had worked closely
with the leaders on their reasonably positive year-end
declaration -- "although I wouldn't have written it exactly
that way," he clarified. UNFICYP SRSG Taye-Brook Zerihoun
had taken a similar approach on a recent post-meeting
statement extolling progress on "hierarchy of laws" and
"harmonization and cooperation between the federal government
and constituent states," (Reftel),aiming to improve
atmospherics and preserve momentum. Both men therefore were
troubled by Christofias's recent public assertions that the
sides had made few advances. "Perhaps he's playing to the
hard-liners to prove he won't sell out Greek Cypriots,"
Downer surmised, although he thought little of the tactic.


3. (C) Governance had proven tough. Christofias and Talat
had spent many hours debating what Downer termed CyProb
semantics -- the existence on the island of peoples (with the
right of self-determination) or communities (without),the
origin of sovereignty, the meaning of "constituent state,"
and whether the T/Cs were isolated or only felt that way. To
the blunt-spoken Australian Downer, this was time wasted. As
to positives, a recent G/C paper on breaking deadlocks in the
legislative and judicial branches looked promising, and he
hoped the Turkish Cypriots would respond positively at the
next scheduled meeting. (Note: Media on January 16 reported
progress on this matter).


4. (C) Unquestionably, the sides would have inked greater
advances had they utilized the Annan Plan as a starting
point, Downer alleged. Continuing G/C demonization of the
Plan made that "concession" unthinkable, however. The UN
envoy's impressions of the 2004 work were mixed. Any new
plan must be shorter, simpler, and sell-able to the masses.
"There's no earthly reason for us trying to reach agreement
on the words to the national anthem," for example.

--------------
Subjects Don't Get Easier
--------------


5. (C) Negotiators would conclude Governance deliberations
shortly and move to Property. "Property looks extremely
hard," Downer admitted -- far more difficult than during the
Annan Plan era, owing to development in the north. Talat's
brewing political troubles threatened progress, he thought.
Downer thought Talat's CTP would lose seats in the April 19

NICOSIA 00000028 002.3 OF 002


"parliamentary" elections owing the rapidly failing T/C
economy and widespread public belief that the "government"
was at fault. The T/C leader likely needed tangible,
sell-able negotiations "victories" to improve the party's
chances. It was for this very reason that Christofias's "no
advances" remarks were harmful.


6. (C) As the UN understood, Talat currently enjoyed
"fast-track" negotiations authorities. A
"government/parliament" controlled by the nationalist UBP
could revoke such privileges, however, complicating the T/C
leader's life immensely. Further, "parliamentary" approval
was required of all referenda in the "TRNC" -- and the
settlement would require a rank-and-file vote. All told,
while a CTP loss did not spell automatic derailment of the
Cyprus negotiations, Downer concluded, it would represent a
detour.

--------------
How Can We Help? "With Turkey," Of Course
--------------


7. (C) Washington's greatest contribution to settlement
talks lay in squeezing greater flexibility from the Turks,
Downer offered. He acknowledged the limits of U.S. influence
in Ankara, but noted that no country nor the UN had the same
access. Military-to-military contacts seemed the most
productive, especially since Turkish General Staff buy-in was
imperative for security- and troop withdrawal-related
elements of any arrangements. Downer praised notorious
hard-liner Ertugul Apakan, the GoT's point-man on Cyprus,
whom he called a straight-shooter. When Apakan insisted that
Talat had free rein to negotiate constitutional matters --
and that continuing the Treaty of Guarantee was Ankara's only
red line -- Downer had believed him. UNFICYP Chief of Staff
Gerard Hughes was less sanguine over the possibility of
anyone influencing the Turkish generals. Bryza outlined the
limited nature of U.S. leverage over Ankara, noting U.S.
influence derived more from a long-term collaborative
relationship than pressure. American goodwill in Turkey had
improved since the beginning of enhanced PKK-related intel
sharing, Bryza agreed, but this was an asset to be expended
sparingly. He noted that Ankara seemed to have afforded
Talat considerable negotiating space; the Turkish military's
red lines seemed to be unyielding insistence on maintaining
the Treaty of Guarantee and a Turkish presence on the island.


--------------
Better News on CBMs
--------------


8. (C) Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) like opening the
Limnitis BZ crossing were secondary settlement matters,
Downer argued. Nonetheless, the Turkish Cypriots' refusal to
temporarily open Limnitis to northbound church worshippers in
September and continued inability to reach agreement on its
eventual establishment had cast a pall on the process.
"(Chief G/C negotiator George) Iacovou felt betrayed, and has
held up progress on other CBMs since," the UN envoy revealed.
Negotiators had made progress in recent weeks, however, and
the remaining sticking point surrounded deliveries of
supplies through Limnitis to the T/C military envoy of
Kokkina. Greek Cypriots seemingly would permit food and
other consumables to pass, but were still drawing the line at
gasoline, "which could fuel weapons to use against Greek
Cypriots," Downer explained. The UN team was visiting local
Turkish forces commander LTG Zorlu immediately after the
lunch and intended to follow up.


9. (C) Divergent positions also plagued Phase II of the
Ledra Street crossing, which entailed shoring up the decrepit
buildings abutting the passage. Turkish Cypriots approved of
facade fixes and other structural work to protect
pedestrians, but opposed full restoration of the buildings, a
G/C demand. Downer thought that agreement on Limnitis would
bring movement on Ledra Phase II. Other CBMs were stalled,
however. Zerihoun blamed the impasse on the G/Cs, who were
refusing any contact with "TRNC officials." Workarounds --
identifying qualified NGOs in the north which might carry out
the work instead of the "government," primarily -- were
constrained by the paucity of qualified organizations.


10. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.
Urbancic