Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NICOSIA272
2009-04-16 14:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

CYPRUS: SCENESETTER FOR FM KYPRIANOU'S APRIL 20

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1814
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0272/01 1061401
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161401Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9798
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1432
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000272 

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: SCENESETTER FOR FM KYPRIANOU'S APRIL 20
VISIT

REF: NICOSIA 266

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000272

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: SCENESETTER FOR FM KYPRIANOU'S APRIL 20
VISIT

REF: NICOSIA 266

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Your April 20 meeting with Republic of
Cyprus Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou will demonstrate
continued high-level U.S. support for reunification
negotiations. You will want to note that the international
community has high expectations for these talks and that the
status quo on the island cannot continue. UN envoy Alexander
Downer recently argued "it is time to inject some uncertainty
in Greek Cypriots' minds that this cannot go on forever." We
ought to press Kyprianou on the RoC's unhelpful foreign
policy turns; under President Demetris Christofias, Cyprus
has sought to warm relations with Havana, Caracas, Tehran,
Moscow, and Damascus. Last, you might want to raise our
continued interest in the cargo of the M/V Monchegorsk, a
Russian-owned, Cypriot-flagged freighter carrying arms from
Iran to Syria in contravention of UN resolutions. Cyprus
eventually ordered the ship to port and confiscated the
cargo, but has yet to answer the UN Sanctions Committee's
request for details on cargo ownership. END SUMMARY.

-------------- ---
Tense Atmospherics in the Run-up to Your Meeting
-------------- ---


2. (C) You last saw Markos Kyprianou in Prague, on the
margins of the April 5 U.S.-EU summit. The Cypriot FM pushed
for increased pressure on Turkey to support the settlement
talks. A "new start in bilateral relations with the new U.S.
administration" was also on his mind, in the form of more
frequent political-level dialogue, greater U.S. support for
Christofias, more "gestures" toward the Greek Cypriot (G/C)
side, and a policy of "no surprises." Kyprianou's chief of
staff angrily cited that "no surprises" clause upon learning
you intended to receive Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali
Talat on April 15. The Ambassador sought to re-engage
Kyprianou regarding his visit before the FM's departure for
Washington, but before a meeting could be arranged, the
Minister traveled to New York for meetings with Secretary
General Ban Ki-Moon and other UN officials.


3. (C) A degree of "visit neuralgia" now grips the Greek

Cypriot community, spurring fears in this zero-sum region
that U.S. efforts to strengthen relations with Ankara somehow
downgraded our dealings with Greece and the Republic of
Cyprus. It reached fever pitch during the President's
two-day visit to Turkey, but actually began with your own
March 7 joint statement with Turkish FM Ali Babacan. Your
pull-aside with Kyprianou in Prague lowered temperatures
temporarily, but they have jumped again. You can expect
Kyprianou to voice his displeasure over the April 15 Talat
visit, perhaps even complaining about having learned about it
from the media (the truth is that the T/C leader immediately
contacted President Christofias with the news, before anyone
released it publicly.)

-------------- --------------
Relations with Cyprus: "The Problem," and a Whole Lot More
-------------- --------------


4. (C) During his 30-minute call on you April 20, Kyprianou
will want to focus on efforts to resolve the Cyprus question.
We are supporting the talks from the sidelines, urging
flexibility from the parties plus Turkey and Greece,
coordinating messages with our P-5 partners both locally and
in New York, discreetly funding substantive experts advising
the UN team, and promoting enactment of confidence-building
measures to improve the negotiating climate.


5. (C) President Christofias is invested heavily in getting
a deal -- some say he has staked his legacy on it. History
shows, however, that G/C leaders lose little electorally by
taking hard lines in the talks. Christofias will not walk
away from the table; the risk is that the talks could die
slowly, with G/Cs citing Turkish and T/C "intransigence" as
the cause. To counter this, UN envoy Downer has adopted an
"inject some uncertainty" stance, publicly underlining the
negative outcomes for both sides if pro-solution leaders
Christofias and Talat do not reach agreement. Such
consequences could include changes to the UN Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) mandate or force level. We should support Downer
in this campaign by underscoring to Kyprianou and other G/C
leaders that now is the time to do a deal. Hard compromises
will be required from both sides, and the leaders have a
special responsibility to educate and lobby their respective
rank-and-file to support the process and an eventual deal.


6. (C) A caveat is in order. Negotiations to resolve the
Cyprus Problem take place in a community-to-community
framework, with the Republic of Cyprus president representing
Greek Cypriots and, since the 1983 declaration of the
"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," the "TRNC president"
representing Turkish Cypriots. As such, the RoC FM does not
take active part in the bi-communal discussions. Even so,
Kyprianou has influence, and he attempts to shape debate in
meetings of the Council of Ministers, formally the RoC
executive branch's highest deliberative body. In Brussels
and with fellow EU foreign ministers, he constantly lobbies
for tougher European positions vis-a-vis Ankara. In Cypriot
eyes -- and amongst many Europeans hostile to Ankara joining
the Union -- Turkish EU accession is dependent on moves to
normalize Turkey-Cyprus relations. Here Kyprianou has taken
a strong stance against the opening of further Acquis
negotiating chapters until Turkey extends its Customs Union
agreement to Nicosia, opens its ports and airports to Cypriot
craft, and drops its opposition to Cypriot membership in
international organizations of which Ankara is already a
member.

--------------
A Ledger That's Unfortunately Tilting Red
--------------


7. (C) In regional and multilateral fora, there are
positives to report. Just three days ago, President
Christofias personally approved our request for landing
privileges for the aircraft carrying the lone surviving
Somali gunman from the Maersk Alabama hijacking. He voiced a
commitment to work with the U.S. and others to fight seaborne
piracy. The government in March ordered the deportation to
Greece of a terrorist wanted by Turkey, fully aware that
Ankara would seek extradition from Athens. Both are worthy
of your mention to Kyprianou.


8. (C) Our desire for a better relationship with Cyprus is
firm. Since Christofias's election in February 2008,
however, we have witnessed an ideologically-motivated attempt
to turn back the clock to the heydays of the Non-Aligned
Movement. He has publicly praised Fidel Castro, welcomed a
new Venezuelan Embassy in Nicosia, lauded Iran, and vilified
NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Christofias's
commitment to Russian President Dimitri Medvedev to promote
the latter's European security proposal within the EU seems
gratuitous, and his outreach to Hugo Chavez and Venezuela
strikes us as an intentional move to distance his government
from the United States. While the questionable policy shift
is the president's making, you should call Kyprianou on it,
urging him to use the new and/or upgraded relations with
rogue states to demand better behavior and improvements in
their abysmal human rights records.


9. (C) Cyprus's new direction under Christofias has made
final resolution of the M/V Monchegorsk incident problematic.
Acting on reliable information, U.S. naval forces in January
boarded the Russian-owned, Cypriot-flagged Monchegorsk,
finding cargo and documents indicating it was carrying arms
from Iran to Syria in contravention of UN resolutions. Only
a full-court international press from the UN Security Council
and EU convinced Cyprus to summon the vessel to port for a
more-thorough inspection and eventual seizure of the cargo.
Subsequent RoC cooperation with the UN's Iran Sanctions
Committee (ISC) has been half-hearted; we therefore recommend
that you question Kyprianou regarding the UN request for
Cyprus to share information on cargo ownership.

--------------
What's Topping His To-Do List?
--------------


10. (C) Upon departing for the United States on April 15,
the Cypriot Foreign Minister repeated his mantra that the
U.S. Government should pressure Turkey regarding a Cyprus
settlement. Kyprianou has not specified what he would have
us press Ankara to do, however. Our view, shared by the UN's
Downer, is that Turkey mainly is observing the talks at this
point, not directing them. You might push Kyprianou for
concrete actions the international community might take with
Ankara to spur greater Cyprus Problem movement.


11. (C) He will get specific on two closely-related matters,
however. Part and parcel of its non-recognition of the
Republic of Cyprus, Ankara regularly opposes Cypriot
membership in international bodies in which the GoT already
sits, from the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) to the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Of greatest recent interest to
Nicosia has been a spot in the Contact Group on Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS),since Cyprus maintains the
world's eleventh-largest merchant fleet. Both in Washington
and on the island, Cyprus has sought our support in its bid
to join, and Kyprianou may push as well; our general policy
is to support Cypriot membership in entities that are global
and inclusive in nature. Turkey, which has contributed a
ship and helicopter, opposes Cypriot participation in the
CGPCS unless all UN states are admitted. The FM may also
raise Turkish naval vessels' recent harassment of
Cypriot-contracted research vessels conducting natural gas
and petroleum exploration off the island's southern coast.
The RoC has responded by blocking the opening of the EU
Acquis energy chapter in Brussels. We have been urging
moderation and restraint on both sides.

--------------
Who He Is
--------------


12. (C) Son of former Republic of Cyprus President Spyros
Kyprianou, the Cypriot FM was educated at all the right
schools, including Cambridge and Harvard, and was groomed
from an early age for politics. His name recognition here is
such that pundits refer to him only as "Markos," a la Elvis
or Madonna. Most Cypriots believe he will eventually become
president, and both AKEL (far left) and DISY (right-center)
approached him in 2007 to be a joint (but formally
non-aligned) candidate to challenge then-President Tassos
Papadopoulos. Kyprianou demurred, mainly because
Papadopoulos and he belong to the same DIKO party, albeit
from different factions. Once Papadopoulos failed to advance
to the second round of elections in February 2008, AKEL's
Christofias sought and obtained DIKO's support, acceding to
the latter party's demand to name Kyprianou foreign minister
if he emerged victorious. Christofias won the race and
brought the DIKO man into his cabinet.


13. (C) The relationship between the Cypriot president and
his FM is icy by all accounts. Their Cyprus Problem
philosophies are miles apart, for example, with Kyprianou
much more the hard-liner. Personally, the small-townish,
USSR-educated, and far-from-eloquent Christofias feels a bit
diminutive next to his aristocratic minister. The president
has responded by isolating Kyprianou from the talks and
minimizing his influence by seeking greater powers for the
Presidential Diplomatic Office, staffed by more trusted
confidants. On the Monchegorsk incident and dealings with
Syria, as well as on relations with Havana and Caracas, it is
clear that the Christofias Palace, not the Kyprianou MFA, is
clearly at the helm.
Urbancic