CYPRUS: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S APRIL 15

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000266

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S APRIL 15
MEETING WITH TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER MEHMET ALI TALAT

REF: A. NICOSIA 186

B. NICOSIA 199

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1
.4(b) and 1.4(d).


1. (C) Summary: Your April 15 meeting with the leader of the
Turkish Cypriot (T/C) community, Mehmet Ali Talat, is an
opportunity to unambiguously register U.S. support for
current efforts to re-unify Cyprus. This is a time of
extreme crisis for T/C pro-solution forces, of which Talat is
the undisputed leader. The slow pace of UN-brokered
negotiations has left the secular, moderate Talat and his
Republican Turkish Party (CTP) "government" open to attacks
from anti-solution nationalists, who appear poised to triumph
in April 19 "parliamentary" elections. Talat, who would
still remain the T/C leader and main negotiator until
"presidential" elections in April 2010, fears a stormy
cohabitation and hard-line pressure at the negotiating table
should anti-solution right-wingers take control of the T/C
"parliament." End Summary.

--------------
Pushing a Pro-Solution Agenda
--------------


2. (C) Since coming to power in December 2003, Talat and the
center-left CTP "government" have been the driving Turkish
Cypriot force to reunify the island under UN auspices as a
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. He has taken forceful
steps to purge the education system of ethnic (anti-Greek
Cypriot) bias, improve conditions for the 300-odd Greek
Cypriots (G/Cs) remaining in the north, and repair endangered
cultural heritage sites, mostly Greek Orthodox churches.
Talat even hopes to engage Archbishop of America Demetrios
and other prominent Hellenic-Americans during this visit. At
home, however, he faces growing indifference and even support
for a two-state solution among his fellow Turkish Cypriots,
thanks mainly to the 2004 G/C rejection of the Annan Plan and
rising disappointment with the lack of European Union and
United States efforts to end T/C "isolation."


3. (C) Nevertheless, Talat still has a clear vision of a T/C
future in a new, reunified federal Cyprus, wherein Turkish
Cypriots have an effective voice in central decision making
and control over local affairs in a T/C constituent state.
He recently announced he would step down as T/C leader in
2010 if "his mission" to reunite the island failed. Talat
believes in a Turkish Cypriot identity unique from Turkey.
For him and most pro-solution Turkish Cypriots, being
integrated into Turkey -- either by the in-migration of Turks
or through de facto or de jure annexation -- is only slightly
less palatable then being dominated by Greek Cypriots, his
ultimate fear.


4. (C) Talat largely views his meeting with you as U.S.
re-affirmation for his pro-solution outlook and efforts.
Although disappointed that the strong T/C Annan Plan "yes"
vote (65 percent) in 2004 did not deliver greater USG
"rewards," such as direct air connections, Talat and the
Turkish Cypriots consider the United States the only fair
broker among the P-5. They were heartened by your recent
statements in Ankara regarding Turkish Cypriot isolation and
by your willingness to meet the T/C leader, as Secretaries
Powell and Rice had done previously. T/Cs' mistrust many
other international actors. They are largely frustrated with
the EU and UN. In their eyes, the EU is unduly maniplated by
the G/Cs, who sit as sole representatives of the Republic of
Cyprus; Brussels has proven unable to deliver on promises to
ameliorate T/C isolation -- for example, by extending direct
trade privileges to Turkish Cypriots -- because Greek
Cypriots regularly exercise a veto on matters requiring EU
member-state consensus.


5. (C) Talat, who met with both of your immediate
predecessors (in 2004 and 2005),is likely to raise the
following during your meeting:

-- the hope that the U.S. appoint a special Cyprus Envoy;

-- the imperative of accelerating the on-going settlement
effort through greater involvement of the UN and the
international community;

NICOSIA 00000266 002 OF 003



-- the benefits of increased engagement with T/Cs, which
would cause G/Cs to become less intransigent;

-- the need to end Turkish Cypriot isolation; and

-- a comment from the U.S. to use the Annan Plan or "UN body
of work" as the basis of future negotiations and as the
starting point for the proposed U.S. special envoy.

He will also refute Greek Cypriot calls for greater pressure
on Ankara, claiming (largely correctly, we believe) that
presently he is "his own man" in the negotiations. We
recommend you commend Talat's pro-settlement efforts to date,
especially his moderate public discourse and efforts to
achieve ethnic harmony, and then focus the discussion on the
continued need for flexibility and compromise from both Greek
and Turkish Cypriots.

--------------
US Special Envoy Indispensable, He Thinks
--------------


6. (C) Talat believes that the appointment of a U.S. Cyprus
envoy is crucial. He also knows that the Greek Cypriots
oppose such a move, as does UN Special Envoy Alexander
Downer. Talat nonetheless considers that, absent foreign
envoys' contributions during the Annan process, the sides
never would have reached the referendum stage; the same holds
true today, he argues. While Talat accepted the G/C push for
more limited foreign involvement in the present negotiations,
he is convinced that, given the entrenched positions and
bitter histories of both sides, it will be impossible to ink
a deal without a push from outside actors. Talat reckons the
most opportune time for a U.S. appointment would be after two
complete readings of all the negotiating topics, which he
expects by September. In his view, the U.S. envoy might then
contribute to the give-and-take, crucial to reaching a final
agreement by late 2009 / early 2010.

-------------- --------------
Need to Speed Up the Process Through Greater UN Involvement
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Talat feels the current negotiations are too slow and
will push you for a greater UN and international community
role in facilitating them. He initially thought the sides
could conclude a deal by December and then put it to their
respective populations in simultaneous referenda, but to date
they have covered only half of the core topics. Talat
laments that UN envoy Downer is "just watching" and not
playing a sufficiently active role, attributing his
reluctance to G/C pressure. While Downer is slowly turning
up the heat, for example by bringing in foreign experts to
draft "food for thought" papers, the present UN profile is
far lower than during the 2002-2004 Annan period. The G/Cs,
on the other hand, are happy with the current pace and level
of UN and IC involvement and will actively resist changes.

--------------
Greek Cypriots Don't Need a Solution
--------------


8. (C) Talat believes the Republic of Cyprus's international
recognition and EU membership insulates the Greek Cypriots
from any negative results of the possible failure of the
present negotiations. While G/C leader (and RoC President)
Demetris Christofias wants a solution, Talat argues, he has
no incentive to take risks and reach compromise, given
Christofias's default position as head of a wealthy,
recognized state. Talat fears that his G/C counterpart
secretly wants to drag things out until Turkey's EU progress
report comes due in November/December, a period when G/Cs
believe the T/C and Turkish side will be weaker and other
more pressure to make concessions. Conversely, Talat will
complain he is saddled with the disadvantages of "TRNC"
non-recognition, which include dependence on Turkey for most
basic services (telephone/internet, post, and air
connections, for example) and the inability to trade directly
with the outside world.

--------------
End Turkish Cypriot Isolation Now!

NICOSIA 00000266 003 OF 003


--------------


9. (C) Talat will argue that the only way to force Greek
Cypriots to compromise is by positive international
engagement with Turkish Cypriots that ends their G/C-imposed
isolation. He believes that his people should no longer be
punished for the division of the island, given the G/C "No"
vote in 2004 and consequent EU and U.S. promises to lift T/C
isolation. Talat may ask for increased U.S. investment --
including the establishment of branded franchises (which
would result in those franchises being excluded in the south)
-- and some mechanism to allow flights into Ercan Airport in
the north. He may also ask you to use your good offices with
the EU to lobby for implementation of the stillborn 2004
Direct Trade Regulation.

--------------
A Word on T/C - Turkish Relations
--------------


10. (C) Talat rejects Greek Cypriot claims that he is a
"puppet" of Ankara. In fact, the T/C leader has deftly
capitalized on a confluence of interests with Turkish PM
Tayyip Erdogan and the AKP government to bolster pro-solution
forces on the island and win Turkey's acceptance for his
"Turkish Cypriot" vision. At this stage in the talks Talat
is the dominant player, although he and his team are in
regular contact with Ankara. While Turkey's role will
certainly grow once issues like security guarantees and
territory are discussed, Talat apparently has succeeded for
the time being in convincing PM Erdogan not to interfere on
issues not of existential Turkish concern, such as
governance, property restitution/compensation, EU matters and
economics. Nevertheless, Talat and CTP hint that
anti-solution groups within AKP and the Turkish bureaucracy
may not share Erdogan's willingness to trust Talat. Talat
worries that these elements might grow bolder if Turkey's EU
bid is put on hold, AKP is seriously weakened at the ballot
box, or the nationalist, anti-solution Turkish Cypriot
opposition comes to power.

--------------
And on the Need for a Photo Op
--------------


11. (C) With "TRNC parliamentary" elections just one week
away -- and with Talat's CTP trailing nationalist, hard-line
UBP by a significant margin -- many in the international
community have been searching for means to buoy pro-solution
T/C forces. Talat's visit constitutes just such a tool in
our kit. For maximum electoral bounce, however, and to ward
off attacks from UBP that Talat's status in Washington has
been downgraded, the T/C leader needs to be received in
similar fashion to 2004 and 2005. While there will be no
press at your meeting, Talat is bringing a
large-by-Cypriot-standards journalist contingent. He
considers at least a shot of a handshake by the official
photographer essential (the decision not to have photos upset
Talat when we briefed him on April 13, undoubtedly because he
surmised the UBP-ers would seek to capitalize on this as a
"downgrade" of his standing.) The Embassy fully understands
the sensitivities involved, especially amongst the Greek- and
Greek Cypriot-American community. That said, allowing a
quick photo shoot would be consistent with past State
practice and go a long way towards helping Talat electorally.
Urbancic