CYPRUS: UN ENVOY SHARES REPORTING PLAN DETAILS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000257

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UN ENVOY SHARES REPORTING PLAN DETAILS

REF: NICOSIA 193

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The UN Good Offices Mission on Cyprus (UNGO)
will orally brief the Security Council on/about April 30,
Special Adviser Alexander Downer informed the Ambassador on
April 9. While the report will present a reasonably positive
account of negotiations progress so far, it also will hint
that UN peacekeeping assets are in short supply worldwide, a
warning that UNFICYP's continuing presence on the island is
not a given. Downer did not favor formal discussion of
changes to the force's mandate in the upcoming UNFICYP report
or June rollover, however, reckoning that that exercise was
better tackled in December. Reiterating his earlier opinion,
he claimed that the naming of a U.S. Cyprus Coordinator would
not contribute meaningfully to a solution and might even
derail progress in the short-term. Regarding
confidence-building measures (CBMs),the UN envoy confirmed
news that leaders Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat
would announce the implementation of two measures after their
April 10 meeting. Efforts to open the Limnitis Buffer Zone
(BZ) crossing remained stalled, however, owing mainly to G/C
negotiator George Iacovou's refusal to accept a UN-brokered
compromise. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Travel Plans Firming Up
--------------


2. (C) Between April 9 meetings with the Cypriot leaders and
dinner with the EU, UN Special Adviser on Cyprus Alexander
Downer provided the Ambassador a 75-minute readout of his
recent activities and future plans. He started by discussing
his upcoming oral report to the UN Security Council (he does
not plan to submit a written report). Downer intended to
arrive in New York on April 28 for consultations, and would
present his briefing to the Council on April 30 or May 1.
The British were handling the logistical details with the
Secretariat, he noted. Downer was still mulling details, but
he thought the report would recount UNGO developments
reasonably positively, noting the good atmospherics between
the leaders and progress inked so far but also establishing
that significant challenges remained. Deeper in the remarks
-- but aiming to send a clear message nonetheless -- would be
Downer's admonition that growing geopolitical instability
made competition fierce for UN peacekeepers. Their
deployment to Cyprus, whose conflict was anything but hot,
must be continually evaluated. He welcomed the Ambassador's
intention to collaborate with local UK High Commissioner
Peter Millett in preparing building blocks for a Council
Presidency statement that Downer hoped would follow the UNGO
presentation.

--------------
Stronger Message in December, Not June
--------------


3. (C) Turning next to UNFICYP's twice-yearly written
report, to be prepared in May and endorsed by the Security
Council in June, Downer predicted its format would hew
closely to past examples. Even with Good Offices presenting
a separate oral message to the Council, it still would
contain political observations, and he and UNFICYP chief
Taye-Brook Zerihoun would collaborate closely in its
preparation. Downer did not believe it appropriate to refer
to changes to UNFICYP's mandate and/or a more frequent
rollover in the written report and/or accompanying UNSCR that
endorsed it this time around. That discussion should occur
in the November/December iteration, when he would have
greater clarity of where the settlement process was headed.
In this go-round, the mandate discussions should instead be
informal, with a six-month technical rollover following.
Nonetheless, UN staff in the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) already had begun a white paper-type
exercise on the future of UNFICYP, Downer allowed.


4. (C) He believed it vital to keep the Russians fully
involved in the UNFICYP/UNGO discussions and as "on board" as
possible. One of the reasons the 2004 Annan Plan had failed
was Russia's feeling that the U.S. and UK had marginalized
its role; Moscow thus had been all too willing to carry the
G/Cs' water in opposing the plan in the Council. Downer
acknowledged the Russians' wont of late to echo G/C talking
points on Cyprus, meaning that convincing them to speak and
act constructively would prove difficult. The French seemed
less willing to support Greek Cypriot positions without
question, Downer offered, complimenting the even-handedness
of local French Ambassador Nicolas Galey. And Paris,

NICOSIA 00000257 002 OF 002


reportedly aiming to scale back UN PKO deployments worldwide,
might not oppose changes to UNFICYP. (Note: Our impressions
of Galey are not as favorable. At meetings of the local P-5,
he defends G/C positions almost as strongly as his Russian
counterpart.)

--------------
Still No Love for Envoy Idea
--------------


5. (C) The UN envoy remains opposed to the nomination of a
U.S. Cyprus coordinator. While the appointment might please
Turkish Cypriots, Downer explained, it would "scare the
horses" in the G/C camp and, on balance, upset the process.
He had discussed the possibility of a U.S. coordinator
nomination with AKEL Secretary General and close Christofias
confidant Andros Kyprianou that same day, and Kyprianou had
called it a bad idea. Downer also shared a second-hand
account that UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband had informed
the Secretary that Britain did not intend to name a
high-level envoy, mainly because he (Downer) had advised
against it.

--------------
Picture Not All Black on CBMs
--------------


6. (C) Details remained sketchy regarding the status of the
proposed Limnitis BZ crossing, Downer admitted. An April 8
meeting with Iacovou had shed no light, but he hoped to gain
greater clarity from his April 10 meeting with Christofias.
On the bright side, Talat had assured Downer that the Turkish
military was prepared to accept the latest UN compromise,
which involved the Greek Cypriots supplying electricity to
the nearby Turkish Cypriot military enclave at
Kokkina/Erenkoy. Interestingly, the T/C leader had viewed
favorably Christofias's reported referral of the arrangement
to the RoC National Council. Talat thought the RoC president
was attempting to put his political rivals on the spot,
daring them to oppose a deal that would allow the politically
popular crossing to open.


7. (C) G/C negotiator George Iacovou was holding up progress
on Limnitis and the other CBMs, Downer ventured. The vain
(Downer's characterization) and often cranky (ours)
septuagenarian remained upset that the Turks/TCs allegedly
had broken an earlier gentlemen's agreement to open Limnitis
without strings; seeking payback, he was erecting all types
of roadblocks on CBM progress, usually citing his oppostion
to "upgrading" the "illegal TRNC." Iacovou had relented on
allowing free ambulance passage through the BZ and on
measures to improve law enforcement cooperation between the
sides, however. Downer expected these CBMs to be announced
after the leaders' April 10 meeting. (Note: Talat told the
Ambassador on April 10 that the agreement on law enforcement
was "historic.")

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) Less than four weeks ago, Downer's private message on
the upcoming UNFICYP report and rollover resolution rang
harsher than today. "UNFICYP's continuation should
definitely be in play in the upcoming (May/June)
deliberations" he asserted to us on March 19, adding that the
international community ought to use the discussions in New
York to "inject some uncertainty" into the minds of Cypriots
(reftel). Why the more restrained view now, with the real
UNFICYP crunch time put off until December? Perhaps it is
because moves on UNFICYP, which undoubtedly would shake up
G/Cs, mostly would be met with yawns by Turkish Cypriots, who
consider the Turkish Army their true source of security on
the island. It follows, then, that the international
community should play this card only if Greek Cypriots
clearly are the intransigent party in the talks. Iacovou's
blockage of the CBMs aside, the current reality is not nearly
so black-and-white, so Downer's newfound hesitance in firing
the UNFICYP bullet strikes us as reasonable.
Urbancic