CYPRUS: UNFICYP DOWNBEAT ON CBM PROGRESS, TURKISH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000217

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UNFICYP DOWNBEAT ON CBM PROGRESS, TURKISH
RESTRICTIONS

REF: A. NICOSIA 193

B. NICOSIA 211

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer desires
continued U.S. pressure on Turkey for flexibility on Cyprus
and is pursuing a call on the National Security Adviser to
make this point. UNFICYP chief Taye-Brook Zerihoun told the
Ambassador on March 25 that Downer acknowledges Turkey's
backing of the UN settlement effort, but believes it should
be more vociferous in support of Turkish Cypriot leader
Mehmet Ali Talat's efforts. More direct, visible USG
intervention in the Cyprus settlement talks likely would harm
the negotiating climate, Zerihoun thought, due to continuing
G/C fears of Anglo-American interference. On the Limnitis
Buffer Zone (BZ) crossing, a key confidence-building measure,
the UN diplomat confirmed the G/C side was balking at the
latest UN compromise; worse, Christofias had tabled the plan
for discussion by the Republic of Cyprus's National Council,
a notoriously sieve-like and nationalistic institution.
Zerihoun did not limit his criticisms to the Greek Cypriot
side. UNFICYP personnel were facing continued restrictions
on movement and activity north of the BZ, and he was
protesting loudly both locally and in New York. END SUMMARY.

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Downer: Turkey Still Key
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2. (C) Zerihoun had sought the meeting with the Ambassador
to follow up a same-day telcon in which he mentioned UNSA
Downer's interest in calling National Security Adviser
General James Jones. He could provide few specifics
regarding the points Downer sought to raise, but surmised the
gist would entail seeking continued U.S. encouragement of
Turkey to engage productively and flexibly on Cyprus. Downer
understood that Turkish officialdom backed the UN Good
Offices mission and the settlement effort, Zerihoun
continued, "but it could always do better." Leaders such as
PM Tayyip Erdogan quite reasonably were focused on March
municipal elections, with Cyprus on the back burner. But
Erdogan and/or President Abdullah Gul ought to show more
support for the process by publicly commending the leaders'
efforts, Zerihoun reckoned. The U.S. might also play a
useful go-between role, reminding the Turkish leadership that
Europe would appreciate Ankara's intention to become "part of
the solution" on the island.


3. (C) Cyprus undoubtedly would receive mention during the
President's April 6-7 visit to Turkey, the Ambassador
assured. And the U.S. had committed to supporting Downer's
Good Offices mission wherever and however possible. He
wondered whether the Turks would find the approach
informative absent a specific action request, however. Was
there anything concrete that Downer wanted the Turks to do?
Further, Ankara did not appear to be hindering CyProb
progress at this stage, the Ambassador added.


4. (C) Picking up on Zerihoun's earlier points, the
Ambassador said that the starting point of most U.S.
discussions with Ankara was identifying ways to help get
Turkey into the European Union. This included finding a
solution to the Cyprus Problem. Trying to anticipate a
potential Turkish response to such a vague request from
POTUS, the Ambassador speculated that Turkey might respond
with a long-held but anathema-to-Downer suggestion: that the
U.S. name a Special Cyprus Coordinator to assist in the peace
process. Zerihoun fretted that such a move could derail the
talks at this point, owing to continuing G/C fears of an
Anglo-American conspiracy to impose a Cyprus solution.
Envoys would come later, he thought, based on his experiences
in other peacekeeping missions (Darfur was his last). But it
made no sense for them to deploy before the real
give-and-take commences later in the year. Zerihoun
committed to trying to obtain a better read on what Downer
wanted POTUS to raise with the Turks.

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No Light in Limnitis Tunnel
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5. (C) The Ambassador raised UN efforts to broker a
compromise to allow the Limnitis BZ crossing in NW Cyprus to
open (Ref A),providing readouts of his recent conversations
with the sides' chief representatives and our recent efforts
in Ankara. In a March 24 dinner, G/C lead negotiator George

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Iacovou stated flatly that the Greek Cypriots would not
accept the UN's latest compromise. His T/C counterpart,
Ozdil Nami, had seemed more flexible (Ref B),telling him on
March 19 that he awaited a concrete proposal from Iacovou
that stipulated G/C conditions. Last, the Ambassador shared
that Embassy Ankara colleagues had pitched the UN arrangement
on Limnitis with GoT interlocutors and had received
encouraging responses but no guarantees.


6. (C) Zerihoun confirmed the current Limnitis impasse and
speculated that Iacovou's new, hard-line stance likely
reflected President Christofias's political calculus that the
negatives of accepting Turkish/T/C preconditions outweighed
the electoral benefits of opening the crossing. Zerihoun had
heard from AKEL party leader Andros Kyprianou that
Christofias recently tabled the UN compromise for discussion
by the National Council, an RoC consultative body comprised
of representatives from all G/C political parties that
tackled Cyprus Problem matters exclusively. Hard-line
positions usually prevailed on the Council and it leaked like
a sieve, he and the Ambassador agreed; Christofias might have
put Limnitis on the agenda hoping others might kill it,
thereby absolving himself of political blame.


7. (C) UN personnel continued to work for a deal, lately
engaging the "mukhtars" (village bosses) on either side of
the crossing route in hopes they would lobby their respective
"capitals." Zerihoun questioned whether time better spent
on core negotiations was being wasted on confidence-building
measures, but concurrently worried that lack of movement on
CBMs was symptomatic of a greater problem: the sides' lack
of confidence in the process and each other. CBMs currently
were not prioritized but rather "bundled," Zerihoun
explained, with the UN directing effort to any where progress
looked possible (Limnitis was formerly in that camp.) He now
thought the prospective crossing point needed to be
"de-linked" from the other CBMs. The G/C rejection of the
Limnitis compromise also threatened progress on shoring up
dangerous buildings along the Ledra Street BZ crossing,
another point of contention between the sides. (Note: The
UN compromise on Limnitis entails Greek Cypriots linking the
T/C military enclave of Kokkina to the G/C electrical grid,
obviating the need for UN escorted fuel convoys from the
north -- once a T/C precondition for Limnitis's opening.)

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Turkish Noose Tightening Around UNFICYP
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8. (C) Zerihoun turned next to a complaint his lieutenants
have often raised: increasing Turkish restrictions over
UNFICYP's activities and movements in the north. Greek
Cypriot UN personnel -- UNFICYP treats them no differently
from other nationalities on staff -- have faced especially
strict controls, even being removed from Kyrenia while on
liberty. Turkish Forces behavior was erratic, Zerihoun
claimed, and TF leaders had assured they had enacted no new
regulations, but were only enforcing existing ones. The
situation was becoming untenable for UNFICYP operations,
however, and was resulting in further T/C "isolation," as
personnel now had limited opportunities to engage Turkish
Cypriots.


9. (C) UNFICYP Force Commander Mario Sanchez-Debernardi
intended to engage local TF commander LTG Hilmi Zorlu soonest
to protest, while PKO leadership at UN Headquarters in New
York planned to summon the Turkish permanent representative.
Zerihoun was not seeking U.S. intervention yet, but might at
some future point if he cannot break the impasse with the
Turkish Forces. Continued problems in the north will have to
be raised in UNFICYP's June report to the Security Council,
he added.

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Comment
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10. (C) The UN and Downer were correct in deciding recently
to devote additional energies to CBMs in order to generate
positive negotiating momentum. Regrettably, progress is
proving every bit as hard (or harder) to tally here as in the
core CyProb issues such as property and governance. Just
deciphering who did what when, and why, on Limnitis is
proving a full-time job (tellingly, at a March 26 lunch
French Ambassador Nicolas Galey reported that Iacovou six
days earlier had stated the G/Cs supported the current UN
compromise). Regarding Downer's interest in engaging General

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Jones, the Ambassador is attempting to contact Downer
(currently in Australia) for specifics and will report
contents of that conversation separately.
Urbancic