Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NICOSIA193
2009-03-19 09:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

CYPRUS: UN'S DOWNER REMAINS REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNC #0193/01 0780942
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 190942Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9718
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1391
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000193 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UN'S DOWNER REMAINS REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC

REF: NICOSIA-EUR/SE EMAIL OF 3/13/09

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000193

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UN'S DOWNER REMAINS REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC

REF: NICOSIA-EUR/SE EMAIL OF 3/13/09

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer remains
reasonably optimistic the Cypriot leaders can make a notional
deal by late 2009 or early 2010, although he acknowledges the
sides' substantive differences have yet to narrow much. In a
March 12 tour d'horizon with the Ambassador, Downer outlined
his new public message, evaluated progress achieved in the
governance and property chapters, and charted out future
discussions. He ventured that breakthroughs on CBMs were
forthcoming, cautioned that UNFICYP's continued presence on
Cyprus was not a given, and previewed his reporting plan for
the Security Council. Downer also stumped for greater
international support for T/C leader Talat in order to help
Talat's electoral chances, lambasted EU contributions toward
his mission, and bemoaned UN prohibitions over him using the
north's Ercan Airport. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
Downer's Current Message: Get On With the Bloody Thing
-------------- --------------


2. (C) UN Special Adviser Alexander Downer on March 12 paid
a 90-minute call on the Ambassador, raising numerous
sensitive areas of the ongoing Cyprus negotiations. Downer
stressed he was sharing the information only with the U.S.
and UK. Please protect, as Downer is extremely sensitive to
having leaks circle back to him, and likely would stop
providing us with detail if he believed we were sharing his
briefings outside USG channels.


3. (C) He began by outlining his public message regarding
the talks. In a recent visit to a Turkish Cypriot
university, he had urged students and faculty "not to blame
others for your problems, don't look to us (the UN) to solve
them, and take responsibility for your own country." The UN
had been on Cyprus for 45 years, he explained, but would not
be here forever. Downer did not believe his message would
trouble T/Cs, who enjoyed the Turkish Army's protection. But
it would disturb Greek Cypriots, who, along with Greece, paid
a third of UNIFCYP's costs and wanted the troops to remain.

"That arrangement really doesn't fit well with me," Downer
offered. (Note: In a day-later briefing to the diplomatic
corps, the UN envoy repeated his admonition over the UN's
non-permanence on Cyprus, adding that, were the blue helmets
to leave, the G/Cs would be forced to negotiate with the
Turkish Army -- to them, an unpalatable prospect.)

--------------
Latest on Property ) Still a Tough Nut
--------------


4. (C) Downer turned next to leaders Demetris Christofias
and Mehmet Ali Talat's discussions on property, which had
ended with the sides still far apart. Turkish Cypriots had
agreed that all residents enjoyed a right to property, but
insisted this right could not be allowed to dilute
bi-zonality, which was enshrined in thirty years of UN
resolutions and work. There also existed great differences
over the basis for compensation for lost land. Greek
Cypriots had wanted compensation based current value -- an
impossibility, Downer observed, given the likely worth of USD
20-30 billion. Nor was there agreement on the G/C demand
that legal persons (the Church, mainly) have the same rights
on property as natural persons. A UN-contracted expert was
currently poring through European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) cases, looking for applicable precedents.

--------------
But Some Recent Progress on Governance
--------------


5. (C) Although the leaders had ended discussions on
governance, the UN and the sides' experts remained engaged,
Downer informed. His staff was pushing two proposals to
break the impasse on the federal executive model (G/Cs want a
strong executive composed of a president and VP elected on a
joint ticket, while T/Cs favor a weak executive based on the
Swiss model, featuring a rotating presidential council.) The
UN's first option, which looked similar to the Greek Cypriot
proposal, was a compromise arrangement that entailed 20
percent of each community's voters casting ballots in the
other's election. The system was designed to answer a T/C
criticism of the G/C joint-ticket plan: that, because G/Cs
were far more numerous, they could in effect elect both their
community's representative and the T/C's. Downer thought
that Greek Cypriots likely would support the UN compromise

NICOSIA 00000193 002 OF 003


but that T/Cs would not, claiming it would hurt
nationalist/right-wing parties like UBP (as the 20 percent
from one community would certainly vote against the other's
nationalist force),who would therefore campaign against a
referendum to legitimize this arrangement.


6. (C) The UN's alternate plan envisaged a South Africa-type
structure with the bi-communal senate (with equal members
from each community) picking the chief executive. The upper
house election of the president was a feature of the current
T/C proposal, but the UN compromise would create a far
stronger executive -- the president, not the senate, would
choose the cabinet, for example -- and thus be more
acceptable to Greek Cypriots. Downer thought the G/Cs could
live with it.

-------------- --------------
Optimistic First Pass Through Issues Will Finish Soon
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Downer believed the leaders would finish their first
pass through the core Cyprus Problem chapters by early May.
Privately, Christofias and Talat had agreed to conclude EU
matters and economic issues before T/C "parliamentary"
elections on April 19. Shortly thereafter, they would tackle
the final two issues, territory and security/guarantees. On
the former, the 2004 Annan Plan must be the leaders' base
point for talks, while on the latter, the leaders likely
would make the quickest possible reading, since their
positions were so distant and because this chapter would
involve other parties (the guarantor powers) not currently at
the table.


8. (C) By late spring, they and the UN would begin "Phase
II" -- a study of areas of medium convergence that still
required bridging solutions. Downer did not expect major
format/framework changes in Phase II. &The Great Game,
begins with Phase III,8 he predicted, when Christofias and
Talat would engage in real give-and-take in an attempt to
reach a deal.

--------------
Helping Talat's Electoral Chances
--------------


9. (C) Talk of "TRNC parliamentary" elections and the need
to help Talat's CTP party chances has peppered the leaders'
and negotiators' meetings lately, Downer noted. A March 17
meeting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
chambers of commerce, at which Talat and Christofias would
speak, was part of the unofficial plan to aid CTP.
Confidence-building elements represented another element.
Downer admitted he had not been focused on CBMs, but now
realized they could spur movement on core issues by improving
the atmosphere. He and deputy Taye-Brook Zerihoun had been
pressing G/C chief negotiator George Iacovou, trying to get
the G/Cs to relent on their opposition to CBMs over fears
they spawned "creeping TRNC recognition." Six-hundred
thousand dollars in UNDP-channeled, USAID seed money was
available to help spur momentum, he added.

--------------
Limnitis Crossing ) A Deal Looks Closer:
--------------


10. (C) Topping the UN to-do list was the proposal for a
buffer zone crossing at Limnitis in northwest Cyprus. The
major remaining pothole -- a Turkish Cypriot demand that the
UN escort fuel trucks from Limnitis to the T/C military
enclave at Kokkina -- remained "toxic" to G/Cs. But perhaps
the G/Cs could supply electricity to Kokkina, obviating the
need for fuel convoys? (Note: this was actually the
Embassy's idea, raised earlier in a meeting with UNFICYP
officials). Downer had pitched the compromise first to T/C
chief negotiator Ozdil Nami, who seemed receptive. Iacovou
unofficially called the proposal a "good idea," but never
formally responded with the G/Cs' position.


11. (C) Despite Downer's "pre-cooking," the leaders, who had
discussed Limnitis at their March 11 meeting, did not debate
the UN compromise in detail (in separate out-briefs with
Downer after the leaders' lengthy one-on-one, Christofias
claimed he had raised the compromise but got no substantive
response from Talat, while Talat told Downer that Christofias
had offered nothing new.) Downer had mentioned it again
with Talat on March 12, pushing him to accept the deal and
another CBM regarding ambulances and announce them at the
March 17 joint chamber event; the T/C leader promised to
consult with the Turkish Army (Note: it does not appear

NICOSIA 00000193 003 OF 003


Talat mentioned the CBMs at the chambers meeting). Downer
also had pitched the idea to Turkish MFA U/S Ertugrul Apakan,
who seemed lukewarm to it. Before switching topics, he
requested the Ambassador to urge Ambassador Jeffrey in Ankara
to lobby Apakan further on this Limnitis proposal. (Note:
we understand from our UK colleagues that Iacovou shot the
compromise down and that CBMs remain stuck. Ambassador will
meet T/C negotiator Nami on March 19 to discuss CBMs.)

--------------
Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Role TBD?
--------------


12. (C) UN patience on Cyprus was wearing thin, Downer
alleged, arguing that "this effort should be last roll of the
dice." That said, and despite G/C insistence for a "Cypriot
solution," UN help was still vital to deliver a solution. If
the current process failed, however, Downer believed the UN
ought to re-assess its presence here. "There are too many
other competing needs, while here there's no suffering," he
analyzed. UNFICYP's status should definitely be in play as a
tool to spur movement or counter intransigence, especially
Greek Cypriot. The international community should use the
next rollover renewal (in June) to "inject a bit of
uncertainty" on the force's future, Downer concluded.

--------------
Report to UNSC Could Slip
--------------


13. (C) The Good Offices Mission's report to the Security
Council would be verbal, not written, Downer promised. This
tack would eliminate or reduce unproductive battling over
language. Its timing was still in question, however. Downer
preferred late April (his daughter's upcoming wedding is one
reason.) But he feared the actual date could slip until
early May.

--------------
EU Role in Cyprus Process a Disaster
--------------


14. (C) Venting, Downer blasted Brussels' CyProb role. "I
thought the UN bureaucracy was bad," he chuckled, "but the
EU, especially the Commission, is f-ing awful." After two
months of delays in securing an EU technical expert, Brussels
officials had identified one -- a Dane named Sorensen,
currently in Serbia -- only to change their minds, leaving
the Cyprus discussions on EU matters to begin (and, as of
March 18, end for this phase) without an expert on hand. In
response, the Good Offices Mission would have to hire a
part-time consultant. "Brussels generally treats Turkey like
sh-t," the never-bashful Australian continued, "and they're
overplaying their hand if they think the Turks will go
begging."

--------------
Travel Woes, With Ercan Off-Limits
--------------


15. (C) Downer concluded the meeting by complaining about
air links. The UN's prohibition over using Ercan Airport
meant that travel to Ankara from Nicosia was an all-day
affair -- a productivity killer for the still part-time
envoy. The Turks had suggested instead that he conduct his
monthly trip north via a chartered aircraft from the Akrotiri
Sovereign Base Area; they would cover fuel and crew costs if
Downer could secure the plane. While Zerihoun and others in
UNFICYP were queasy over the arrangement, citing UN rules,
Downer was giving it full consideration.

--------------
Comment
--------------


16. (C) Downer is correct that the June UNFICYP renewal
discussion in the UN Security Council likely will be a
significant milestone in this phase of the Cyprus talks. So
far, both sides continue to put forth rather maximalist
positions. By the time Downer presents his first report in
May, however, we should have a much better idea of real
intentions. It will be then that we should consider a public
UNSC discussion on the future of UNFICYP and other measures
the U.S. might take, either unilaterally or multilaterally in
New York. Downer's assessment of European Union performance
during these talks is all-too-accurate, however.
Urbancic