Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NICOSIA141
2009-02-20 14:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

CYPRIOT POSITIONS FOR FEBRUARY GAERC

Tags:  PREL PGOV ZL AF SU GZ YI BK KO HR MK CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9652
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0023
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0029
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA 0010
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RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 0015
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1370
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000141 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE AND EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZL AF SU GZ YI BK KO HR MK CY
SUBJECT: CYPRIOT POSITIONS FOR FEBRUARY GAERC

REF: POINTS FOR FEBRUARY 23-24 GAERC FROM INTELLIPEDIA

Classified By: DCM Jonathan Cohen, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000141

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE AND EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZL AF SU GZ YI BK KO HR MK CY
SUBJECT: CYPRIOT POSITIONS FOR FEBRUARY GAERC

REF: POINTS FOR FEBRUARY 23-24 GAERC FROM INTELLIPEDIA

Classified By: DCM Jonathan Cohen, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) On February 19, Poloff delivered reftel points to MFA
European Union desk officer Nikos Panayiotou. Turning first
to Afghanistan, Panayiotou stated that the GOC is in broad
agreement with the USG points raised and appreciates the need
for a regional approach, particularly one that takes into
account the role of Pakistan. Panayiotou noted that fully
staffing EUPOL has been a challenge, as the pay is really no
higher to go to Afghanistan than other places, and people are
reluctant to go there because of security concerns; he could
not estimate when it would reach full staffing levels.
Regarding any role the EU would play in the upcoming Afghani
presidential elections, Panayiotou stated that the issue is
still being looked at and he could not say at the moment what
form, if any, such support would take; however, he indicated
the EU would likely contribute to electoral monitoring.


2. (C) Panayiotou stated that it is still up in the air
whether Sudan would stay on the agenda for next week's GAERC.
Much would depend on whether an arrest warrant for President
Bashir is issued before then. Panayiotou remained
non-committal about the GOC stance on the possibility of a
deferral for such a warrant. Panayiotou also said that the
GOC believes that mediator Balosse is doing good work; it
welcomes last Tuesday's goodwill agreement and hopes that the
number of rebel groups signing on to it grows.


3. (C) Panayiotou expressed his government's agreement with
almost all points on Gaza; however, on a Hamas-Fatah
"technocratic government," Panayiotou said that the GOC would
judge such a government on "actions rather than words."
Panayiotou also stated that the GOC has serious concerns
regarding GOI adherence to the Quartet Principles, especially
regarding its settlement policy.


4. (C) On the Western Balkans, Panayiotou stressed that not
all member states (i.e. Cyprus) have recognized the
International Civilian Office (ICO) nor the International
Civilian Representative (ICR) and, therefore, ideas about the
ICO "filling the space as UNMIK winds down" are problematic
for the GOC. However, Panayiotou expressed GOC understanding
of the importance of EULEX reaching full operational
capacity, which he believes is "on schedule." The GOC also
understands that there is a need for formal institutionalized
coordination on the ground between the many actors in Kosovo,
such as EULEX, KFOR and the OSCE. Panayiotou requested USG
advice regarding how such coordination could be accomplished.
On Serbia, Panayiotou noted that the GOC has made a
concerted effort to engage Belgrade and fully supports the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement process.
Strengthening President Tadic is a priority for the GOC,
Panayiotou said, as he "has taken a significant risk" by
cooperating with Western actors.


5. (C) Panayiotou was non-committal on a replacement for
Bosnia High Representative/EU Special Representative Miroslav
Lajcak and said that the GOC "would examine all the
candidates before making a decision." On the outstanding "5
2" objectives, Panayiotou said the GOC is "more optimistic"
than the USG and thinks that all closure objectives will be
fulfilled before the OHR is closed. On Macedonia, Panayiotou
stressed that Cyprus would like to see Macedonia do more to
resolve the name issue and show "more positive actions
towards its neighbors." Panayiotou said that Macedonia's
June 2008 elections were likely flawed and hoped that the
world would see a fair, free election next month. As with
any potential EU member state, the GOC would support
membership for the GOM, should all criteria be fulfilled.
Panayiotou added that while the GOC recognizes that the USG
has put pressure on PM Gruevski regarding the name issue, it
would like to see even more done in the future. Panayiotou
said that the GOC fully supports the USG points on Albania.
Panayiotou expressed concern over Croatia's border dispute
with Slovenia, but added that, should all criteria be
fulfilled, the GOC would support Croatia's accession to the
EU.


6. (C) Panayiotou said that the GOC does not see the Eastern

NICOSIA 00000141 002 OF 002


Partnership (EaP) as a track to EU accession for Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova or Ukraine. As an
initiative, the GOC broadly supports the EaP, pending a
determination of final modalities. Regarding Belarus's
inclusion in the EaP, Panayiotou said the GOB would need to
fulfill all conditions, as would any partner; the GOC is
hopeful this will be the case.
Urbancic