NIGER -- ASSESSING THE NEED FOR INCREASED LAW

UNCLAS NIAMEY 000089

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/RSA - C POMMERER, INL/AAE - A ALTON, AND
DS/T/ATA A GONZALEZ

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC KCRM PARM PGOV PTER SNAR SOCI NG
SUBJECT: NIGER -- ASSESSING THE NEED FOR INCREASED LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING

REF: STATE 5448


1. The following is Post's response to provide input to help
further define law enforcement and judicial training needs.
Below are Post's responses to the questions posed:


A. What are the key internal or regional challenges the host
government's non-military security apparatus confronts?
(i.e., local/regional crime, trafficking of persons,
narcotics, resource theft, smuggling, illicit small and light
arms shipments, domestic and regional terrorism, etc.)

In February 2007, the Tuareg rebel group, Movement of
Nigeriens for Justice (MNJ),launched a series of attacks
against military and strategic installations in the north.
These attacks continued throughout 2007 and 2008. In
response, the government declared a state of alert on August
24, 2007, which has remained in effect. While civilian
authorities generally maintained effective control of the
security forces, there were some instances in which elements
of the security forces acted independently of government
authority.

The Government of Niger security forces concentrate their
attention on radical/militant Islamic elements and terrorist
threats from external groups, such as Al Qaeda in the Lands
of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Internally, the Government of
Niger security forces are focused on the MNJ in Niger. The
borders are very insecure and access across the borders is
quite easy, especially in remote areas. Smuggling is an
issue across all of Niger,s borders, with drugs (opiates and
hashish) and contraband goods (cigarettes) being of primary
concern on the border with Nigeria. Narcotics, illicit small
arms and light weapons, and land mines are smuggled across
northern Niger, taking advantage of the old historic trade
routes across the Sahel and Sahara regions. Trafficking in
persons has been reported as an issue in previous Human
Rights Reports by the U.S. Embassy. There are no threats
inside Niger that act beyond its borders. Since December
2008 and January 2009, with the kidnappings of UN Special
Envoy Fowler and his associates, and four European tourists,
security concerns have increased related to groups outside
Niger crossing the border with Mali and making incursions
into Niger for kidnapping raids, particularly in the regions
immediately to the north and northwest of the capital, Niamey.


B. What are the host government's non-military sector's
capabilities to respond to these challenges? Where ability
to address these issues is lacking, please provide details:
what knowledge, skills/training, equipment, relationships,
policies and/or procedures are responsible for the lack of
capacity?

The Armed Forces (FAN),under the Ministry of National
Defense, is responsible for internal and external security.
The Gendarmerie, under the same ministry, has primary
responsibility for rural security. The National Forces for
Intervention and Security (FNIS),under the Interior
Ministry, are responsible for domestic security and
protection of high-level officials and government buildings.
The National Police, also under the Interior Ministry, are
charged with urban law enforcement. The Directorate of
Documentation and External Security (DGDSE) is the primary
body responsible for intelligence gathering.

In many ways Niger is in the infant stages of development of
full programs. Organizations and individuals at lower levels
are fully motivated and ready to accept advice and aid. It
does not appear the organizations at the lower level obtain
full support, however, from the higher levels of government.

The Gendarmerie units are small and have great areas to
cover. They are very receptive to advice and willing to
accept financial aid and training. They are not funded to
perform their mission as well as the international community
would like. The Gendarmerie is responsible for investigating
police abuse; however, impunity is a problem.

The DGDSE is headquartered in Niamey and has 10 regional
offices in major cities and one at the Niamey International
Airport. DGDSE officers are professional and well trained,
but are hampered by a lack of resources and personnel.

The police are largely ineffective due to lack of basic
supplies such as vehicle fuel, radios, uniforms, handcuffs,
batons, and badges. Patrols are sporadic and emergency
response in Niamey can take almost an hour or more. Police
training is minimal and only specialized police units have
basic weapons-handling skills. Corruption remains pervasive.

On the whole, security forces do not adequately police the
border regions. The Government of Niger lacks capacity to
control borders. Additionally, corruption in the form of
bribes undermines controls in place. The possibility exists
for outside groups to use the country as a temporary refuge.

Niger has implemented anti-terrorist and
anti-money-laundering legislation; however, the level of
competency and training of law enforcement officials is
questionable. In 2003-2004, a unit called CENTIF, made up of
lawyers, police, and customs officials was created on paper,
though never stood up.


C. Highlight any specific non-military security or judicial
training requirements (basic, mid-level, specialized,
institutional) and the intended host government recipient
agency.

The National Police intend to set up a Counter Terrorist
unit. The police received ATA training in 2008 appropriate
for this purpose (Interdicting Terrorist Activities) as well
as ATA-funded equipment for tactical operations. Additional
training directed at this effort would be greatly welcomed by
the Director General of the National Police.


D. Host government's willingness to accept and be an
effective partner in the implementation of USG assistance.

The Government of Niger has been receptive to training
offered through the Regional Security Office for non-military
units. Two ATA courses were offered in FY 08, one in 2007,
and four in 2006. The training has included, where
appropriate, elements of the National Police and the
Gendarmerie. For example, in 2008, the ATA course Airport
Security Management included both police and gendarmerie
officers responsible for airport security in Niamey.

ATA plans to visit Niger from February 22-28, 2009, to
conduct a Program Country Review. The host government has
been extremely cooperative in preparation for this visit, and
the Regional Security Office anticipates a pQductive visit
by ATA.


E. Other efforts by international partners in providing
non-military security assistance and/or training to law
enforcement and judicial institutions of the host government.

The Government of Niger also receives training from France
(police, military, and intelligence),and has received
training in the past from Libya and Algeria. There are
cooperative agreements with Mali (e.g., right to pursue
(i.e., "hot pursuit") between the two countries). The
European Union has also provided training in the area of
immigration control.


F. Is there any type of existing or planned non-military
regional training center in your country, operated by either
an international partner or host country?

Only the military has a regional training center, and this is
limited to higher-ranking officials. The National Police
have one police academy training center located in Niamey.
The Gendarmerie does partial training with the military
throughout the country and the remainder of its training in
Niamey. The European Union has provided funding for March
2009 to train police inspectors from the National Police (80
officers),FNIS (20 officers),and the Gendarmerie (20
officers),but the Gendarmerie withdrew its participation.


2. The point of contact for this cable is RSO Jeff
McGallicher or ARSO Brian Caza, both of whom may be reached
24 hours through Marine Post One at 227-72-26-61, 62, or 63
ALLEN