INDIA-IAEA: SHARED CONCERN ON IRAN-SYRIA REPORT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000370

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2019
TAGS: KNNP PARM IAEA MNUC IR SYR TRGY IN PINS ENRG
KCRM
SUBJECT: INDIA-IAEA: SHARED CONCERN ON IRAN-SYRIA REPORT,
DEFENSIVE ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

REF: A. SECSTATE 16285

B. UNVIE 87

C. SECSTATE 148969

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Les Viguerie for Reasons 1.4
(B and D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Ministry of External Affairs Director for
Disarmament and International Security Affairs Gaddam
Dharmendra shared February 28 India's perspective on
Iran-Syria and India's Additional Protocal, two items on the
agenda of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board
of Governors meeting March 2-6. India claimed to share our
concern about lack of cooperation from Iran and Syria
detailed in Directer General ElBaradei's February 19 report,
and planned to once again to work from within the Non-Aligned
Movement to strengthen its statement and to craft a separate,
more critical Indian national statement. Dharmendra was
defensive about possible criticism of the late submission and
limited scope of India's draft Additional Protocol, saying
India had charted a middle course and had "come a long way."
Dharmendra also confirmed that India would participate in the
Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group
(ITWG) annual meeting in Vienna. END SUMMARY.

Iran/Syria: Working To Strengthen Statements
- - -


2. (C) Poloff delivered ref A demarche to Ministry of
External Affairs Director for Disarmament and International
Security Affairs Gaddam Dharmendra February 28, stressing
Iran and Syria's lack of any meaningful cooperation with the
IAEA as documented by Director General ElBaradei's February
19 report. Dharmendra replied, "We all know what is
happening there," but he was uncharacteristically cautious
about giving clues as to India's planned response. He shared
that India was engaged in discussions with other Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) states of a draft statement for the IAEA Board
meeting, and that India was also preparing its own national
statement. He suggested that India would resist from within
NAM efforts by Iran and Syria to craft a statement supportive
of their activities, and that India's national statement
would be more critical. He refused to give any further hints
and would not be drawn out on whether India supported
releasing the Syria report to the public. He reiterated the
standard position that India shared our concerns and did not
want another nuclear weapon state in the region.

Additional Protocol: "We've Come a Long Way"
- - -


3. (SBU) Dharmendra reaffirmed India's hope that the IAEA's
Board of Governors would approve its Additional Protocol (AP)
at the March Board meeting (ref B). Dharmendra, who was part
of the Indian team that negotiated its AP text, was defensive
when asked about the possibility that some delegations might
criticize India's late AP submission and its disappointingly
limited scope. He said the explanatory notes circulated by
the IAEA would address any specific questions about the
contents of the draft text. More broadly, he said India
decided to chart a course between those of China and Russia,
which he characterized as "saying no to everything," and the
U.S. approach, which he characterized as "saying yes, but
subject to national security provisions." He mentioned
Cuba's AP twice as one influential model. He said India
could have ratified the U.S. AP with only the name of the
country changed, but instead engaged in four rounds of
serious discussions with the IAEA Secretariat. Anyone who
doubted the sincerity of India's efforts should request a
copy of the marked-up draft from the Secretariat, which he
asserted would show that India was amenable to the
Secretariat's suggestions. "A careful reading of the text
will show that we have come a long way," according to
Dharmendra.


4. (C) Dharmendra was dismissive of the possibility that a
weak AP could be a precedent for Brazil or Pakistan. He said
India's AP could not be a model for Brazil because Brazil has
full-scope safeguards, though he conceded that Brazil might
have other reasons to oppose a robust AP. He suggested
Pakistan's AP was the least of India's worries about its
Western neighbor. He concluded that it should be no surprise

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that countries like New Zealand remained bitter about India's
exception in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),adding, "They
told us explicitly at that time that they would 'get us' when
it came time to approve the AP."

India to Attend Nuclear Smuggling Meeting
- - -


5. (U) Dharmendra also confirmed, in response to ref C, that
India will plan to send appropriate officials to the Nuclear
Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) annual
meeting in Vienna June 29-July 2, but he said he would have
to wait for the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in Mumbai
to make formal nominations. Notably, Dharmendra commented
that India would like to improve its officials' technical
understanding of nuclear forensics, not only to prevent and
prosecute nuclear smuggling, but also better engage in
discussions of the IAEA's investigations into Syria's nuclear
program central to ElBaradei's February 19 report.


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