Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NEWDELHI1300
2009-06-23 13:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:
INDIA JUSTIFIES DISSENT ON NUCLEAR FUEL BANKS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 001300
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN
SUBJECT: INDIA JUSTIFIES DISSENT ON NUCLEAR FUEL BANKS
REF: A. STATE 57598
B. NEW DELHI 1211
C. NEW DELHI 924
Classified By: CDA Peter Burleigh for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 001300
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN
SUBJECT: INDIA JUSTIFIES DISSENT ON NUCLEAR FUEL BANKS
REF: A. STATE 57598
B. NEW DELHI 1211
C. NEW DELHI 924
Classified By: CDA Peter Burleigh for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)
1. (C) Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon explained to the
Charge d'Affaires June 22 India's rationale for failing to
support International Nuclear Fuel Bank proposals at the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors
meeting in Vienna June 15-16 (ref A). According to media
reports, India was alone among 25 IAEA Board members (though
later joined by Iran) in opposing proposed fuel assurance
arrangements, thereby relegating these efforts to further
"discussions and consultations." Menon affirmed that
although India supported fuel banks, it viewed itself as a
full participant, including possibly as a supplier. He
confirmed that the Indian Mission in Vienna was right to
oppose any plan that precluded India's full participation due
to its status as a non-signatory of the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Menon lamented that while
the delegation was subjected to considerable pressure to
support the proposals, no delegation made any serious attempt
to address India's core concern or to reassure its delegation
that further discussion would reverse India's exclusion on
the basis of its NPT status.
2. (C) India's opposition was not inconsistent with its
previous messages about fuel banks, though no Indian official
used opportunities in advance of the Board meeting to alert
us to this possible outcome. Menon had confirmed for
visiting Under Secretary Burns that India supported the
establishment of nuclear fuel banks and wanted to work with
the U.S. to make it a reality, but he did not elaborate (ref
B). Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary for
Disarmament and International Security Affairs Gaddam
Dharmendra outlined India's views on fuel banks May 5 (ref
C),stressing that India viewed itself as a supplier under
any fuel bank arrangement. Dharmendra subsequently reffirmed
this position June 12, adding that India did not yet have
views on any particular proposal. Neither Menon nor
Dharmendra used these various interactions to alert us to the
seriousness of their concerns. The issue was also raised
with Special Secretary Katju on the margins of a meeting with
the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism in Washington June 16
as the IAEA Board meeting was underway, but he failed to
intervene.
3. (C) COMMENT: Though Indian officials could have been more
forthcoming in advance of the Board meeting, India's position
reflects its unwavering conviction that, as a responsible
state with nuclear weapons, it should be permitted to play a
role in the international nonproliferation regime
commensurate with its capabilities. India rejects as a false
dichotomy the choice between accepting the NPT-derived status
of Non-nuclear Weapon State and its exclusion from global
nonproliferation efforts, many of which it would otherwise
embrace (such as fuel banks). Indian officials feel the
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative -- including the IAEA
Board's consensus approval of its limited safeguards and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group's exception to its full scope
safeguards requirement -- legitimizes its exceptional status
as a responsible nuclear power in order to welcome its
contribution to global nonproliferation efforts. Indian
officials tend to overlook that India's status remains
controversial.
4. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: In fact, while much of the world
may have decided to no longer treat India as a proliferation
problem, its unique status does not yet permit it to be fully
part of the solution. India does support fuel banks. But as
long as it finds itself on the wrong side of a line drawn on
the basis of the NPT, it may feel compelled to make common
cause with those countries that likewise feel excluded -- or
targeted -- by the nonproliferation regime. India is sending
a message: either let us in as we are or we will be forced
into opposition from the outside. END COMMENT.
BURLEIGH
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN
SUBJECT: INDIA JUSTIFIES DISSENT ON NUCLEAR FUEL BANKS
REF: A. STATE 57598
B. NEW DELHI 1211
C. NEW DELHI 924
Classified By: CDA Peter Burleigh for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)
1. (C) Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon explained to the
Charge d'Affaires June 22 India's rationale for failing to
support International Nuclear Fuel Bank proposals at the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors
meeting in Vienna June 15-16 (ref A). According to media
reports, India was alone among 25 IAEA Board members (though
later joined by Iran) in opposing proposed fuel assurance
arrangements, thereby relegating these efforts to further
"discussions and consultations." Menon affirmed that
although India supported fuel banks, it viewed itself as a
full participant, including possibly as a supplier. He
confirmed that the Indian Mission in Vienna was right to
oppose any plan that precluded India's full participation due
to its status as a non-signatory of the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Menon lamented that while
the delegation was subjected to considerable pressure to
support the proposals, no delegation made any serious attempt
to address India's core concern or to reassure its delegation
that further discussion would reverse India's exclusion on
the basis of its NPT status.
2. (C) India's opposition was not inconsistent with its
previous messages about fuel banks, though no Indian official
used opportunities in advance of the Board meeting to alert
us to this possible outcome. Menon had confirmed for
visiting Under Secretary Burns that India supported the
establishment of nuclear fuel banks and wanted to work with
the U.S. to make it a reality, but he did not elaborate (ref
B). Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary for
Disarmament and International Security Affairs Gaddam
Dharmendra outlined India's views on fuel banks May 5 (ref
C),stressing that India viewed itself as a supplier under
any fuel bank arrangement. Dharmendra subsequently reffirmed
this position June 12, adding that India did not yet have
views on any particular proposal. Neither Menon nor
Dharmendra used these various interactions to alert us to the
seriousness of their concerns. The issue was also raised
with Special Secretary Katju on the margins of a meeting with
the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism in Washington June 16
as the IAEA Board meeting was underway, but he failed to
intervene.
3. (C) COMMENT: Though Indian officials could have been more
forthcoming in advance of the Board meeting, India's position
reflects its unwavering conviction that, as a responsible
state with nuclear weapons, it should be permitted to play a
role in the international nonproliferation regime
commensurate with its capabilities. India rejects as a false
dichotomy the choice between accepting the NPT-derived status
of Non-nuclear Weapon State and its exclusion from global
nonproliferation efforts, many of which it would otherwise
embrace (such as fuel banks). Indian officials feel the
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative -- including the IAEA
Board's consensus approval of its limited safeguards and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group's exception to its full scope
safeguards requirement -- legitimizes its exceptional status
as a responsible nuclear power in order to welcome its
contribution to global nonproliferation efforts. Indian
officials tend to overlook that India's status remains
controversial.
4. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: In fact, while much of the world
may have decided to no longer treat India as a proliferation
problem, its unique status does not yet permit it to be fully
part of the solution. India does support fuel banks. But as
long as it finds itself on the wrong side of a line drawn on
the basis of the NPT, it may feel compelled to make common
cause with those countries that likewise feel excluded -- or
targeted -- by the nonproliferation regime. India is sending
a message: either let us in as we are or we will be forced
into opposition from the outside. END COMMENT.
BURLEIGH