INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY LEAKS SPUR DISCUSSION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001143

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID EAGR PK IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY LEAKS SPUR DISCUSSION OF
PAKISTAN DIALOGUE

Classified By: CDA Peter Burleigh for reasons 1.4 (B, D).


1. (C) Summary: Despite Pakistan's release of JUD leader
Hafiz Saeed on Tuesday and allegations of cease-fire
violations yesterday, Indian media is buzzing with
suggestions that the Indian Government is taking a second
look at its no-dialogue strategy with Pakistan and may be
considering restarting talks with Islamabad sooner than
expected. Following purposeful leaks of information by the
Ministry of External Affairs, a public discussion has ensued
about whether GOI should re-engage in a dialogue with
Pakistan six months after the Mumbai attacks.


2. (C) Summary Continued: The leaks contradict earlier
statements that India would not engage in talks with Pakistan
until Islamabad delivers on its promises to follow through
with a successful prosecution of the individuals involved in
the planning and execution of the Mumbai attacks last
November. A second look at India's strategy may be due to
perceptions that external pressure, mostly from the U.S.,
will eventually force a dialogue. Foreign Secretary Menon
himself in a June 4 conversation with the Charge would only
say definitively that India had decided to go ahead with a
donation of wheat to feed displaced persons from the Swat
Valley. End Summary.

Background on the Leak


3. (C) Several major Indian dailies on Thursday morning
carried headlines and editorials about India's possible new
approach toward Pakistan, with most of them referencing "a
well-placed source" that provided information about the
different options now under consideration at the "highest
levels of the government." Quoting President Kennedy, the
new Indian External Affairs Minister, S.M. Krishna,
reportedly told his officers, "We should not negotiate out of
fear but we should never fear to negotiate". The media is
also speculating that the first signs of a change in tone
toward Islamabad could take place 15-16 June when Prime
Minister Singh and President Zardari attend the Shanghai
Cooperation Summit in Yekaterinburg (if Singh goes).

A Change in Heart, A Contradiction, or Simply False
Information?


4. (C) The sudden flurry of discussion about a possible
re-look at Pakistan policy is a surprise because it does not
track with many previous official statements criticizing
Pakistan for not fully cooperating with GOI over the last six
months since the Mumbai attacks. Last week, newly appointed
EAM Krishna reiterated his predecessor's message that Delhi
does not intend to resume talks with Islamabad before
concrete steps are taken to successfully prosecute the terror
groups responsible for the Mumbai attacks. ( Comment: The
contradiction is not indicative of the validity of the new
information the press is reporting, because the GOI sometimes
fails to coordinate at the highest levels or officials launch
trial balloons. What is odd is the timing: the reports of a
possible shift in policy come just days after Islamabad's
release of Jamaat-ud-Dawa Chief Hafiz Saeed, a move Krishna
strongly condemned, and on the same day that Indian press
reported that the Pakistani Army violated the ceasefire in
Kashmir for the eighth time in 2009. End Comment.)

Menon on Wheat for Swat



5. (C) In a June 4 conversation with Charge on other
subjects (septel),Menon noted the flurry of media
speculation about talks with Pakistan. He said that India
had decided to go ahead with a donation of wheat in response
to a World Food Program appeal for aid for displaced Swat
residents. Menon said that donating the wheat through the
WFP would make it more palatable for Pakistan to accept.
India is likely to make an announcement about the donation in
the next day or so.

NEW DELHI 00001143 002 OF 002



New Delhi's Motivations



6. (C) A possible reconsideration, if it in fact is taking
place, of GOI's current strategy may be in reaction to what
the press has characterized as international demands for
India to relax its "unhelpful rigid stand" and anticipated
U.S. pressure to resume a dialogue during Secretary Clinton's
possible visit to India this summer. In addition, Delhi may
be feeling pressure from the media itself, which more and
more often points to the government's unsuccessful post-26/11
campaign. (Comment: By promising to not engage in a dialogue
until Islamabad delivers something concrete, the government
may now feel it set the bar too high and is allowing its
foreign policy to be held hostage to the vagaries of the
Pakistani judicial system. It is conceivable Delhi would
want to expand its options. End Comment.)


7. (C) Comment: A shift in public opinion may place some
pressure on the government to reconsider its current strategy
and to keep the option for a dialogue open. Such a shift
would better position India diplomatically, but the problem
then, from Delhi's point of view, would be with whom in
Islamabad to negotiate. If and when India decides to change
its approach and resume talks with Pakistan, the absence of
what the GOI considers a trustworthy and influential
interlocutor in Islamabad becomes a dilemma. India sees
competing power centers in Islamabad and is hesitant to
commit to talks with a civilian government which is viewed
here as weak and lacking credibility.
BURLEIGH