Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NEWDELHI1052
2009-05-22 12:26:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR UPDATES ON INFORMATION ON

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PK IN 
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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6705
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7694
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6420
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3434
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6351
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RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8337
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
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RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 NEW DELHI 001052 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR S/CT HILLARY BATJER JOHNSON AND S/CT PAUL SCHULTZ,
NCTC, DHS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PK IN
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR UPDATES ON INFORMATION ON
HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES-INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING
AND SHARING

REF: STATE 032287

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 NEW DELHI 001052

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR S/CT HILLARY BATJER JOHNSON AND S/CT PAUL SCHULTZ,
NCTC, DHS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PK IN
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR UPDATES ON INFORMATION ON
HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES-INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING
AND SHARING

REF: STATE 032287


1. (SBU) The following information is provided in response to
reftel request for details of India,s immigration and border
controls.

A. (SBU) Immigration Data Bases and Traveler Information
Collection:
-- What computerized immigration databases are used to track
entries and exits? Foreigners Regional Registration Officers
(FRRO) uses a computerized entry/exit tracking system, but
these systems are not linked to a centralized database.
-- Is the computerized immigration database available at all
ports of entry (POE5)? Most air ports of entry and some land
ports of entry have access to such systems, but they are not
linked to a centralized database.
-- If immigration databases are available at some POEs, but
not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will
receive the tool? Apparently, this is determined by a
combination of factors to include: volume of crossings or
entries, affluence of the state containing the POE and the
perceived importance of the POE by the Ministry of Home
Affairs (MHA).
-- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the
systems? The systems do not read biometric passports and are
isolated (not linked to a centralized database).
-- For example, limited training, power brownouts, budgetary
restraints, corruption, etc.? All of the above. Further
Police and other law enforcement and court agencies will
write requests to the Bureau of Immigration for input of
derogatory data, such as convictions, warrants etc. into the
lookout systems. This is a time delay. The state agencies do
not have electronic linking of such data to Bureau of
Immigration Computer Systems.
-- How often are national immigration databases updated? This
info has not been shared by MHA.
-- What are the country,s policies (legislation, mandates,
etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in
the country? India recently began requiring air carriers to
provide APIS info on travelers coming to India pursuant to an
amendment to the Foreigners Order, 1948 which was published
in the Gazette of India on January 24, 2008.
-- Are there different policies for entry and exit at air,

sea, and land POE5 and for domestic flights? It would appear
as such, but MHA will neither confirm nor deny this. These
different POEs are controlled by different entities such as
the military, the Border Security Force (BSF),the Bureau of
Indian Immigration and the state police. The Immigration
services at the major International Airports in India and the
Foreigners, registration work in five major cities, are
handled by the Bureau of Immigration (BOI). The field
officers in charge of immigration and registration activities
at Delhi, Muxnbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Amritsar are called
Foreigners Regional Registration Officers (FRRO5). Apart from
the FRROs who look after the immigration/registration
functions in the above mentioned five cities, the concerned
Districts Superintendents of Police function as Foreigners
Registration Officers (FROs) in all the states in the
country.
-- What agency oversees the collection of traveler
information? The Ministry of Home Affairs manages most of
these activities in conjunction with the Indian Intelligence
Bureau (IB),the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) which is
India,s foreign intelligence agency, the Central Industrial
Security Forces (CISF),the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security
(BCAS),the state police and the Bureau of Immigration (BOl).
-- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share
that information with foreign governments? India shares
information with foreign partners sparingly and only on a
limited bi-lateral basis. The U.S. does not have an

NEW DELHI 00001052 002 OF 008


Immigration Mutual Assistance Agreement with India at this
time, so our requests for information are viewed on a
case*by-case basis where responses are given sometimes or
not at all. In March 2002 the Indian Parliament, in a rare
joint session, passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA)
over the objections of several opposition parties and in the
face of considerable public criticism. The National Human
Rights Commission, an independent government entity,
criticized the measure finding the existing laws were
sufficient to combat terrorism. The law codifies the
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance that in turn builds on the
repealed Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)
Act (TADA). It gives law enforcement sweeping powers to
arrest suspected terrorists, intercept communications, and
curtail free expression. Critics argue that the experience of
TADA and POTA shows that the power was often misused for
political ends by authorities and that POTA does little to
curb those excesses. POTA was repealed in the year 2004, as
minority communities were targeted in India. After 26/11 the
TADA was amended and the National Investigation Agency was
established to collect and share information with foreign
governments.
-- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record
(PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels? Yes,
but only as part of a pilot project mainly conducted at the
international airports in Delhi and Mumbai.
-- Is this data used for intelligence or law enforcement
purposes to screen travelers in a systematic way?
Theoretically, yes. The GOl reports that this info will be
shared with security, intelligence and border control
agencies.
-- Does host government have any existing treaties to share
PNR data? Not that we can determine. At this point in time,
the Indian APIS data is not collected and stored in a format
compatible with the European and American APIS systems.
-- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems
(APIS),interactive advanced passenger information systems
(IAPIS),or electronic travel authority systems been
effective at detecting other national security threats, such
as wanted criminals? Most likely, but no reports of this have
been received from the GOl. It appears that APIS is used
primarily to expedite immigration clearance at their woefully
inadequate ports of entry.

B. (SBU) Watchlisting:
-- Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen
travelers at POEs? Yes.
-- What domestic sources of information populate the
name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons,
terrorist lookouts, and criminal wants/warrants? lB terrorist
lookouts and Interpol warrants mainly. However, all law
enforcement agencies within India are able to enter lookouts,
referred to as in India as Look Out Circulars (LOC) by
forwarding a request to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA),
Joint Director for Zimnigration. These requests follow a
standard format, which includes at least three identifying
factos such as full name, passport number, date and place of
birth, and photo if available. The LOC indicators contact
information for the originator of the LOC as well as the
action requested by the originator if the subject of the
lookout is encountered, to include detention. The LOC will
remain in place for 12 months but can be extended.
-- If host government maintains a watchlst, how many records
does the watchlist contain, and how many are
terrorist-related? Unable to say; info not shared by GOl at
this level.
-- Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist? Mainly
the Indian Intelligence Bureau, who works closely with the
Bureau of Immigration. Also, Bureau of Immigration, Foreign
Regional Registration Office (FRRO),located at R.K. Puram,

NEW DELHI 00001052 003 OF 008


New Delhi, is very uncooperative and reluctant to answer any
questions concerning this information.
-- What international watchlists does the host government use
for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists,
UN, etc.? The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) Interpol
disseminated all Interpol Red Notices to the border and along
with Look Out Circulars (LOCs),Interpol lookouts are part of
the watchlists. According to police sources, these watchlists
are not combined and generally border officials will first
check the LOCs watchlist, followed by Interpol notices.
-- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist
between host government and its neighbors? This info not
shared at this level.

C. (SBU) Biometrics:
-- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air,
land, sea)? If no, does host government have plans to install
such a system? Only at select airports as part of a pilot
project involving e-passports for select Indian diplomats and
government officials. India has recently initiated first
phase deployment of Biometric e-Passport for Diplomatic
Passport holders in India and abroad. The new passports have
been designed indigenously by the Central Passport
Organization, the India Security Press and lIT Kanpur. The
passport contains a security chip with personal data and
digital images. Initially, the new passports will have a 64KB
chip with a photograph of passport holder and subsequently
include the holder,s fingerprint(s). The biometric passport
has been tested with passport readers abroad and is noted to
have a 4 second response time which is less than that of a US
Passport (10 second response time). The passport need not be
carried in a metal jacket for security reasons as it first
needs to be passed through a reader, after which generates
access keys to unlock the chip data for reader access.
-- If biometric systems are available at some POES, but not
all, how does the host government decide what POE5 will
receive the tool? Delhi and Mumbai were chosen as most
government officials fly via these POE5.
-- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host
government use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial
recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal
identification, DNA*based identification, keystroke
dynamics, gait analysis? Fingerprint identification, digital
photo and personal info.
-- Are the systems ICAO compliant? The Indian press reports
indicate that the e-passport is ICAO compliant.
-- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POE5? No.
-- What are the systems and models used? Infineon
Technologies (FSE/NYSE: IFX) was announced as the supplier of
the contactless security microcontrollers for India,s
electronic passport program. The India electronic passport
project utilizes the SLE 66CLX800PE security microcontroller
from Infineon which provides advanced performance and high
execution speeds and was specifically designed for use in
electronic passports, identity cards, e-government cards and
payment cards. The security microcontroller features a
crypto-coprocessor and can operate at very high transaction
speeds of up to 848 kbits per second even if elevated
encryption and decryption operations have to be calculated.
In addition, the SLE 66CLX800PE offers all contactiess
proximity interfaces on a single chip: the ISO/IEC 14443 Type
B interface and Type A interface which are both used for
communication between electronic passports and the respective
readers, and the ISO/IEC 18092 passive mode interface which
is used in transport and banking applications mainly in
Japan. Infineon is currently the world,s only chip card IC
provider offering contactless microcontrollers with all
relevant contactless proximity interfaces on a single chip.
The SLE 66CLx800PE is also compliant with global ICAO
(International Civil Aviation Organization) standards for

NEW DELHI 00001052 004 OF 008


electronic passports. (source: WEBWIRE * Tuesday, March 03,
2009)
-- Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the
host government target a specific population for collection
(i.e. host country nationals)? At present, they only screen
their diplomats or government officials that have been issued
Indian e-passports.
-- Do the biometric collection systems look for a one to one
comparison (ensure the biometric presented matches the one
stored on the e-Passport) or one too many comparisons
(checking the biometric presented against a database of known
biometrics)? Not sure.
-- If biometric systems are in place, does the host
government know of any countermeasures that have been used or
attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints? That info has not
been shared.
-- What are the host government,s policies on collecting the
fingerprints of travelers coming into the country? India does
not collect fingerprints at this point in time.
-- Which agency is responsible for the host government,s
fingerprint system? The Indian Government rarely collects
fingerprints. When collected, it is done by local police in
local jails, but only with the consent of the prisoner.
-- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS,
UK1 or RTID compliant? No.
-- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? We are
not sure of the exact procedure the GOl uses to collect
fingerprints, it should be noted that the India Bureau of
Immigration and FRRO do not collect fingerprints.
-- Which agency collects the fingerprints? State and city
police.

D. (SBU) Border Control and Screening:
-- Does the host government employ software to screen
travelers of security interest? Yes, but these systems are
not yet networked or linked to a central database.
-- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only
non-host- country nationals? Only those with machine-readable
passports, but the systems are not linked to a centralized
database. Only host-country officials who have been issued
e-passports are tracked as far as we can tell.
-- What is the frequency of travelers being &waived
through8 because they hold up what appears to be an
appropriate document, but whose information is not actually
recorded electronically? Frequently with GOl employees or
officials.
-- What is the estimated percentage of non-recorded
crossings, entries and exits? Though we are unable to affix a
set percentage we can state that non-recorded crossings are
suspected to be very high at land border crossings due to
corruption, apathy and selfpreservation.
-- Do host government border control officials have the
authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on
who can enter the country? The Border Security Force (BSF)
which guards the India-Pakistan and the India-Bangladesh
borders, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBPF) which
is deployed along the India- Tibet (China) border and the
Assam Rifles (AR) which is deployed along the India-Myanmar
border, are usually the first representatives of the Indian
system which travelers may encounter when they enter or exit
India by land routes.
The vastness of the border terrain make it difficult to
physically man the entire international borders of India. The
gaps in the border left unguarded, are often used by
criminals to illegally enter/exit the Indian territory. If
caught while entering illegally, the authorities may return
the interloper across the border. The border guarding force
may interrogate and detain the person as permissible under
the law of the land, at the border itself, pending decision
by the administrative authorities. In all such cases, the

NEW DELHI 00001052 005 OF 008


person will have to be ultimately handed over to the local
police who will exercise their powers under relevant
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC).
It is part of the duty and responsibility of the border
authorities to rule out any criminal or anti-national intent
on the part of the traveler who may be entering the country
for mala fide purposes. If caught illegally exiting India,
the person may be handed over to the local police for
investigation and for further action according to law. In
cases where the traveler is found in possession of invalid
travel documents or in cases of violation of any other Indian
law, the traveler may be detained by the border authorities
at the border post itself and are then handed over to the
local police for investigation. In all such instances, after
the registration of a case on the basis of a First
Information Report, the police would lodge the accused mala
fide traveler in the area prison and produce him/her in the
local court for trial in conformity with the provisions of
CrPC.
-- If so, please describe this authority (legislation,
mandates, etc). Indian Penal Code, the Foreigners Act, 1946,
Foreigners Order, the Passport Act 1967 and the Criminal
Procedure Code of India, 1973 (Cr.PC).
-- What are the host government,s policies on questioning,
detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting
themselves at a point of entry into the country? The
engagement of the BSF and their power to arrest, detain and
question civilians in non- war situations is governed by the
Criminal Procedure Code of India, 1973 (Cr.PC). This law that
regulates the operation of law enforcement officers,
including paramilitary units like the BSF in a civilian
settings.
-- Which agency would question, detain, or deny entry?
Depending on the type of POE, the region, sensitivity, etc,
usually the Indian Military Intelligence, the Border Security
Force, the State Police, the Bureau of Immigration or the
Intelligence Bureau would question detain or deny entry.
-- How well does information sharing function within the host
government, i.e., if there is a determination that someone
with a valid host-government visa is later identified with
terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally?
Not sure how this is exactly done. As mentioned earlier the
United States does not have an Immigration Mutual Assistance
Agreement (IMAA) at this time. CBP has discovered the Bureau
Of Immigration and FRRO to be uncooperative and non sharing,
except in their time of need when they will call the
residence for information concerning passengers at the
Airports.

E. (SBU) Passports:
-- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport
containing biometric information? No.
-- If so, what biometric information is included on the
document, i.e. fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc.?
N/A
-- If not, does host government plan to issue a biometric
document in the future? When? Yes, facial recognition is
planned starting (estimate) January 2010. A second phase
might include fingerprints.
-- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport
containing biometric information, does the host government
share the public key required to read the biometric
information with any other governments? N/A
-- If so, which governments? N/A
-- Does the host government issue replacement passports for
full or limited validity (i.e. the time remaining on the
original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)?
Full validity is generally issued. A one-year passport may be
issued if expedited service is requested.
-- Does the host government have special

NEW DELHI 00001052 006 OF 008


regulations/procedures for dealing with &habitual8 losers
of passports or bearers who have reported their passports
stolen multiple times? Yes, according to contacts, but the
details of the procedures were not publically available. As
per the FRRO the Bureau of Immigration and FRRO, lookouts are
placed on those habitual losers of passports or bearers who
have reported their passports stolen multiple times. The
subject is then detained and questioned when encountered in
their entry/exit registration lookout systems.
-- Are replacement passports of the same or different
appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have
something along the lines of our emergency partial duration
passports)? Same appearance.
-- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or
fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports? Same
appearance.
-- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the
number of replacement or &clean8 (i.e. no evidence of prior
travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas? No.
-- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number
series or otherwise identified? No.

F. (SBTJ) Fraud Detection:
-- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are
instances of fraud involving documents followed up? Local
immigration and police have been very responsive to requests
and complaints filed by USG personnel, particularly part of
the ARSO/I program, targeting fraudulent documents. During FY
2008, local police arrested 280 persons countrywide for
various violations of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) related to
document fraud. In all cases, local police require a written
complaint, called a First Incident Report (FIR),to be filed
before taking action. Neither immigration nor police
officials will routinely take action against a traveler until
the traveler presents the fraudulent documents at the
immigration check point.
Likewise, Airline Liaison Officers (ALOs) and document
advisors from the UK, Canada, Austria, and Germany working at
the airports in New Delhi and Mumbai have reported that
immigration and police will take document fraud cases
referred by these officers. Immigration officials at the
primary international airports do have examination equipment
such as U/V lamps and training on basic document detection.
However, fraud detection varies widely depending on the
volume of crossings or entries, affluence of the state
containing the POE and the resources and personnel assigned
to the POE by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Immigration
officials tend to detect more fraud with foreign documents as
these travelers often receive more scrutiny that travelers
with Indian documents.
-- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken
out of circulation, or made harder to use? In cases where
immigration officials have referred the case to police and
the individual has been arrested, the documents are normally
seized as part of the criminal case. However, it is normal
for the immigration officials to refuse entry and return the
traveler to the originating country with the same fraudulent
documents. Gol officials do not routinely cancel, mark, or
seize these documents, particularly for transit passengers.
It is not uncommon for Airline Liaison Officers from the U.K.
Canada, Germany, or Austria, to encounter or off-load the
same traveler presenting the same fraudulent document on
multiple occasions. Gol officials do not routinely issue a
substitute transportation letter for the deported traveler
and seize the fraudulent, counterfeit, or altered document.

G. (SBU) Privacy and Data Security:
-- What are the country,s policies on records related to the
questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered
at points of entry into the country? These records would fall
under Under the Right to Information (RTI) Act of 2005 as

NEW DELHI 00001052 007 OF 008


well as any other internal policy and procedure documents.
-- How are those records stored, and for how long? Unknown.
-- What are the country,s restrictions on the collection or
use of sensitive data? Unknown.
-- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public
on the implementation of new databases of records? Unknown.
-- Are there any laws relating to security features for
government computer systems that hold personally identifying
information? Unknown.
-- What are the rules on an individual,s ability to access
data that homeland security agencies hold about them?
Under the Right to Information (RTI) Act of 2005, Indian
citizens as well as overseas Indian citizens (OCI,s) and
Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs),can request access to
information held about them within Indian files. Under the
Act, information is defined as any material in any form,
including records, documents, memos, e* mails, opinions,
advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks,
contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material
held in any electronic form and information relating to any
private body which can be accessed by a public authority
under any other law for the time being in force. Likewise,
the Act includes records in the forms of documents,
manuscripts, files, microfiche, and copies of documents.
Requesters may ask for certified copies of the documents as
well as the information in the form of a diskette, video
tapes, or any electronic medium in which it is stored.
The Act does allow the G0I to withhold release of information
in cases which affect issues of sovereignty, law enforcement,
security, or bi-lateral foreign relations. The Act
specifically allows the Gol to reject from disclosure,
"information received in confidence from foreign Government"
(section 8(1) (f) and "information, the disclosure of which
would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or
identify the source of information or assistance given in
confidence for law enforcement or security purposes" (section
8(l)(g)). To enhance the security of any information provided
to the Gol, it is recommended that a provision be included by
the USG that the information being provided to the Gol be
exempted from disclosure under the RTI Act of 2005, sections
8(1) (f) and/or 8(1) (g)
Requesters under the RTI Act are required to state that they
will not circulate, use, or share information with any person
or in any manner which would be detrimental to the Unity and
Sovereignty or against the Interest of India. However, it is
unknown how vigorously this provision is enforced.
-- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of
birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about
enforcement actions)? Unknown.
-- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the
government to obtain these types of data? Under the RTI Act,
only citizens, OCI,s (Overseas Citizens of India) and PlO,s
(Persons of Indian Origin) can ask for information.
Non-Indian citizens who are married to an Indian citizen do
qualify for PlO status and would therefore be entitled to
request information under the RTI Act. Indian citizens
overseas can file a request with the closest Indian Embassy
or Consulate. The Act extends to all of India except the
State of Jammu and Kashmir.

H. (SBU) Identifying Appropriate Partners:
Department would appreciate post,s in-house assessment of
whether host government would be an appropriate partner in
data sharing. Considerations include whether host government
watchlists may include political dissidents (as opposed or in
addition to terrorists),and whether host governments would
share or use U.S. watchlist data inappropriately, etc.
-- We have no information to answers these questions.
-- Are there political realities which would preclude a
country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement

NEW DELHI 00001052 008 OF 008


with the U.S.?
-- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed
to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and
nondisclosure of information?
-- How much information sharing does the host country do
internally? Is there a single consolidated database, for
example? If not, do different ministries share information
amongst themselves?
-- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal
statutes that do so?
BURLEIGH