MINURCAT RISING: REINFORCED UN PKO REPLACES EUFOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000097

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

NSC FOR GAVIN AND HUDSON
PARIS FOR POL - DELIA AND KANEDA
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
ADDIS PASS TO USAU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF MASS MARR UN PKO SU LY
CD
SUBJECT: MINURCAT RISING: REINFORCED UN PKO REPLACES EUFOR
IN CHAD, SRSG BRIEFS ON STATUS AND DARFUR REFUGEE SITUATION

REF: A. A. USUN 0281

B. B. NDJAMENA 0057

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--------------
SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) The EU PKO EUFOR, one of two PKOs authorized by
UNSC 1778, stood down March 15, transferring its authority to
provide security to civilians in Eastern Chad and
Northeastern CAR to the UN's MINURCAT, whose mandate was
enhanced to include such a role by UNSC 1861. Many of EUFOR's
EU-member and other troops were re-hatted to MINURCAT March
15 and will continue for varying lengths of time in the UN
PKO, as new troop contingents are folded into MINURCAT. SRSG
victor Angelo's planning for the transition appears likely to
obviate any security gap in eastern Chad as the UN assesses
its ability to absorb more refugees if Khartoum's post-ICC
indictment actions provoke Darfur IDPs to cross into Chad.
The SRSG has stressed to diplomats here that MINURCAT's
mandate under UNSC 1861 is virtually identical to the
combined mandate of EUFOR and MINURCAT under UNSC 1778, with
the addition in 1861 of "benchmarks" to assess MINURCAT's
performance and give the SRSG observer status in the Dakar
Accord. Angelo has also emphasized that he is keen to
implement the "civilian" aspects of the mandate -- in the
areas of human rights, including use of child soldiers, and
reform and strengthening of the judicial and penal systems in
eastern Chad, which will complement the deployment of
UN-trained Chadian police and gendarmes to provide security
inside the refugee camps and IDP sites. The SRSG underlines
that progress on the civilian side will depend on adequate
funding of the Trust Fund that provides money for the
civilian projects and activities.


2. (SBU) Transfer of Authority ceremonies went well on the
ground here, and MINURCAT II has begun to take control of the
role, personnel, and facilities of EUFOR. The SRSG's plan
for the gradual departure of major EUFOR troop contributors
France and Poland, who will not stay in MINURCAT, appears
sensible and viable. SRSG Angelo's ability to plan,
organize, and negotiate with the GOC will be of key
importance if the situation in Darfur results in significant
new refugee flows into Chad. The USG should be prepared to
assist him if negotiations with the GOC for more sites and
refugees become necessary. END SUMMARY.

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EUFOR STANDS DOWN
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3. Ambassador attended ceremonies in N'Djamena (March 14)
and Abeche (March 15) to mark the Transfer of Authority from
EUFOR to MINURCAT March 15. UN PKO Chief Alain LeRoi and
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner were the leading
visiting EU and UN officials taking part. The EU PKO EUFOR,
one of two PKOs authorized by UNSC 1778, stood down March 15
and its authority to provide security to civilians in Eastern
Chad and Northeastern CAR was transferred to MINURCAT, whose
mandate was enhanced to include that role by UNSC 1861. Many
of EUFOR's troops were re-hatted to MINURCAT March 15 and
will continue for varying lengths of time in the UN PKO, as
new troop contingents are folded into MINURCAT. SRSG Victor
Angelo's planning for the transition appears likely to
obviate any security gap in eastern Chad as the UN assesses
its ability to absorb more refugees if Khartoum's post-ICC
indictment actions provoke Darfur IDPs to cross into Chad.

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MINURCAT II
STANDS UP
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4. (U) SRSG Victor Angelo briefed UNSC member ambassadors
resident in Chad March 18 on the nascent MINURCAT's
operational status and planning. (COMs of U.S., France,
Libya, China, and Russia comprise the group, which meets with
the SRSG bi-weeekly.) He stressed that MINURCAT's mandate
under UNSC 1861 was virtually identical to the combined

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mandate of EUFOR and MINURCAT under UNSC 1778. Exceptions
were the addition in UNSC 1861 of "benchmarks" to assess
MINURCAT's performance of its responsibilities, and the
granting of observer status to the SRSG in the Dakar Accord
implementation process between Chad and Sudan. Angelo
stressed also that he was keen to implement the "civilian"
aspects of the mandate -- in the areas of human rights,
including use of child soldiers, and reform and strengthening
of the judicial and penal systems in eastern Chad, which
would complement the deployment of UN-trained Chadian police
and gendarmes to provide security inside the refugee camps
and IDP sites. The SRSG underlined that progress on the
civilian side depended on adequate funding of the Trust Fund
that provides oney for civilian projects and activities.

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COUNTING THE TROOPS
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5. The Current Lineup: As of March 18, MINURCAT's military
strength is some 4,890 out of a total authorized 5,200. That
includes 780 French, 400 Irish, 400 Polish, 160 Russians, 120
HQs staff, 100 Austrians, 100 Finns, and 40 Croats.


6. In the Pipeline: En route are: 850 Nepalese, 800
Ghanaians, 500 Togolese, 300 Malawians, 150-200 Uruguayans,
50 Egyptians, and 40 Bangladeshis. Requests have been made
to China, Libya, and Namibia for small specialized units --
logistics, medical, and transport specialties.


7. The force structure will change over time, as countries
like France and Poland withdraw their troops as troops in the
pipeline arrive and deploy. French troops will be out of
MINURCAT by September, but France will continue to provide
logistical and transportation support to MINURCAT from EFT
(Elements Francais au Tchad) based bilaterally here.

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HOW IT WILL BE DEPLOYED
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8. MINURCAT Deployments:

-- Northern Sector: With bases at Iriba and Bahai:
Currently manned by Poles and Croats, who will cede to troops
from Malawi on the latter's arrival.
-- Central Sector: With bases at Farchana and Guereda:
Currently manned by the French, who will cede to Ghanaian
troops on arrival.
-- Southern Sector: With base at Goz Beida: Currently
manned by the Irish and Finns, who will continue in MINURCAT.
-- Central African Republic: With base at Birao: Currently
French, who will cede to Togolese.
-- Headquarters and Strategic Reserve: With base in Abeche:
Nepalese, Togolese, Austrians, Russians, Norwegians, and
Bangladeshis.

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U.S. MILADS ARRIVE
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9. (U) Two U.S. military officers, an Army and an Air Force
lieutenant colonel, assigned as Military Advisors to
MINURCAT's Headquarters Staff, arrived here March 18. One is
scheduled to do intelligence analysis in the HQ in N'Djamena
and the other will assist in operations at Abeche airport.

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DIS AND COORDINATION
MECHANISMS
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10. SRSG Angelo reported that all 850 members of the
Detachement Integre de Securite (DIS),Chadian police and
gendarmerie officers trained by the UN, were now deployed in
refugee camps in eastern Chad. The GOC had agreed to arm all
of them with side arms in the coming week. The SRSG reported
that the GOC was reviewing the structure and performance of
its own specially-created agency for liaison between the GOC

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and EUFOR and MINURCAT, called the National Committee on
International Forces in Chad (CONAFIT). The goal was to make
CONAFIT more streamlined and more efficient. The SRSG said
that MINURCAT elements would have a weekly coordination
meeting with GOC elements -- CONAFIT, Chad military
commanders, Chad police and gendarmerie commanders, local GOC
officials. MINURCAT would also hold weekly meetings with the
INGOs active in eastern Chad, alternately in Abeche and
N'Djamena. The SRSG said that the general agreement between
MINURCAT and the GOC would soon be supplemented by a Status
of Forces agreement (SOFA) to take into account MINURCAT's
new military security role and personnel.

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MORE DARFUR REFUGEES
TO CHAD?
--------------


11. (SBU) The SRSG said that as the senior UN official in
Chad now, he was reviewing the situation in Darfur,
especially if Khartoum's recent expulsion of INGOs and
possible negative actions regarding security of Darfur IDPs
were to motivate more Darfuris to cross the border into Chad.
Right now, the UN was not seeing too much movement of IDPs,
but it was early still. What movement among IDPs the UN was
seeing was north-south movement, rather than east-west
movement. That was positive, as was the fact that IDPs in
Darfur are generally not located near the Chadian border,
which made eventual IDP decisions to cross the border more
studied ones. The SRSG said that UN agencies in Chad had
estimated that they could accommodate up to 50,000 more
Darfur refugees if necessary, with existing stocks in
existing locations. After that, negotiations with the GOC
for more sites and more refugee acceptances would be
necessary. Such negotiations, he noted, were never easy.

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COMMENT
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12. (SBU) The Transfer of Authority ceremonies went well on
the ground here, and MINURCAT II has begun to take control of
the role, personnel, and facilities of EUFOR. The SRSG's
plan for gradual departure of major EUFOR troop contributors
who will not stay in MINURCAT (France and Poland) appears
sensible and viable, obviating any security gap. SRSG
Angelo's ability to plan, organize, and negotiate with the
GOC will be of key importance if the situation in Darfur
results in the arrival of significant new numbers of refugees
from Darfur into Chad. The USG should be prepared to assist
him if negotiations with the GOC for more sites and refugees
becomes necessary.



13. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.









NIGRO