Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NDJAMENA234
2009-06-16 16:26:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

MINURCAT CHIEF DESCRIBES POST-EUFOR TROOP

Tags:  PREL PREF PHUM SU CT CD 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000234 

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES, IO/PKO, AND PRM/AFR
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL -- LORD
PARIS FOR POL -- KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM SU CT CD
SUBJECT: MINURCAT CHIEF DESCRIBES POST-EUFOR TROOP
CONTRIBUTION GAPS, INCREASING CHALLENGES IN CAR

REF: N'DJAMENA 223

This message is sensitive but unclassified. Not for Internet
dissemination.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000234

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES, IO/PKO, AND PRM/AFR
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL -- LORD
PARIS FOR POL -- KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM SU CT CD
SUBJECT: MINURCAT CHIEF DESCRIBES POST-EUFOR TROOP
CONTRIBUTION GAPS, INCREASING CHALLENGES IN CAR

REF: N'DJAMENA 223

This message is sensitive but unclassified. Not for Internet
dissemination.


1. (SBU) Summary: On June 16, UN Special Representative
Victor Angelo da Silva chaired a meeting of diplomatic reps
in N'Djamena to address concerns about MINURCAT's
peacekeeping activities, including the inability of some
contributing states to deploy fully-equipped peacekeeping
contingents in a timely manner to Eastern Chad. Angelo was
flanked by MINURCAT Force Commander Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji
of Kenya, who described shortfalls in manpower, armaments,
equipment and transport, which Kandji said were becoming
particularly acute as the last EUFOR units drew down in
preparation for July departure. Additional MINURCAT
officials, including the Acting UNPOL Commander and the Head
of the Human Rights Section, reported on activities within
their purviews. Angelo noted that the security situation in
CAR was rapidly reaching a point where MINURCAT would have
neither the mandate nor the military capability to respond,
potentially leaving 40,000 CAR IDPs without international
assistance. End summary.

--------------
MINURCAT PEACEKEEPING
--------------


2. (SBU) MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo devoted much of his
monthly meeting for N'Djamena's diplomatic corps to a
discussion of force generation and troop contribution
matters. Force Commander Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji made
clear that with one-third to one-half of expected
international peacekeeping units yet to be deployed, or
deployed without proper equipment, MINURCAT was having to
make very targeted decisions about where to conduct patrols.
As the rainy season approached, peacekeepers were focused on
prepositioning supplies. Beyond that task, they were making
a priority of humanitarian escorts and liaison with the NGO
community. A mechanism for centralized escort requests had
recently been established and seemed to be functioning well,
said Kandji. The arrival of Russian experts deployed to
CONAFIT (Chad's own Coordination national d'appui a la force
internationale) was improving MINURCAT's coordination with

the GoC, and Russia's provision of helicopters had increased
the UN's lift and medevac capacities (which had previously
depended on two Italian-provided C-130s and additional Polish
assets).


3. (SBU) Kandji expressed concern that some newly-arriving
international peacekeeping units had appeared without force
protection equipment, meaning that they were for the time
being "camping in Abeche," unable to perform duties
independent of property-equipped peacekeepers, some of these
holdover troops from the previous EUFOR deployment. Kandji
noted that ensuring the rapid deployment of the remaining
one-third of MINURCAT's promised troops before the final
departure of EUFOR units would require considerable pressure
in New York. In the course of June, Ghanaian and Nepalese
units were set to arrive, but unless they brought suitable
force protection gear, they would "just take up space."


4. (SBU) According to MINURCAT's Administrative Section
Head, the chief problem facing the UN in Chad in addition to
inadequate troop deployments was the failure of an ICAO team
to complete preparation of the "apron" around the airfield at
Abeche. The team would arrive later in the week, he noted,
so the problem appeared to be on the road to resolution. The
French Ambassador offered that although EUFOR troops might
appear better-equipped than some non-European newcomers to
MINURCAT, the reality was that repayment and financing
problems were proving so difficult for the EU to handle that
the entire concept of a separate European Security and
Defense Policy had come in for questioning.

---
DIS
---


NDJAMENA 00000234 002 OF 003



5. (SBU) The Acting Commander of MINURCAT's UN Police units
(responsible for advising and training the Chadian
Detachement integree de securite (DIS),which provides police
protection in refugee camps) reported on the visit of a New
York-based assessment mission sent to advise on how to
overcome start-up problems with the Chadian force. The
Acting Commander indicated that the assessment team had
concluded that the DIS was functioning effectively despite
certain well-publicized incidents. (See reftel for the
assessment team's debrief to Embassy N'Djamena.)

--------------
CHILD SOLDIERS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
--------------


6. (SBU) The Head of MINURCAT's Human Rights Section
described initiatives to address violence against women,
noting that the phenomenon had most recently been reported in
significant numbers in May, at the time of the Chadian Army's
victory over Chadian rebels, following which soldiers from
the Armee Nationale Tchadienne (ANT) had been accused of
carrying out several rapes. The UN and DIS were involved
with helping victims find means to bring charges and deal
with the problem of impunity, as some soldiers claimed they
were immune from prosecution.


7. (SBU) Impunity also remained a challenge with respect to
the hiring of child soldiers, said the Human Rights Section
Head, particularly among JEM commanders. The ANT, for its
part, had essentially stopped the practice of recruiting
children, he continued, but had not yet fulfilled its
promises to demobilize those who were already a part of the
force. MINUCAT had active programs of "sensitization" on the
subject, and had found Chad's MoD quite receptive, to the
point where the MoD had agreed to set up a transition center
for child soldiers in Abeche. But desire at the higher
levels of the Chadian government to end use of children in
combat had not yet transferred into willingness on the part
of some lower-level commanders to free minors in their
charge. Meanwhile, Chadian rebels seemed to be continuing to
recruit children, and were suspected of making sweeps through
some villages in Eastern Chad in an effort to round up
youngsters and take them to Sudan for training before the
seasonal rains began. Some parents seemed inclined to show
support for the rebel cause by offering up their children,
said the Human Rights Section Head. Additional sensitization
work was clearly needed among rebel groups and sympathizers.


8. (SBU) As for humanitarian demining, one major project in
the vicinity of Am Dam was now completed, the Human Rights
Section Head noted. The EU Ambassador to Chad added that his
organization was engaged in a demining project in the
vicinity of Goz Beida.

--------------
SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION IN CAR
--------------


9. (SBU) Victor Angelo concluded the meeting with a
description of the precarious situation in Northern CAR,
where many NGOs had suspended operations in the course of the
previous several days due to security concerns. MINURCAT was
far from having the military capacity to deal with the
security needs of northern CAR, Angelo continued, which was
now characterized by a proliferation of ethnically-based
militias on both sides of the Chad-CAR border, as well as
rampant banditry in CAR. MINURCAT's relations with the CARG
remained good, but Bozize's long-term ability to hold onto
power in Bangui was far from certain, and had evaporated in
the North. Under the circumstances, MINURCAT was considering
airlifting supplies to vulnerable populations along the
border, 40,000 of whom were on the CAR side and 70,000 of
whom were in Chad.

--------------
CHAD-SUDAN BORDER MONITORING
--------------


10. (SBU) Charge d'affaires spoke briefly with Victor

NDJAMENA 00000234 003 OF 003


Angelo about the possibility of better coordination between
MINURCAT and UNAMID, including through joint surveillance of
the Chad-Sudan border (an idea originally proposed in the
course of the visit of U.S. Special Envoy Scott Gration to
Chad in May.) Angelo recommended making a proposal in New
York, as he said that neither he nor UNAMID's SRSG was
well-placed to approach the other about a new joint mandate.
BREMNER