MAKING CHAD A PART OF THE SOLUTION IN DARFUR: AN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000111

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR SE GRATION, AF/FO, AF/C, AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM PTER MASS LY SU CT CD
SUBJECT: MAKING CHAD A PART OF THE SOLUTION IN DARFUR: AN
ACTION PLAN FOR POSITIVE OUTCOMES IN THE REGION

REF: A. 1. NDJAMENA 103

B. 2. NDJAMENA 102

C. 3. NDJAMENA 100

D. 4. NDJAMENA 98

E. 5. NDJAMENA 97

This message is Sensitive but Unclassified. Not for Internet
dissemination.


1. This is an action message: See para 5 and subsequent.

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CHAD MOST AFFECTED BY DARFUR
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2. (SBU) Besides Sudan itself, Chad is the country most
affected by the Darfur Crisis. Virtually all Darfuri
refugees are in Chad, which also hosts a vast humanitarian
assistance effort and a UN PKO, MINURCAT. Darfur-created
tensions between Chad and Sudan have degenerated into a proxy
war that has made Chad prey to Sudan-sponsored Chadian
rebels. These groups regularly attack, reaching Ndjamena
twice in the past three years, nearly overturning the
government, and causing havoc, taking innocent lives and
destroying infrastructure across the country. The GOC's
security needs have led to high defense spending, reduced
funding for social and economic development, and far less
attention to elections and government reform than we would
like.

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GOC SEEKS USG ENGAGEMENT
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3. (SBU) The Government of Chad is obsessed with the
regional nature of the Darfur crisis and seeks to engage with
the USG to resolve Darfur-created instability. The GOC is
eager to see the results of the USG's review of Sudan policy,
and keen to work with us as we implement policies that
address problems in Sudan as well as in Chad. Chadian
officials hope for U.S. support for, and more active
involvement in, UN, AU and OIC efforts to manage the Darfur
crisis and improve Chad-Sudan relations. They would like
existing Afro-Arab efforts to include initiatives not only to
reconcile Sudanese rebels with the GoS but also to end
Sudanese financial and material support to Chadian rebels.
Domestically, the threat from Sudan discourages and
undermines efforts by many, including the current Prime
Minister, to toward better governance, democratic elections,
and official transparency. Chadian officials will need
considerable encouragement and assistance to move toward
elections on schedule, to take concrete steps to restore
relations with IFIs, and to conduct institution-building and
development of the public sector and economy. MINURCAT's
"civilian" mandate to promote human rights and spur judicial
and penal reform now join robust EU and French efforts to
promote better and more effective governance.

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U.S. INTERESTS
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4. (SBU) The USG's humanitarian interests in Darfur are
obvious. Our interests in Chad derive from the nation's
proximity to and implication in the Darfur situation. The
USG already invests heavily in Chad: In 2009, we will spend
approximately USD 125 million to assist refugees and IDPs,
and upwards of USD 150 million on MINURCAT. Chad thus
already serves as a platform for carrying out our regional
stabilization goals. But the current platform is unstable
and could tip in a negative direction if we do not shore it
up. We should keep in mind the extreme fragility of the
Chadian state, one of the weakest in the world. Preventing
Chad from moving toward failing- or failed-state status is a
legitimate aim of USG policy, and merits greater attention.
We believe that we can use our presence here more effectively
by undertaking some if not all of the additional steps
outlined below.

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AN ACTION PLAN FOR REGIONAL PROGRESS
TOWARD A SOLUTION IN DARFUR
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5. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: That the U.S. consider enhancing
Darfur policy options by taking actions vis-a-vis Chad and
the GOC, in the areas of Diplomacy, Democracy/Good
Governance, Counterterrorism Cooperation, and Security

NDJAMENA 00000111 002 OF 003


Assistance, and by reinforcing Embassy Ndjamena's ability to
implement USG policy here, outlined in paras 6-10 below.

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DIPLOMACY
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6. (SBU) The USG could:

-- Re-Designate SE as "Special Envoy for Sudan and Eastern
Chad" or "Special Envoy for Sudan, Eastern Chad, and
Northeastern CAR";

-- Arrange an early visit to Chad by SE Gration;

-- Arrange an early visit to Chad by an AF Bureau senior
official;

-- Provide an early invitation to a senior Chadian leader to
visit Washington, with assurances of appropriately high-level
meetings;

-- Encourage the UK to establish its (planned) diplomatic
presence here;

-- Encourage Turkey to establish its (planned) diplomatic
mission here ASAP;

-- Encourage the Saudis to reopen their Embassy here;

-- Consult more closely with the French and EU on Chad;

-- Consult with the Libyans and the Qataris on their efforts
toward Chad-Sudan reconciliation;

-- Increase USG support to MINURCAT by: Assigning more U.S.
military advisers to MINURCAT; assigning U.S. police officers
to UNPOL; and contributing to the Trust Fund for civil
affairs projects.

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DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
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7. (SBU) The USG could:

-- Increase USG assistance to the 2010 election process;

-- Review the USG approach to Chad's relations with the IFIs,
with a view to encouraging each side to better meet the
other's expectations;

-- Facilitate meetings in Washington for the Chadian Finance
Minister and senior officials from Treasury;

-- Consider USG technical assistance to Chad in the area of
public finance and resource management;

-- Consider deploying a G/TIP TDY team to Chad to provide
advice on resolving trafficking issues, with the aim of
avoiding sanctions.

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COUNTERTERRORISM
COOPERATION
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8. (SBU) The USG could:

-- Restart military-to-military CT cooperation under TSCTP,
and reinforce that point with a visit by AFRICOM CG Ward.
(Restarting TSCTP cooperation is already in train, but will
be facilitated by resolving Leahy Vetting procedural issues.)

-- Reinforce ongoing civilian CT cooperation, including by
visits here by senior S/CT and/or ICITAP leaders. (This also
will be facilitated by resolution of Leahy Vetting procedural
issues.)

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SECURITY ASSISTANCE
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9. (SBU) The USG could:

-- Increase funding for IMET and FMS programs;

-- Seek a U.S.-produced alternative to C-130Js for Chad.

NDJAMENA 00000111 003 OF 003




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U.S. RESOURCES IN COUNTRY
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10. (SBU) The USG could:

-- Assign Long-term TDY Reporting Officer to Embassy Ndamena
dedicated to the situation in Darfur and Eastern Chad.

-- Deploy an S/CRS Team to Chad.

-- Ensure increased USAID/OFDA TDY presence in country.

-- Provide increased travel funding so Embassy Officers could
make working visits to Khartoum, Tripoli, Paris and Brussels.
NIGRO