KENYA POLICE OVERVIEW, PART THREE: THE WAY FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NAIROBI 001183

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

AF/E FOR SUSAN DRIANO; INL FOR LENDSEY SMALLS AND KEVIN
BLAKEMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019
TAGS: ASEC KCRM KJUS PGOV PHUM KE
SUBJECT: KENYA POLICE OVERVIEW, PART THREE: THE WAY FORWARD

REF: A. 2008 NAIROBI 2212

B. 2008 NAIROBI 2253

C. 2008 NAIROBI 2401

D. 2008 NAIROBI 2563

E. 2008 NAIROBI 2660

F. NAIROBI 458

G. NAIROBI 551

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger, Reasons 1.4 b,d


1. (U) Summary: This cable is the third in a three-part
series on the police in Kenya. Part one provided an overview
of police structure and leadership, and assessed the
strengths and weaknesses of the main police agencies. Part
two summarized our current assistance to Kenyan law
enforcement agencies. This cable notes challenges facing the
main police agencies, progress to date on police reform, and
how best to engage with the law enforcement sector here to
achieve U.S. policy goals.


2. (U) Of the three major police services (the Kenya Police
Service (KPS),Administration Police (AP) and Kenya Wildlife
Service (KWS)),only the KWS has not been accused of
committing serious human rights abuses. Allegations against
the KPS and AP include torture, extrajudicial killing, rape,
excessive use of force, extortion, failure to intervene, and
corruption. To date, neither the KPS nor the AP leadership
has undertaken any publicly known credible investigation into
these allegations. The commission appointed to investigate
the post-election violence in Kenya, known as the Waki
Commission, recommended a number of police reforms in its
500-page report. (See ref C). Our assistance is designed to
support specific U.S. interests (for example,
counterterrorism and support for the goals of the Women's
Justice and Empowerment Initiative) and to avoid assistance
which could directly or indirectly contribute to human rights
abuses.


3. (SBU) We have not yet seen significant efforts toward
implementation of any suggested reforms, although the
Minister of Internal Security just convened a National Task
Force on Police Reform chaired by retired judge Philip
Ransley (additional details to be reported septel). The
commission has been directed to submit its report no later
than July 31, 2009. The Ambassador has met with Ransley, and
post and Task Force staff are meeting to discuss ways in
which U.S. assistance and expertise can best further the
process of reform.


4. (C) Following a review of the issues related to security
sector reform and our current assistance programming, post
has four recommendations for future engagement: first, that
we continue our focus on and support to coastal, maritime,
and border security elements; second, that we create an
Embassy-wide standard "application" that all candidates for
training should fill out and that must be submitted prior to
Leahy vetting; third, that we focus our section 1207 police
pillar on reform, and condition other training, especially
equipment grants, on progress on key reform recommendations;
and fourth, that we institute better interagency coordination
and seek greater Washington input into the development of our
Mission-wide security assistance policy. End summary.

MUNGIKI KILLINGS


5. (C) In 2007, accusations began to emerge from local human
rights organizations and the media that a special Kenya
Police Service (KPS) squad called the Kwe kwe (the Kiswahili
word for "weed," as in weeding out bad elements from the
community) was executing members of the Mungiki gang. The UN
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, Philip Alston,
visited Kenya in February 2009. In his initial report in
April 2009, he asserted that police death squads were
assigned to kill suspected Mungiki members, and said he took
testimony from a former squad member that he and his
colleagues were personally involved in the murder of 58
alleged Mungiki members. Following Alston's report, the KPS
leadership initially denied that the Kwe Kwe existed, then in
subsequent statements said the squad's work was necessary to

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protect the community from the Mungiki menace.


6. (U) The Mungiki began as a religious/community
organization promoting a return to traditional Kikuyu values
and beliefs; it morphed into an organized criminal gang and
was subsequently outlawed by the Kenyan government. The
Mungiki is, in fact, an extremely violent gang with both
political and security sector connections. They derive most
of their income through extortion, particularly in the public
transport sector, and are responsible for murders, torture,
maiming, and beheading victims with little provocation. Small
business owners and some homeowners, especially in some slum
areas in Nairobi and Central province, are also forced to pay
for "protection" or face destruction of their property. The
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNHCR) alleges
that, in 2007 and 2008, KPS officers killed more than 500
suspected Mungiki members.

POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE


7. (U) When the post-election violence broke out in late
December 2007, the Kenya Police Service (KPS) and
Administration Police (AP) were accused by local and
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of
committing serious human rights abuses, including torture,
rape, extrajudicial killing, and excessive use of force.
According to the report of the Waki Commission, which heard
testimony from dozens of witnesses during its investigation
into the post-election violence (see ref C),both the KPS
and, to a much lesser extent, the AP, were implicated in
using excessive force to suppress rioters, in shooting
unarmed citizens, and in sexually assaulting women. In
particular, the KPS' General Services Unit (GSU) and the AP's
Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU),both paramilitary units, were
accused of using excessive force and extrajudicial killings
of civilians.


8. (SBU) However, the police have also been victims of civil
disobedience and on more than one occasion have been
overwhelmed and violently attacked. Angry mobs have
reportedly killed police officers, including in an incident
when hundreds of rioters stormed an arsenal to obtain arms
for use in inter-tribal clashes. Underlying public sentiment
is a deep distrust of the police, which can easily lead to
mob action and violence that prompts ill-trained and
inexperienced officers to react adversely and thus fuel
further violence and mistrust. In the long term, the cycle of
mistrust and violence has resulted in allegations of
sustained human rights abuses by members of the security
forces.

RECENT PROBLEMATIC OPERATIONS


9. (U) In March 2008, the Kenyan military and AP began an
operation in the remote Mount Elgon area of western Kenya
designed to neutralize the Sabaot Land Defense Force (SLDF),
a local militia group that has been terrorizing the
population since 2006. About one month into the operation,
allegations of serious human rights abuses by both police and
military began to emerge, which are more extensively covered
in ref B.


10. (SBU) In late October 2008, Army, KPS and AP personnel
were deployed to the towns of El Wak and Mandera, both
located near Kenya's border with Somalia. Their mandate was
to provide security relief to the area and to seize illegal
weapons that were fueling local inter-clan conflict in the
area. (See refs D and E). Local residents alleged that KPS
and AP forces used excessive force to induce them to reveal
weapons caches or to turn in weapons. Poloffs visiting the
area spoke to local AP and KPS officers about the
allegations. They did not deny the allegations, but stated
that the operation was necessary. To date, neither the KPS
nor the AP have undertaken a publicly known credible
investigation of the allegations.

RESPONDING TO PROTESTS AND CRIME


11. (U) Local media report that police frequently use

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excessive force in responding to protests and crime,
especially in Nairobi. In March 2009, after unknown
assailants murdered two human rights activists (see ref F),
students at the University of Nairobi protested. Police
allegedly shot and killed one student during the protest,
which had turned violent. Three police officers were arrested
in the case, but subsequently released without charge after
forensic reports indicated the bullet recovered from the
student's body was not fired from a standard police weapon.
The student's death, as well as the murder of the activists,
remains unsolved. On April 22, seven carjackers were fatally
shot by police on Lunga Lunga Road in Nairobi. In recent
months, police have shot and killed men accused of stealing
cell phones from pedestrians along Uhuru Highway, one of
Nairobi's main streets.


12. (C) The use of excessive force highlights several key
weaknesses in the way the KPS in particular is managed. There
is essentially no oversight of police conduct, either via
internal or external mechanisms. A Police Oversight Board
formed in September 2008 has not received sufficient funding
and has reportedly succumbed to political infighting. Police
are poorly trained and suffer from low morale and a very poor
public image. The public in general, and the police in
particular, have very low confidence that Kenya's backlogged,
corrupt, and inefficient legal system can deliver justice to
crime victims. The Police Act of 1970, though revised in
1988, is in desperate need of comprehensive revision. For
example, police are authorized to shoot a fleeing felon in
the back. Public lack of faith in both the police and the
justice system also feeds vigilantism, a common problem in
both urban and rural Kenya.


13. (U) Corruption is also rampant in the police services.
Residents of Nairobi's Mathare slum allege that most people
who are arrested there (for assault or rape, for example) are
offered the chance to buy back their freedom. Only those who
are unable to raise the cash will go to jail. In some cases,
the victim who made the complaint will then be arrested and
charged with the crime of giving false information to a
police officer, thus giving officers the chance to collect
twice on the same case. The KPS Traffic Police routinely put
up roadblocks in Nairobi and on major roads throughout the
country. An alarming number of motorists stopped at these
roadblocks are expected to pay cash bribes and frequently do
so. Commercial trucks and matatus (public mini-buses that
form the heart of Kenya's public transportation system) are
favorite targets and consider bribes to the police a routine
cost of doing business.

RECOMMENDATIONS


14. (C) In two areas in particular, we should continue what
we are doing and what is working well. Namely, we should
continue our support for, outreach to, and cultivation of
those services involved in border, coastal, and maritime
security. Our engagement in these areas is in our direct U.S.
national interests (promoting regional peace and security and
combating terrorism and piracy),and the GOK has demonstrated
its desire to collaborate in these areas.


15. (C) In an unprecedented development, the KWS and AP are
working closely together on border security, and they are
keen to learn from and collaborate with us. In addition, the
decision to focus on maritime security and police
investigative capacity was the product of a thorough
assessment and subsequent review coupled with multiple
meetings with Commissioner Ali, AP Commandant Mbugua, and
others. Lastly, with regard to vetting, post has implemented
a policy that exceeds minimum standards, and we will continue
that. However, post also plans to create a Mission-wide
"standard application" for all potential training candidates
to complete prior to initiation of the Leahy vetting process.
Information contained in the standard application will help
in identifying early individuals who may have a "hit" in a
post database.


16. (C) Our second recommendation is to be prepared to focus
a new assistance program on police reform when the National

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Task Force on Police Reform recommends meaningful reforms and
the government demonstrates willingness to implement them.
The Task Force has been directed to submit its report no
later than July 31, 2009. The Ambassador has met with the
Task Force chairman, and post and Task Force staff are
meeting to discuss ways in which U.S. assistance and
expertise can best further the process of reform.


17. (C) While the proposed 1207 police pillar will focus on
reforms in the area of police-community relations that were
negatively affected by the post-election violence, other
reforms are also urgently needed. For example, security
sector assistance could address the need to strengthen
conflict resolution mechanisms and develop an early warning
response system for police. We might provide technical
experts to assist in drafting a modern code of conduct and
use of force policy for both the AP and KPS. Small grants for
local NGOs to engage police in peace-building and
reconciliation efforts could help promote a more harmonious
civilian-police relationship, particularly in communities
most affected by the post-election violence.


18. (C) While current equipment grants are for non-lethal
equipment i.e. cyber forensics tools and boats),we may wish
to consider conditioning further training and equipment
grants on implementation of key reforms. Equipment in
particular, which is universally viewed with enthusiasm by
police agencies, should be conditioned on reform
implementation. The most critical police reforms, in addition
to revising and implementing a new code of conduct and use of
force policy, include the establishment of effective internal
and external oversight mechanisms and the creation of an
independent Police Service Commission, which would regulate
hiring, promotions, salaries, and pensions.


19. (C) Our final recommendation, which we are undertaking,
is that while focusing on border and coastal security, we
institute better inter-agency coordination at post and with
Washington. A review of our training offerings across
agencies suggests there may be some duplication of substance
and that some police personnel may be recipients of multiple
trainings, not necessarily as part of a coordinated
professional development program. The field is particularly
crowded in the area of counter-terrorism courses. While some
of the individuals trained have been able to use the training
in follow-on assignments, informal efforts to follow up with
alumni of our programs indicate that not all are able to
practice what they have learned. KPS management in particular
is prone to implementing arbitrary personnel transfers that
undermine our training investments.


20. (C) Other obstacles to the effectiveness of training
include an uncooperative KPS Commissioner, politicization of
leadership and rivalries among law enforcement agencies,
inadequate GOK funding for law enforcement agencies, and the
continuing lack of anti-terrorism or anti-money laundering
legislation. With the exception of a maritime assessment (see
para 15),no comprehensive security sector assessment has
ever been undertaken, although the Task Force on Police
Reform has been directed to assess capacity to respond to
critical threats.


21. (C) The DS/ATA program director at post has worked on
developing a comprehensive database of all Kenyan personnel
trained. This project needs to be completed and
operationalized as soon as possible. We are also seeking
greater control over candidate selection to ensure candidates
are merit-based and to eliminate as much as possible
participants whose deployment histories raise questions about
their conduct. In the continued absence of credible
investigations by the KPS and AP leadership and given the
alleged pattern of abuses, we face a significant challenge to
minimize the risk of having trained police personnel who
commit abuses. A mitigating factor rests in the focus of the
ATA programs. ATA courses target maritime security personnel,
police forensic investigators, newly formed AP/KWS border
patrol units and other specialty units that have not been
implicated in human rights abuses.


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COMMENT


22. (C) There are important U.S. national security interests
at stake in Kenya. Security sector assistance is a key means
to advance those U.S. national security interests. The
challenge we must grapple with is how best to use security
assistance to engage on areas of interest to us without in
any way contributing to human rights abuses, and how best to
use current and possible future assistance to press for and
encourage meaningful police reform. End comment.

RANNEBERGER