KENYA: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 001101

SIPDIS

FOR A/S CARSON AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GAVIN FROM THE
AMBASSADOR. LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2039
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL KE PINR
SUBJECT: KENYA: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHAEL E. RANNEBERGER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AN
D (D)


1. (C) Summary. Kenya is poised at an historic transition
point as the struggle between pro and anti-reform elements
intensifies. This message discusses the dynamics of change
underway in Kenya and its emerging, potentially positive,
impact in exerting pressure on the leaders of the coalition
government and political class to implement the reform
agenda. The proliferation of grassroots youth groups
throughout the country, and their efforts to coalesce a
national platform to push for reform across ethnic lines, is
particularly important and positive. We are encouraging and
supporting these youth groups, and we are continuing to
engage intensively with civil society, religious groups, the
private sector, and the media. We are engaging intensively
with the coalition leaders and key actors of the political
class. Combined and complementary domestic-driven and
international pressure (particularly from the U.S. and Kofi
Annan) is the most viable and promising approach to bring
about implementation of the reform agenda. Kibaki, Odinga,
and other key politicians demonstrated during the crisis last
year that they will compromise on important issues in
response to substantial pressure. Domestic-driven pressure
and U.S. efforts are having a noticeable impact on the
political class, as they scurry about to determine how best
to respond to it (and hopefully get on the winning side of
popular demands for reform implementation). We should
maintain high-level pressure through public and private
diplomacy, making clear the consequences of not proceeding
with reforms while at the same time holding out incentives if
the reform agenda is implemented. The May visit of A/S
Carson and NSC Africa Senior Director Gavin greatly
reinforced U.S. efforts, particularly through the message
delivered regarding President Obama,s concerns about lack of
progress on the reform agenda. This message discusses the
current state of play and follow-up. End summary.

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Dynamics of Change
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2. (C) Kenya is poised at a key transition point as the
struggle between pro- and anti-reform elements intensifies.
As previous reporting has spelled out, an agenda for sweeping
reform was adopted as part of the accord that established the
coalition government. At that time we and other observers
had few illusions that the coalition partners were truly
committed to a maximum effort on actual reforms. Full
implementation of the reform agenda would bring about
fundamental change in Kenya, threatening the vested interests
and culture of impunity which have prevailed in Kenya for
five decades. However, in reaching the accord last year, the
coalition partners, President Kibaki and Prime Minister
Odinga, demonstrated that they will compromise on key issues
if they are subjected to substantial pressure. At important
stages of the crisis, they overruled key hard-line advisers
to reach a solution. While international pressure,
particularly from the U.S. and the African Eminent Persons
led by Kofi Annan, was crucial to bring about a political
solution, the most important source of pressure came from the
Kenyan people directly and through civil society, the private
sector, religious groups, and the media. Domestic-driven
pressure and international efforts were complementary and
mutually reinforcing.


3. (C) Establishment of the coalition government and its
stated commitment to a sweeping reform agenda was only the
first step in resolving the post-election crisis;
implementation of the reform agenda is the second crucial
step. If the reform agenda is not implemented in substantial
part, Kenya will likely experience even greater instability
than it did last year, and perhaps well before the 2012
elections. The Kenyan people had high expectations for the
coalition government and for implementation of reforms.
Although in a speech a couple of months ago, Prime Minister
Odinga stated that the &coalition government is more about
continuity than about change,8 most Kenyans hold the
opposite view and expect serious change to address the
underlying issues which contributed to the post-election
violence.


4. (C) Reconstituting the same dynamic which led to a
political solution last year (essential though difficult in a
context that lacks the same sense of dramatic crisis) is the
most viable, and promising, approach to bring about
implementation of the reform agenda. This means coupling

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domestic-driven pressure for reform with international
pressure (and incentives),particularly by the U.S. and
through Kofi Annan,s continuing engagement. The EU remains
largely on the sidelines. In the lead-up to the December
2007 elections the EU and UK were widely perceived as
pro-Odinga, and in the early stages of the post-election
crisis they declared Kibaki illegitimate. The UK has been
working hard to overcome the lingering perception of
partisanship. PM Gordon Brown,s letter to Kibaki and Odinga,
which arrived just a few days after Secretary Clinton,s,
reinforced the message on reforms, and the UK Ambassador told
me that Foreign Secretary Miliband will visit Kenya in
mid-July to keep the pressure on.


5. (C) We have been working hard to encourage and support
domestic-driven pressure for change. The May visit of A/S
Carson and NSC Africa Senior Director Gavin greatly
reinforced these efforts. The clear message they delivered
from President Obama on the need to carry out reforms and the
marker that we will not do business as usual with those who
do not support reform cannot have been misunderstood by
Kibaki, Odinga, and the rest of the political class; it
resonated loudly in the media and with the Kenyan people; and
it escalated our efforts to a new level. Prior to the visit
we had been conveying messages about the concerns in
Washington, and the visit left Kibaki and Odinga in no doubt
as to our seriousness about the reform agenda. At the same
that we are carrying out vigorous public diplomacy, we are
also reaching out intensively to the coalition leadership and
an array of other key actors to urge implementation of the
reform agenda.


6. (C) The efforts we have been making since the signing of
the coalition accord to encourage and support domestic-driven
pressure for reform and the impact of the high-level visit
have increasingly energized civil society, religious groups,
the private sector, and the media to press for implementation
of reforms. In the absence of an obvious crisis, it is hard
to develop the type of concerted approach that we saw last
year. However, while these groups remain more fragmented and
divided than they were during the crisis, the pressure they
are exerting on the coalition leadership, parliamentarians,
and the rest of the political class is starting to be felt.

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Grassroots Youth Movements
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7. (C) Independent grassroots youth groups are proliferating
across the country. Some of these were started in recent
years and some are new, but they are all operating with a
sense of urgency to push the reform agenda. We have been
encouraging them with high profile support. As we do so and
as we continue our public diplomacy, we are citing the speech
which then-Senator Obama delivered in Kenya in August 2006
(which literally could have been written yesterday given its
relevant language on the need for reform). The Office of
Transition Initiatives is helping some groups. I have
participated in several public fora organized by these
groups, which have received extensive media coverage. The
most prominent are the Nyanza Youth Coalition, Rift Valley
Dialogue and Citizens Assembly, and Kikuyus for Change. With
our encouragement, these groups recently pulled together 100
leaders of similar youth groups representing 28 different
ethnic groups to forge an agenda across ethnic lines to press
for implementation of the reform agenda and to promote
reconciliation. Similarly, USAID has greatly expanded
support to civil society organizations with an emphasis on
coalitions representing networks of women, youth, and
religious groups. These organizations have national
grassroots coverage. Civil society organizations, including
our partners, are focusing on pushing hard for implementation
of the reform agenda through more unified strategies. Our
engagement with these groups has helped raise their profile
to the Kenyan people and coalition leaders. The numerous
grassroots organizations are becoming aware of each other,s
activities and working more closely together in part as a
result of our engagement. This is having a synergistic
impact in facilitating networking among them, and is helping
forge a national approach across ethnic lines.


8. (C) The increasing combined and complementary
international pressure (particularly the U.S. and Kofi Annan)
and domestic pressure is beginning to have a noticeable
impact, causing the coalition leadership and political class
to take notice and figure out how to respond to it. While
this falls short of bringing about implementation of the

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reforms, it has caused concern and ferment within the
coalition leadership and political class as they try to
figure out how to respond to it. Some indications that the
pressure is being felt include: Kibaki,s Party of National
Unity has in recent weeks prominently recast its image as
&the party of reform;8 new Minister of Justice Mutula
Kilonzo is talking ever more earnestly about reform,
particularly of the judiciary; a group of parliamentarians is
moving to organize a reform and reconciliation caucus; at the
Madaraka day anniversary June 1, Kibaki and Odinga put on a
show of unity and spoke in the most direct terms yet about
the need for reform, with Kibaki for the first time talking
directly about the need to end the &culture of impunity;8
and, incredibly, the President,s son Jimmy Kibaki (himself a
part of the vested interests) has publicly called for
mobilization of youth to bring about change. While it is
extremely doubtful that the PNU leadership and Jimmy Kibaki
desire anything close to fundamental change, they at least
see the need to appear to be on the right side of the issue.
In Jimmy Kibaki,s case, there is reportedly a more sinister
motive to try and co-opt the emerging grassroots youth
movement as a vehicle for his political ambitions.


9. (C) Parliamentarians are reacting in two very different
ways to the domestic-driven and international pressure, and
in particular to the youth movement. A few parliamentarians
have criticized the U.S. role in reaching out to the youth
groups, but a significant number of parliamentarians are
talking (as noted above) about organizing an informal group
to press for implementation of the reform agenda. We are
reaching out to these parliamentarians, as well as others who
can be influenced to take a pro-reform direction.


10. (C) We are continuing intensive engagement with civil
society, religious groups, the private sector, and the media
to urge a concerted effort to press for implementation of the
reform agenda. The emergence of the grassroots youth
movement is potentially quite significant because it directly
challenges the status quo, and thus the vested interests and
culture of impunity. Indeed, some well-known representatives
of the vested interests have literally tried to co-opt the
youth movements through bribery, as they have successfully
done with some civil society elements in the past. The
grassroots youth organizations are aware of this and are
determined not to be compromised.

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Reforms ) Focus on Results
--------------


11. (C) While the reform agenda is extensive, our focus is on
the following steps that can yield near-term results.
First, we are urging acceleration of the constitutional
review process to produce a draft with meaningful reforms
(particularly on executive power-sharing and devolution of
authority to local levels) can be tabled in Parliament before
the end of the year. Second, we are pressing for the
establishment within the next 2-3 months of a Special
Tribunal to hold accountable those involved in perpetrating
post-election violence, and we are encouraging dialogue among
the government, Parliamentarians, and civil society to work
out acceptable legislation to accomplish this. Third, we are
engaging with the new Interim Electoral Commission to offer
material support and to ensure that it lays the groundwork
for establishment of a permanent independent electoral
commission. Fourth, we are pressing hard for police and
judicial reform. The Task Force on Police Reform recently
set up by the government may be more credible than initially
thought; it is headed by a reputable former judge. We are
working to respond to the Task Force,s request for
international expertise, all with a view to enabling the Task
Force to finish its work as scheduled by the end of July
(septel reports in more detail on police reform). We are
also working on an array of other reform issues, including
land reform.

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U.S. Policy and Steps
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12. (C) Continued intensive U.S. high-level engagement
through private and public diplomacy will support and amplify
the dynamic of change that is being felt. Visits and calls
by senior officials will be helpful, but we should also think
of other ways to exert pressure. One of the steps that had
the most constructive impact during the crisis last year was
the sending of letters to more than a dozen politicians on

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both sides warning them that their relationships with us (and
thus their visas) were in jeopardy unless they ceased support
for violence and supported a political solution. We know
those letters influenced constructive changes in behavior in
a number of cases. Something along those lines making clear
that we will not do business as usual with those in the
political class who do not support implementation of the
reform agenda would be timely now. Coupling that with
actually issuing visa bans against a couple of high profile
figures would have a significant impact in support of
reforms.


13. (C) Even modest additional funding to support grassroots
youth movements as well as civil society organizations would
have a significant impact in propelling change. Programs to
engage the political class, such as the Wilson Center,s
leadership program, may also be helpful.


14. (C) We should, of course, consider incentives to the
political leadership if they implement the reform agenda. We
have, for example, pointed out that the AGOA forum and the
approach the U.S. takes at it will be more positive for Kenya
if some significant reform has been carried out before it
takes place. Holding out the possibility of visits ) if
substantial reforms are carried out ) is another incentive.


15. (C) In short, we need to engage across the board to push
the dynamics of change. Since over 90 percent of the Kenyan
people see the U.S. and its role in Kenya positively, there
is no downside to doing this. In fact, Kenyans look to the
U.S. to exert leadership and to maintain pressure on
political leaders to act on reforms. We continue to receive
constant and extensive feedback from ordinary Kenyans and
responsible actors across Kenyan civil society and politics
thanking us for our efforts and urging that we continue them.
And clearly the political leadership will not move ahead on
real reform unless pressed hard to do so. While the change
dynamic that is being felt has not yet resulted in
implementation of the key reforms, it holds the promise to do
so in the coming months.
RANNEBERGER