Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09NAIROBI1072
2009-06-01 17:38:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

SOMALIA - TFG LAUNCHES RENEWED OFFENSIVE IN

Tags:  PGOV MARR MOPS EAID SOCI PTER SO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7656
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #1072/01 1521738
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011738Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9662
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001072 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV MARR MOPS EAID SOCI PTER SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - TFG LAUNCHES RENEWED OFFENSIVE IN
MOGADISHU

REF: NAIROBI 1057

Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson. Reasons: 1.4 (b,
d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001072

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV MARR MOPS EAID SOCI PTER SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - TFG LAUNCHES RENEWED OFFENSIVE IN
MOGADISHU

REF: NAIROBI 1057

Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson. Reasons: 1.4 (b,
d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: An optimistic Prime Minister Sharmarke
disputed media reports that the TFG was making overtures to
any of the warlords as it struggled to expand its influence
in Mogadishu. Sharmarke thought al-Shabaab was "stretched
thin," and predicted that TFG forces would soon begin another
counter-offensive in Mogadishu that would coincide with a TFG
offensive in Hiraan region led by TFG Minister of Security
Omar Hashi. (The Mogadishu offensive seemed to gather force
June 1, with early reports showing the TFG pushing well into
Yaqshiid District, and al-Shabaab fleeing to the Mogadishu
livestock market.) Sharmarke pushed for more aggressive
rules of engagement for AMISOM, saying that "Somalis are
tired of al-Shabaab, which has been brutally murdering
civilians, and wants to see its fighters removed in any way
possible." The Prime Minister said that the TFG was intent
on maximum transparency and that a copy of its budget had
just been supplied to UNPOS. Negotiations with Ahlu Sunnah
Wal Jama'a had not yet borne fruit, he said. The TFG had
asked Price Waterhouse, with UNPOS support, to audit its
finances and to provide advice on financial administration.
In a June 1 telephone call, President Sharif described
ongoing TFG advances in Mogadishu, which he credited to USG
financial support. Sharif requested urgent financial support
for his government, so that it could press its narrow
advantage. The Prime Minister asked that USG financial
support be in the form of a second, USD 500 thousand tranche
to his government. The President also echoed Prime Minister
Sharmarke (reftel) in urging that the USG strike terrorists
and their camps in Somalia whenever possible. End summary.

PM's Travel
--------------


2. (C) TFG Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke arrived in Nairobi
the evening of May 31 from the Sahel-Saharan heads of state

meeting in Libya. On President Sharif's instruction, he had
pressed the Government of Libya on an earlier pledge of USD 2
million. The TFG was increasingly skeptical that the money
would be provided. Qadhafi had reportedly invited ARS-Asmara
chief Hassan Dahir Aweys to Libya in an effort to broker an
agreement with the TFG, but Aweys had refused to attend.
Sharmarke described the poorly-attended Summit as "a waste of
time." He planned to return to Mogadishu on June 2.

No Warlords
--------------


3. (C) The Prime Minister denied press reports that the TFG
was reaching out to the warlords. Before leaving for Libya,
Sharmarke said he had told Mohammed Dheere that he "must go
back to Nairobi," and had even bought his air ticket.
(Somalia Unit separately confirmed that Dheere is in
Nairobi.) The TFG was negotiating for the handover of
Dheere's seven technicals. The TFG Interior Minister, as
mistakenly alleged by the media, had not met with warlords
Musa Sude, Mohammed Qanyare, and Osman Otto who, in any
event, "no longer control anything," Sharmarke said. The TFG
was resisting efforts to have its conflict with al-Shabaab
become a clan affair. It had recently rejected an offer by
the Mudolud (an amalgam of closely-related Hawiye sub-clans,
which includes the Abgal, Mobleen, Udejeen, and others) to
send up to 2000 troops from Jowhar, Middle Shabelle, for
precisely that reason.

Equipment Needs
--------------


4. (C) Sharmarke again re-hashed the TFG's failure to win
significant territory in its May 22 Mogadishu
counter-offensive (reftel). His government had inherited
inexperienced, undisciplined troops, and remained handicapped
by poor communications and logistics. He seconded TFG Force
Commander Mohammed Osman "Dhumaal," who told Somalia Unit May
30 that his forces needed Motorola handsets that are
compatible with those used by AMISOM, in addition to
transport, like trucks and ambulances. AMISOM had supplied
two trucks and three ambulances for the May 22 attack, but
more was needed. Sharmarke reiterated the TFG's request for
APCS as soon as possible.

Al-Shabaab Stretched Thin

NAIROBI 00001072 002 OF 003


--------------


5. (C) Sharmarke's assessment of al-Shabaab is that they were
"stretched very thin." Al-Shabaab had "nothing in Merca or
Kismaayo." Many of its forces had been deployed to the
central regions. TFG Minister of Security Omar Hashi was
attempting to rally up to 1500 forces in his Hawadle clan
base of Hiraan region. He hoped to push toward the al-Shabaab
Middle Shabelle capital of Jowhar as the TFG's planned attack
in Mogadishu was unfolding in order to prevent al-Shabaab
from re-deploying troops to Mogadishu. (As a footnote, the
Prime Minister noted that the TFG had advanced to the Sana'a
junction in Tribunka (Lower Yaqshid) as of mid-morning, June

1. Subsequent reports on June 1 suggested that the TFG had
continued that advance, with the capture of a al-Shabaab-held
district police headquarters in Yaqshid, and that al-Shabaab
had fled as far as Mogadishu's livestock market.)

Transparent Financing
--------------


6. (C) Sharmarke said that the TFG was fulfilling it pledge
to be as transparent as possible, and to that end it had
provided UNPOS with a copy of its 90-day budget. (Somalia
Unit will get a copy from UNPOS.) It was also in talks with
Price Waterhouse which, with UNPOS's sponsorship, would audit
the TFG and offer counseling on financial administration. In
the meantime, Sharmarke said, "no money is dispersed unless I
approve it." Sharmarke provided Somalia Unit with an
accounting of the USD 500 thousand provided by the USG.
(Somalia Unit has e-mailed the document to AF/E, and AF/RSA.)


7. (C) Noting that "al-Shabaab is getting paid every month,"
the Prime Minister urged that the USG provide assistance for
June troop payments. He asked that, if possible, a second
$500 thousand tranche be disbursed. The USD 2 million
pledged by the Italians was with the AU, he said, and might
not be rapidly dispersed to the TFG from there.

AMISOM Rules of Engagement
--------------


8. (C) As he had at last meeting with Somalia Unit (reftel),
Sharmarke insisted that it was in the TFG's interest to have
more aggressive rules-of-engagement for AMISOM. "Somalis are
happy that we're attacking, he said, and added that
al-Shabaab's willingness to use the population of Mogadishu
as human shields had drained away any legitimacy it might
have had. In order to better contest Mogadishu, he again
asked that the TFG be supplied with APCs.

ASWJ
--------------


9. (C) Negotiations with Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) had
made no headway since Somalia Unit's reftel conversation with
the PM. While believing that ASWJ was "not that powerful,
yet," Sharmarke worried that the TFG was in danger of being
outflanked as it pursued an alliance with ASWJ. ASWJ was
pressuring the TFG to provide financial assistance to it, but
that money would be used by ASWJ to capture territory in
central Somalia that would strengthen its hand in
negotiations with the TFG. Sharmarke predicted that there
would soon be an al-Shabaab - ASWJ fight over the town of
Wabha, roughly between El Bur and Maxaas in Hiran region. An
al-Shabaab victory would allow it to move to Dhusamarebb,
while an ASWJ triumph would open the door to Bulo Burti.


10. (C) The TFG was negotiating with ASWJ's central region
elder Sheikh Mohamed, but had made no progress to date.
Sharmarke noted that former TFG Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed
Abdisalaam Aden was also engaged with Sheikh Mohamed for
influence with ASWJ. Abdisalaam seemed to be sponsored by
the GoE, Sharmarke noted, adding another difficulty to
forging a coalition with ASWJ.

Conversation with Sheikh Sharif
--------------


11. (C) In a June 1 telephone conversation, TFG President
Sheikh Sharif described to the Ambassador progress TFG forces
were making in fighting that day in Mogadishu. According to
Sharif, and other observers contacted by Somalia Unit, as of
early afternoon June 1, TFG forces had taken control of
Yaqshiid district police headquarters and had caused
al-Shabaab to retreat to the livestock market. Sharif

NAIROBI 00001072 003 OF 003


credited USG support for the TFG's advances, and alleged that
TFG forces had made discrete progress at three unnamed
locales in Middle Shabelle. (Somalia Unit has, to date, been
unable to determine what progress in Middle Shabelle
President Sharif was referring to. There appear to be TFG
preparations for battle under way near Mahadday, about 22
kilometers from Jowhar, however.) He asked for immediate USG
financial support to the TFG as it continued its campaign
against al-Shabaab.

President Urges Kinetic Strikes
--------------


12. (S/NF) Sharif echoed Sharmarke (reftel) in asking the USG
to strike terrorists and their training camps in Somalia. He
said the TFG had information that Chechens and Bosniaks were
"living openly" in Baledogle, and asked that the USG consider
a strike.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) With the TFG's Mogadishu counter-offensive making
good progress as of this writing, both President Sharif and
Prime Minister Sharmarke seemed more optimistic, but they
believe that international, particularly USG, support is
essential to maximizing their narrow advantage. We agree,
and urge that rapid delivery of the heavy ammunition and
weapons from Entebbe, as well as financial assistance --an
additional USD 500 thousand-- be released to the TFG as soon
as possible.
RANNEBERGER