SOMALIA - AL-SHABAAB TAKES KEY MIDDLE SHABELLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 001010

DEPT FOR AF/E, A/S CARSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV MOPS MARR EAID SOCI PINR SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - AL-SHABAAB TAKES KEY MIDDLE SHABELLE
TOWN; POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS

REF: NAIROBI 986

Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).

1.(C) Summary: Following a May 16 meeting with allies near
the city of Afgoye, al-Shabaab forces seized control of the
Middle Shabelle capital of Jowhar early May 17. Control of
Jowhar places al-Shabaab between the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) in Mogadishu and potential Ahlu Sunna Wal
Jama'a allies in Hiran region and Central regions. The
setback was partially offset by warlord Indha Adde's return
to the TFG fold May 17. As of mid-afternoon May 17, the
quiet in Mogadishu had been interrupted only by the exchange
of a few mortar rounds between the TFG at Villa Somalia and
al-Shabaab forces near the Bakara Market. Mogadishu was
quiet as of the morning of May 18.


2. (C) Embassy has been attempting to persuade ASWJ contacts
to cooperate more closely with the TFG. The TFG Prime
Minister told us May 18 that he was meeting with ASWJ in
Mogadishu in an effort to bring it into an alliance. The TFG
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Security are traveling
to Addis Ababa May 18 in order to get the GOE to use its
influence on ASWJ and to meet with ASWJ representatives
there. See paras 12 - 15 for action taken and recommended
next steps. End summary.

Spoilers Meet in Afgoye
--------------


2. (C) On May 16, Al-Shabaab confederates Muhtar Robow,
Hassan al-Turki, Ahmed Abdi Godane abu Zubeyr, and Fuad
Mohamed Qalaf "Shangole" were joined at "Villa Afgoye," about
thirty kilometers from Mogadishu, by Hisbul Islam's Hassan
Dahir Aweys and Omar Imam, and others for a meeting
presumably convened in order to agree on strategy prior to an
expected offensive on the TFG in Mogadishu.


3. (C) Contacts told us May 17 that the al-Shabaab contingent
at the Afgoye meeting insisted that Aweys disavow an earlier
comment, reported in the press, critical of Osama bin Laden
before he would be allowed to formally join forces. Aweys
reportedly agreed, and the group devoted the rest of the
meeting to agreeing a strategy for a widely-expected
offensive on the TFG in Mogadishu. Deputy Prime Minister
Hassan and Minister of Security Hashi told Ambassador May 18
that Aweys had been given money and weapons by Eritrea,
remained "hungry for power" and would not back down. He was
cooperating with al-Shabaab, but was not part of the movement
and could part ways with it at any time.


4. (C) Following the May 17 meeting, warlord Yusuf Mohamed
Siyad "Indha Adde," who had joined the TFG opposition
following the arrival in Somalia of Aweys, returned to the
TFG. Contacts ascribed the reasons for Indha Adde's return
to the warlord's unhappiness at losing control of his men and
technicals to al-Shabaab and/or to rumors that the TFG was
better able to pay him and his troops than al-Shabaab.
Although Indha Adde's allegiances could shift yet again, the
TFG was reportedly happy with this minor piece of good news.

Al-Shabaab Takes Jowhar
--------------


5. (C) On the morning of May 17, al-Shabaab forces took
control of the Middle Shabelle "capital" of Jowhar. Some
sources reported that Jowhar was captured without a fight,
while others say that TFG-loyal forces provided cover as
members of the TFG abandoned the city. Still others reported
associated TFG - al-Shabaab fighting in Garasley, a town
between Balad and Jowhar. The TFG Prime Minister told us May
18 that plans were being made to re-take Jowhar. TFG Deputy
Prime Minister Hassan and Minister of Security Hashi told
Ambassador May 18 that the attack on the TFG in Mogadishu and
the capture of Jowhar had been preemptive strikes, designed
to interrupt TFG progress in organizing its joint security
forces. The taking of Jowhar was intended to distract public
attention from al-Shabaab's inability to make further
progress in Mogadishu. They predicted that the TFG would be
able to push al-Shabaab from Jowhar "quickly." Jowhar is
important because it separates Mogadishu from Hiran Region,
where potential TFG ally Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a has been
engaged in fighting with al-Shabaab in Maxaas as recently as
May 17. It is also a traditional Abgal stronghold.
(President Sharif's sub-clan.)

Shelling in Mogadishu
--------------


6. (C) May 17 saw scattered shelling of Villa Somalia, the
Police Academy, and other locations in Mogadishu. Several
children were reported killed by rounds that hit near the
Police Academy while President Sharif was officiating at a
ceremony.


7. (C) In spite of the fall of Jowhar, the spoilers' meeting
in Afgoye, and the scattered fighting in Mogadishu, TFG
members were outwardly calm. Contacts in Mogadishu described
a business as usual atmosphere. Others reported, however,
that the TFG's ability to respond meaningfully to the attacks
was hindered by stalled negotiations over pay with potential
militias, including Indha Adde's. The TFG was insisting that
the militias be paid after the soldiers had demonstrated
their battle-worthiness, while the militias wanted to be paid
first. President Sharif told the Ambassador in a May 17
telephone call that he was cautiously optimistic about his
government's prospects for success in these difficult
circumstances. The Ambassador phoned Sheikh Sharif to assure
him of our support and to obtain a firsthand assessment of
the situation. Prime Minister Sharmarke told us by telephone
May 18 that he was "trying to be confident." Both Sheikh
Sharif and Sharmarke, as well as Sharif Hassan and Omar
Hashi, were grateful for the monetary assistance provided by
the U.S. the week of May 11.

Ahlu Suna Wal Jama'a, al-Shabaab
Fighting in Hiran Region
--------------


8. (C) Fighting resumed May 17 in the town of Maxaas, Hiran
Region, between Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a and al-Shabaab. Unlike
the May 15 fighting, reports indicate that al-Shabaab got the
upper hand on May 17, although it is widely expected that
ASWJ will resume its efforts to take Maxaas on May 18.

Foreign Fighters
--------------


9. (C) Hassan and Hashi joined other TFG contacts in worrying
about the large number of foreign fighters entering the fray.
They are well trained and equipped, they said. The
Ambassador told them to supply us with passport data,
photographs, or any other evidence so that the USG could
investigate.


10. (C) In response to Ambassador's question, Hassan and
Hashi asked USG help in pressing Somalis, including
disaffected MPs, to stop discrediting the TFG. They promised
to provide a list of the chief spoilers for Embassy use.
They also alleged that some foreign fighters continued to
enter Somalia via Nairobi, and asked that the USG intercede
with the Government of Kenya. The Ambassador asked that the
TFG provide the Embassy with any concrete information, like
aircraft tail numbers and airport of departure, that could be
used with the GOK. Hassan and Hashi also asked that the USG
lobby key members of the Ayer, Murosade, and Ogadeni to cease
their support for al-Shabaab. The Ambassador told them that
the Embassy had already had extensive conversations with the
Ayer, and would reach out to the other clans as well.

Reaching Out to Addis and ASWJ
--------------


11. (C) Hassan and Hashi told the Ambassador they were
traveling to Addis Ababa in order to attend the May 20 IGAD
Extraordinary Ministerial on Somalia and to urge the GOE to
pressure ASWJ to cooperate with the TFG. They would also
lobby for indirect GOE military support for their government.
(The GOE has been providing material, logistical, and
intelligence assistance to ASWJ.) The TFG officials asked
that the USG intervene with the GOE on this issue as well.
Hassan and Hashi also planned to meet with ASWJ
representatives in Addis. Preliminary discussions with ASWJ
representatives, they said, have been promising.

Embassy Action
--------------


12. (C) Ambassador got GOK Foreign Minister Wetangula's
agreement May 15 to issue a statement in support of the TFG
and critical of Eritrea. The Ambassador also urged that
Wetangula work to ensure that IGAD publicly condemns Eritrea
and calls for sanctions at its May 20 Ministerial on Somalia.


13. (C) Over the weekend, the Embassy contacted members of

ASWJ to urge their cooperation with the TFG. We were also in
contact with influential Ayer sub-clan members both in
Somalia and around the region to urge their support for the
TFG.


14. (U) The Embassy followed the Department's helpful press
statement on the week of May 11 with a statement of its own
(reftel) that highlighted the role of foreign fighters and
re-stated USG backing for the TFG.

Next Steps
--------------


15. (C) In addition to those actions outlined in this
message, possible steps that could be taken to support the
TFG include:

-- Aweys's two wives and children reportedly live in Egypt.
USG could lobby Cairo to tell Aweys that their continued good
status in Egypt is contingent on his more constructive
behavior in Somalia;

-- The Department could ask the GOE to urge ASWJ to ally or
cooperate more actively with the TFG.

-- We could attempt to accelerate movement in forming a
serious security force and highlight international support
for the TFG by asking that the SRSG, accompanied by an AU
representative, lead a mission to Mogadishu to meet the
President, Prime Minister, and other TFG representatives. We
believe that Sheikh Sharif should name Minister of Security
Omar Hashi the key commander of the joint security forces,
and that any further aid to the forces should be funneled
through him. Hashi has considerable military experience, he
is reportedly respected by all others in the TFG, and his
clan affiliation --Hawadle-- makes him less threatening to
other clans participating in the TFG.

-- We should urge the engagement of Arab states and others to
provide money or, better, highly visible equipment supply
flights (by Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and perhaps Jordan). The
flights would resonate well with the Somali public in
Mogadishu.

-- We should provide another tranche of security force
funding, but only after assuring accounting for the funds
already disbursed. The accounting should include how the port
and airport revenues are being used. The Ambassador stressed
this in his meeting with Hassan and Hashi.

-- We could explore imposing sanctions on those in Eritrea
like the Eritrean Ambassador in Nairobi and Colonel Teame
who, we are told, appear to have played a significant role in
supporting Aweys and undermining the TFG.
RANNEBERGER