MUMBAI ATTACKS, LESSONS LEARNED

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MUMBAI 000079

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/OCS/ACS
DEPT FOR CA/EX

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT ASEC CMGT CASC PTER KSAC IN
SUBJECT: MUMBAI ATTACKS, LESSONS LEARNED

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1. (U) Begin Summary. The Mumbai Consulate has compiled the
following lessons learned after managing the response to the
terrorist attack which occurred in on November 26. The attack
engaged the entire Consulate - consular officers, public
affairs, security officers, management and political/economic
officers. End Summary.


2. (U) Background: Beginning at 2120 on Wednesday, November 26,
ten men staged attacks at nine different locations in southern
Mumbai, India, using explosives and firearms. At least four of
these sites, hotels and a cafi, are heavily frequented by
Americans and other non-Indian travelers to Mumbai. The other
sites included a cinema, hospital, train station, and a Jewish
community center. In addition, bombs were left in at least two
taxis, one of which detonated in northern Mumbai and the other
in an eastern portion of the city. Over 40,000 American
citizens, most of Indian origin, are estimated to live in
Mumbai's Consular district, and large numbers of tourists come
to the city at this time of year. This catastrophic attack was
unprecedented in India, where past terrorist strikes have
involved targeted bomb and grenade attacks. The events unfolded
over a period of days and involved multiple specific locations
as well as moving attacks and confrontations with law
enforcement personnel. Reports of hostages, injured and missing
Americans, lost belongings, impending evacuations, and multiple
deaths flooded the U.S. Consulate General throughout the events.
Significant numbers of Americans were directly affected, and
thousands of concerned travelers in India and family members in
the U.S. contacted the Department and the Consulate for
information and assistance. The entire Consulate was mobilized
to staff the crisis: FSNs, FSOs, and EFMs from all sections,
foregoing a long Thanksgiving weekend. The Consulate switchboard
fielded over 3000 phone calls, and countless other calls and
emails came directly to employees' personal cell phones, direct
lines, and PDAs.


3. (SBU) Managing the Crisis: We created two working groups to
handle the event. The first group consisted of POL-ECON / Public
Affairs / Management /RSO/FCS and the health unit and focused on
reporting to the Department and Delhi, public affairs, security
and management. The second group was a consular group and
focused on meeting the needs of our American Citizens. We
received inquiries from 788 Americans. The three hotels attacked
provided guest lists that included 98 Americans and members of
the Consulate were in telephone contact with at least 24
Americans trapped in the hotels until evacuation. Of 171
confirmed deaths, 29 were non-Indians from 15 different
countries. Six Americans lost their lives, more than from any
other country except India. Two Americans were wounded.


4. (SBU) The Working Groups were disbanded on Monday, December
1 and regular consular operations resumed on that day. A normal
schedule of 1100 NIV interviews began on Tuesday, December 2.
The ACS Unit continues to process death certificates, the return
of personal effects, and other follow-up action that resulted
from the attacks, in addition to a normal workload of routine
services.


5. (SBU) SPECIFIC LESSONS LEARNED:


A. Immediate response: Personnel Accountability. As post
management became aware of the crisis, our immediate response
was to activate our phone tree and account for all employees and
family members. Consulate issued a warden notice within about
two hours of the first events. Our continuing challenge was to
understand the evolving nature of the attack. No one, including
local police, clearly understood what was happening. First
reports were of a "gangland" style shooting at Leopold's Cafe
and other locations. During the course of the night it became
clear that this attack was different from previous events, and
it was unclear how it would end.


B. Security: Limited RSO resources at Post and in the Mission
India limited the initial response provided, although Post
benefited greatly from the additional agents, local guards, and
police who augmented security programs and allowed DS to focus

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on the need to assess the safety environment of Consular staff.
This was also the area that post received the most immediate and
needed security reinforcements with help from Delhi and other
consulates. While we were able to get communication out to our
staff via phone trees, we realized that if the phone had gone
down - we could have had a problem. We subsequently renewed and
strengthened our radio program.


C. Technology. Technology was both an asset and a hindrance to
good communication. At times, the volume and variety of
information coming in to the Consulate was difficult to manage
effectively. The Consulate's switchboard received over 3000
calls, which were routed to a message that did not include
information on emergency services and needed to be changed.
Over 1000 emails were exchanged between the CA Task Force and
post, and were not always addressed to the appropriate
responder. Despite the abundance of communication tools, it was
difficult to access good information because of the moving,
changing situation. The CA Task Force provided valuable
assistance in fielding inquiries and providing a
point-of-contact regarding information about missing citizens.
This work was aided by the Consular Task Force (CTF) software in
the Combined Consular Database (CCD),which provided a point of
coordination between Conoffs in Mumbai and in Washington. PDAs
and cell phones were also invaluable for in-field work, but slow
system speeds, inconsistent availability of equipment, and
network unreliability limited this use. Onsite Consular ISC
staff provided access to systems, including increasing the size
of mailboxes, providing FSNs and TDYers with access to systems,
and connecting phones to long distance service. Extra cell phone
batteries, telephones and more frequent radio program are
recommended.


D. Public Affairs played an important role in disseminating
information for the benefit of Americans who need to know what
action to take. Hot line information should be released for
television. Post also recommends in an emergency, one POC be
identified for updating, approving, and posting travel alerts,
travel warnings, warden messages, website information, and email
auto-responses for all of Mission India during crisis situations
in order to ensure consistent and timely release and posting of
public information.


E. Consular Working Group: The Consular Section Chief headed
the Consular Working Group and coordinated with CA's Task Force.
Key officers who live near the Consulate set up the phone center
within an hour of the attacks and constituted the 12-hour
consular night shift over the following four days. Officers
were assigned to visit hospitals, morgues, and evacuation sites
for the purpose of identifying American citizens and were
accompanied by Medical Office or RSO staff, when possible. GOI
security forces changed locations of evacuation sites and in
some cases some sites could not be approached safely. Each case
was evaluated by the security officer and Consul General. Each
Consular shift was organized around POCs who monitored
developments about specific affected sites and individuals.
This allowed both continuity and handoff between shifts, and
provided an informed and consistent contact for concerned family
members and the CA Task Force. Post notes the usefulness of S/ES
recommendations to use identified skills appropriately, and
benefited from the experience of an FSO who spoke Hebrew and was
able to work with the affected orthodox Jewish community. Hindi
and Marathi speakers were assigned to contact hospitals, and one
officer who had worked on after-event reporting in Islamabad
coordinated logging and reporting.


F. Locally engaged staff were key. LES staff member knowledge
and experience was invaluable, particularly with providing
contact information, and access to local services and contacts.
Post noted that some FSNs had more thorough knowledge of the FAM
than experienced FSOs and helped ensure ongoing service to
American citizens during and after the events. Emergency
passports were issued throughout the ordeal and Post coordinated
exit permits with Indian immigration authorities on behalf of
travelers. Onsite services were provided due to the danger of
travel; Post used an onsite passport photographer and arranged

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for exit permits to be issued at the airport.


G. Coordinating with other consulates helped. Eighteen foreign
nationals were killed, in addition to six Americans. Small
staffing and large demand from their own citizens affected the
response from other foreign Consulates. Dual nationals and
overseas residency created some confusion in identifying
nationality and appropriate services for some. Post coordinated
closely with Israeli consuls on behalf of Israeli-American
victims, and coordinated onsite evacuation reception with a
number of Consulates and the affected hotels.


H. TDYers were ready to come in and we appreciated the support
provided by the department. In hind-sight, we probably did not
need everyone that eventually arrived but we were not sure how
long the event was going to go on. We could have used a handful
of consular officers to work NIV operations for two days just to
allow some officers rest before normal operations resumed.


I. Management: The GSO/Acting Management Officer provided
resources to assist with round-the-clock staffing and offsite
operations, including hiring extra cars and drivers for TDY
staff, additional maintenance shifts, and providing direct
assistance to affected Americans, including transport and food.
Post recommends that fiscal authorization be provided even
faster in crisis situations. The RMPO arrived within a few days
and conducted well-received workshops for FSNs and FSOs on the
effects of post-traumatic stress and planned a repeat visit. If
possible we would have brought the RMO/P in earlier to help with
Amcit hostages who had been trapped by the attacks in the hotels.
FOLMSBEE