26/11 ONE YEAR LATER: CAN MUMBAI BE MADE SAFE?

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MUMBAI 000440

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER ASEC IN
SUBJECT: 26/11 ONE YEAR LATER: CAN MUMBAI BE MADE SAFE?

REF: Mumbai 233

MUMBAI 00000440 001.2 OF 005



1. (SBU) Summary: One year after the tragic terrorist attacks
of November 26, 2008, Maharashtra's leaders have introduced
modest improvements in Mumbai's security. Maharashtra's
administration and security officials appear sincere in their
desire to make Mumbai and Maharashtra safer, and to protect its
citizens from further attacks. That said, the state faces
serious challenges in overcoming decades of accumulated capacity
and leadership deficits - as well as bureaucratic hurdles -- in
order to make Mumbai safer. Despite a state election where
security might have been an electoral issue, voters cast their
ballots along identity lines, returning the ineffectual
incumbent coalition to power. A new, energetic police
leadership has introduced some modernization efforts, but
serious questions remain about the professional competence of
the force and the ability of its political leadership to
implement serious reforms. Since the onus for state security is
constitutionally the responsibility of state governments, these
issues in India will always be subject to the capabilities,
competence, and seriousness of the local political leadership,
some of whom are not currently up to the task. End Summary.



26/11 Lessons Learned

--------------




2. (SBU) On November 26, 2008, ten heavily-armed terrorists
landed in Mumbai, and laid siege to a train station, two major
hotels, and a Jewish cultural and religious house. When the
attackers were finally killed over three days later, over 160
people were killed, from 23 different nations. These attacks,
known as "26/11," exposed huge gaps in competence, coordination,
and leadership at the state and central level. During the
attacks, Maharashtra's politicians were criticized for their
seemingly dazed and uncoordinated response to the city's tragedy
as the attacks unfolded over the course of several days. Some
members of the Mumbai Police acted bravely in the first, chaotic
hours after the attacks began, and the force quickly appeared in
strength at the key sites occupied by the terrorists. However,
the Mumbai Police did not have the capability or training to
combat the terrorists occupying the hotels or the Jewish center,
which were only cleared, after some delay, by the paramilitary
National Security Guard forces from New Delhi.




3. (SBU) In the aftermath of the attacks, the Maharashtra
government commissioned a "lessons learned" report from two
retired civil and police officials, Ram Pradhan and V.
Balachandran. (See ref A.) While this report is still
classified, the authors and the press have cited several key
recommendations that address the state's inability to prevent
the attacks, and the inadequate response to them. First, the
central government needed to improve the quality and regularity
of intelligence sharing with state governments, and minimize
inter-agency rivalries that impair timely dissemination of
actionable intelligence. Second, states must themselves improve
procedures for processing, sharing, and acting on intelligence
provided by the central government or collected internally.
Third, the state should clarify clear lines of authority during
city and state crises to avoid the confusion that prevailed
during the attacks. Fourth, the state government needs to
centralize its public communication during crises to prevent the
undisciplined, uncoordinated release of misinformation that
occurred during the attacks. Fifth, the state should develop
and deploy a professional paramilitary first response team to
handle such attacks in the future. Sixth, the police should
prioritize appropriate and timely purchases of weapons and
equipment to modernize the force and its capabilities. Seventh,
the state should bolster its coastal security capabilities, as
well as improve coordination with the Coast Guard and Indian
Navy.



The Politicians: Are They Up to It?

--------------

MUMBAI 00000440 002.2 OF 005






4. (SBU) After the siege ended, the state's top two politicians
- one from each of the governing coalition partners, the
Congress Party and the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) -
resigned at the insistence of their party leaders. NCP Home
Minister R.R. Patil, who was in charge of state security and
made several awkward statements in Hindi (not his native
language) downplaying the seriousness of the attacks, was the
first to go. Congress Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh, who
emerged in public only after the attacks to tour the Taj Mahal
Hotel crime scene with a famous Bollywood horror film producer
in tow, soon followed. Their successors, Ashok Chavan of the
Congress as CM, Jayant Patil of the NCP as Home Minister, faced
both a national and state election within nine months of taking
office. Strict election codes of conduct precluded elected
officials from making major decisions, expenditures, and
procurements for three months during the last year, so the state
government's operations were interrupted twice, for three
months, over the past year.




5. (SBU) Therefore, for most of the time since 26/11,
Maharashtra's politicians engaged in fraternal infighting,
electioneering, and horse-trading over the spoils of office. In
both the national elections of May 2009, and the Maharashtra
state elections of October 2009, the Congress/NCP coalition
increased their seats. (To the surprise of many, security was
not an issue in either election.) After the state elections,
the Congress and NCP fought for two weeks over the distribution
of ministries, balancing family and caste concerns, as well as
the need for both parties to have sufficiently "lucrative,"
money-earning ministries. The coalition re-appointed Home
Minister R.R. Patil to the same office in the new state
government. While Patil's re-appointment raised accountability
concerns, Patil has a reputation for being cleaner and more
serious than other politicians in his party. Patil is also
respected by the police leadership, who see him as more
responsive to the needs and requests of the force.




6. (SBU) By all accounts, Maharashtra has lacked good political
leadership for almost two decades. The last ten years of
Congress/NCP rule has been marked by an inability to implement
major development or infrastructure programs. The political
coalition is openly fractious, ministers routinely criticize
each other in public, and state leaders devote much of their
time to balancing these various interests, leaving little time
for serious pursuits. In this regard, Maharashtra's politicians
are not different from those in many other states - too many
family dynasties, too much corruption, too many builders and
land developers seeking family fortunes. However, the
accumulation of ten years of underperformance, indifference, and
incompetence has lowered the expectations of civil society so
much that even the most marginal of improvements would be seen
as a major victory. Upon returning to office, Chief Minister
Chavan has expressed a strong commitment to improving governance
in the state, but there is nothing in Maharashtra's recent
history that indicates that his tenure could be different.



The Police: Small Movement in the Right Direction~~..

-------------- --------------




7. (SBU) Since 26/11, the Mumbai police have taken modest,
positive steps to boost their professional competence. The new
Mumbai police chief, D. Sivanandan, is enthusiastic,
approachable, and focused. The Indian Administrative Service
officers in charge of the state Home Ministry are some of the
best the state has to offer. Despite the electoral
prohibitions, some money has been spent on weapons and
capability enhancement since the attacks. According to state
Home Secretary Chandra Iyengar, the state has released almost 60
million USD for modernization efforts, including weapons,
coastal patrol boats, training facilities, and armored vehicles

MUMBAI 00000440 003.2 OF 005


which will be introduced over the next few months. The police
have redesigned and revived the use of Quick Response Teams
(QRTs),a complement of better armed and trained police at the
local level, and launched Force One, a 300-member SWAT-like
team, which has received some training from foreign experts.
There are many more police stationed at strategic junctions and
targets, such as five-star hotels. A team from Mumbai's
Anti-Terrorism Squad which participated in a recent security
drill at the Consulate impressed the RSO with their
professionalism. The Mumbai Police has shown great interest in
collaborating with other city police forces, in the U.K. and
U.S.




8. (SBU) Iyengar told Congenoffs that financial resources were
sufficient for force modernization efforts, but training needs
were significant. From basic training for policemen to
highly-specialized paramilitary units, the state hoped to
develop facilities and programs for its long-term training
needs. The state has already founded a jungle warfare training
center in Nagpur, and plans to develop urban terrorism training
centers in Mumbai and Pune. Using mobile first responder units,
the QRTs and Force One, the state aims to develop a "response
which follows a systematic pattern." However, she emphasized
that the government was careful to ensure that the Mumbai and
state police should remain community police forces, and not
evolve into militias. Iyengar reiterated the "enormous" need
for quality intelligence at the state and national level.
Iyengar noted the efforts of former Home Minister, Jayant Patil,
who instituted a weekly meeting among the various state and
central officials to share intelligence and threat assessments,
greatly improving center-state coordination. She also praised
the energy and commitment of Union Home Minster P. Chidambaram,
who "chases us 24/7."



~..But There's a Long Road Ahead

--------------




9. (SBU) Despite official expressions of high confidence, most
citizens and experts are skeptical that the Mumbai police will
be able to institutionalize a higher level of professional
competence in the near or medium term. As with most colonial
legacy police forces, the main job of the Mumbai Police is law
and order; in that, they largely ensure that the city's many
religious and cultural festivals and political rallies take
place peacefully. As such, the police have developed little
enthusiasm for protecting or pursuing the interests of average
citizens. Underpaid, ill-trained, and living in slums
themselves, the police spend a great deal of their time shaking
down the local populace or colluding with vested interests to
supplement their low salaries. Moreover, the force has limited
capability to investigate crimes, have only small amounts of
technology, and will often use force and intimidation to elicit
confessions during interrogations. The police are repeatedly
subjected to political pressures, and must devote significant
manpower to VIP protection. Petty careerism and bureaucratic
and legal battles have forced two changes in the Director
General of Police, the senior-most ranking officer in the state,
in the last six months, paralyzing the force at the top.




10. (SBU) Indeed, mistrust of the police in Mumbai remains
high, and most Mumbaikars expect the police to take advantage of
them when vulnerable, rather than provide help. Moreover, the
police admit to few good contacts in the state's Muslim
communities, either for intel collection or
relationship-building, and Muslims are underrepresented on the
force. Many question whether the police will buy the right
equipment for their force, and whether ever-present corruption
in the procurement process will derail, or delay, sensible
purchases. A retired Admiral told Congenoff that the new police
boats are riverine boats, not coastal boats. An Israeli
security expert who trained Force One informed Congenoff that
the group was better trained than the regular police, but was
some years away from being a competent, professional force.

MUMBAI 00000440 004.2 OF 005


Overall, the police have made modest improvements in their
security capabilities, and the momentum is in the right
direction. With several decades of accumulated capacity
deficits, however, the police will face huge challenges in
speedily modernizing their approach and changing their image.



Coastal Security

--------------




11. (U) In the aftermath of 26/11, security experts called for
improving India's coastal security capabilities. India has a
coastline of 7,500 km (mainland and islands),with 12 major
ports and 187 minor ports. With a coastline of 720 kms,
Maharashtra has the largest number of ports with two major ports
and 53 minor ports; Gujarat has 1600 kms of coastline, with 40
minor ports and two major ports. The Maharashtra police share
responsibility for coastal protection with the Indian Coast
Guard and the Indian Navy, both of which have stations in
Mumbai. The Maharashtra police are charged with security up to
five nautical miles from shore, the Coast Guard from five to 12
nautical miles, and the Navy beyond 12 nautical miles.
Recognizing that the state would not be able to patrol its
entire coastline, Iyengar told Congenoffs that police and local
officials have approached fishing communities to serve as the
"eyes and ears" for policing efforts and for reporting
intruders.




12. (SBU) The Coast Guard Western headquarters in Mumbai
oversees India's coastal territorial waters from the border with
Pakistan border in Gujarat to India's southern tip. After the
26/11 terror attacks, the GOI sanctioned an additional 14 new
coast guard stations to plug the security gap along the
coastline. The Coast Guard also plans to recruit an additional
3,000 personnel to enable it to effectively combat terrorism
from the sea. The Coast Guard plans to acquire 20 fast patrol
vehicles, 41 interceptor boats, 12 coastal surveillance aircraft
(Dorniers),and 7 offshore patrol vehicles, and to place 46
coastal radars spanning 9 coastal stations across India.



Central Government Reforms

--------------






13. (SBU) In response to the 26/11 Mumbai attack, the central
government pushed through Parliament two sets of legal reforms
designed to strengthen India's security apparatus. The first
amended India's Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967 to
increase from 45 to 90 days the period a terrorist suspect can
be detained by police without being charged. This provision
provides Indian police more time to investigate, collect
evidence, and build a case if they suspect the accused is
involved in a terrorist plot. According to two prominent Indian
terrorism attorneys, no one has so far challenged the law in
court despite initial media concerns about possible civil rights
violations.




14. (SBU) The second reform was the passage of the National
Investigation Agency (NIA) Bill of 2008, which created an agency
tasked with investigating terrorist attacks and authorized to
function across Indian state borders without seeking separate
permissions. India's federal constitution grants states
authority over law enforcement and public security, so NIA has
tread lightly so as not to encroach on state sovereignty. The
NIA has so far surmounted jurisdictional obstacles to register
three cases, most recently against David Headley, the Lashkar-e
Tayyiba operative arrested by the U.S. FBI in Chicago.


MUMBAI 00000440 005.2 OF 005





15. (SBU) There appears to be little residual domestic
political impact from the Mumbai terror attacks at this point.
The emotional reaction of the Indian people in the first few
weeks after the attacks dissipated relatively quickly. The
Indian people have become inured by decades of such attacks.
For many of the slum dwellers and poor of India, the attacks
represent the first time wealthier classes were directly
affected. The fall out, if any, during the April-May
parliamentary elections was arguably positive for the ruling
Congress Party as the Muslim electorate in important pockets
rallied to the party seen as the traditional defender of
minorities. Heavy media coverage at the anniversary of the
attacks will no doubt resurrect memories of the spectacle in the
minds of the Indian people and the opposition will attempt to
get some play out of it in parliament this session. There have
been some consequential legacies of the attacks, nevertheless:
India now has in place a competent, take-charge Home Minister,
who is strengthening India's security and intelligence
activities and addressing a host of other major issues such as
Kashmir and the Naxalite/Maoist threat; and the environment for
U.S.-India cooperation on counterterrorism has improved
significantly.



Comment: One Year Later, Concerns Remain

--------------




16. (SBU) One year after the terrorist attacks of 26/11,
Mumbai is only marginally safer than it was a year before.
While no one blames state security officials for the initial
incursion of the attackers -- many cities around the world
remain equally vulnerable to this kind of attack, which can
never be completely prevented - we remain concerned that the
state police do not have the professional capabilities to stop
or contain serious, coordinated violence in the city. Moreover,
we are skeptical that local political leaders have the
competence and purposefulness to support and implement
modernization efforts. While the police will likely be able to
upgrade their "hard" infrastructure through weapons and
equipment purchases, the "soft" infrastructure -- training,
better policing, intel gathering, and better coordination and
implementation - will be a major struggle. With the
constitutional responsibility for internal security largely left
to the states, there are bound to be major discrepancies of
capacity, competence, and coordination between the state and
central governments, and among the states. Despite some
positive steps in the right direction since the attacks, we
believe that there is still significant ground to cover before
Mumbai's security is in the hands of trained, purposeful,
competent professionals. End Comment.
FOLMSBEE