SIX MONTHS AFTER THE ATTACKS, NOTHING'S CHANGED IN MUMBAI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 MUMBAI 000233

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ECON PGOV IN PINR PREL
SUBJECT: SIX MONTHS AFTER THE ATTACKS, NOTHING'S CHANGED IN MUMBAI

REF: 08 MUMBAI 560 AND PREVIOUS

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1. (SBU) Summary: On November 26, 2008, gunmen attacked
Mumbai and killed 166 people during three days of violence. The
Indian public and press were highly critical of the state and
central government's response and the effectiveness of security
forces and emergency services. After the attacks, India's Home
Affairs Minister resigned, along with the Chief Minister and
Home Minister of Maharashtra, and the government promised
changes to better defend against another such attack. Six
months later, however, interlocutors agree that the state
government has made little progress on implementing the promised
reforms. With national and state elections impeding major
course changes for the state government, this inaction is likely
to continue for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the people
of Mumbai do not appear motivated to take political action, as
Mumbai saw a record low voter turnout in the national elections.
There continue to be opportunities for U.S. security and
technology sales, but unclear procurement practices will hamper
the involvement of U.S. companies. End Summary.



THE MUMBAI ATTACKS




2. (U) On the evening of November 26, 2008, ten well-trained
gunmen from Pakistan entered Mumbai on small boats and attacked
high-profile targets with automatic weapons and explosives. By
the time the attack ended 62 hours later, 166 people, along with
nine terrorists, had been killed and hundreds more injured. The
sites that were attacked included two luxury hotels, the Taj
Mahal Palace and the Oberoi-Trident, the main railway terminal,
a Jewish cultural center, a cafe frequented by foreigners, a
movie theater, and two hospitals. Six American citizens were
killed and 20 other foreigners died. Several senior policemen
were killed, including the chief of the Mumbai Anti-Terrorism
squad, Hemant Karkare. One gunman was captured and is currently
on trial in Mumbai. When the attacks began, the Mumbai police
responded quickly, but were widely criticized for not being
equipped or trained to deal with the situation, and for lacking
a coherent command structure, both within the force, and with
other security agencies. Moreover, the Mumbai police's response
was hindered by the lack of a SWAT team or the equivalent, a
notable absence in a city of more than 15 million people,
forcing the city to rely on commandos based in New Delhi to
eliminate the attackers.




3. (U) After the attacks, the press and the general public
launched vociferous attacks against the state and central
governments for the lack of readiness, and lamented the poor
coordination that characterized the response. Thousands of
candle-bearing mourners marched near the Taj Hotel to protest
the attacks and demand improved security. Around the city,
billboards and signs mocked the use of commandos for VIP guard
duties and openly attacked the performance of the police. Some
of the criticism was constructive and detailed: for example, a
citizen's group called Bombay First published a lengthy report
on how to improve crisis management in Mumbai. The report's
recommendations focused on improving the command and control
systems of the police and emergency response units, upgrading
police equipment and training, communicating more effectively
and coherently with the public through the media, and raising
public awareness about security.




4. (U) Maharashtra's Chief Minister, Vilasrao Deshmukh, and
Home Minister, R.R. Patil, resigned in the aftermath of the
attacks. In New Delhi, Home Affairs Minister Shivraj Patil
resigned after taking "moral responsibility" for the situation.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh apologized to the Indian people
for being unable to prevent the attacks, and promised to improve
India's domestic security. New Home Affairs Minister P.
Chidambaram announced reforms including a new national
investigative agency, a new Coastal Command, 20 new
counterterrorism schools, and new regional NSG commando bases.
Maharashtra's new Chief Minister, Ashok Chavan, declared that
security was the government's "top priority."


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CONDITION OF POLICE AND REFORM PLANS




5. (SBU) Last week marked the six month anniversary of the
Mumbai attacks, and local media and observers used the occasion
to evaluate whether the state and central governments have
implemented their promises to upgrade the safety and security
infrastructure of Mumbai. The media highlighted serious
problems with the Indian police, which coincides with the larger
problem of weak governance and corruption at all levels of
government. Overall, India is heavily under-policed, with a
police to population ration of 1:694. This is well below the UN
recommended ratio of 1:400. (Note: For comparison, Mexico's
ratio is 1:492 and Saudi Arabia's is 1:387. End Note.) Looking
specifically at Maharashtra, a credible media source reported
that spending on police modernization in the state drastically
decreased, from $42 million in 2001 to $19 million in 2008. The
state government has not yet appointed a head for the Mumbai
Anti-Terror Squad to replace its fallen chief. Over the last
year, the state High Court invalidated the appointment of the
head of the state police, forcing the state to appoint a new
head who, due to retirement rules, will have only a six month
term. Moreover, during this time, a strict pre-election code of
conduct - which limits any major policy changes or procurements
-- was in place in the two months before the April-May national
elections. There will be similar restrictions in the two months
before the Maharashtra state elections scheduled for September

2009.




6. (SBU) Despite these reports, Prem Krishan Jain, Principal
Home Secretary for Maharashtra State, presented an optimistic
view of the police force. He said Maharashtra added 33,000
police officers in the last three years. Jain described
ambitious plans to arm more policemen, many of whom carry only
lathis (cudgels). Currently, 33 percent of police have
firearms; the state plans large purchases so that 60 percent of
police will have at least a revolver by 2011, he said. (Note:
Congenoffs confirmed that the Maharashtra police placed an order
for 1,000 Smith and Wesson 9mm pistols in April 2009. End
Note.) However, Jain said police armed with revolvers would
not have been able to stop terrorists with assault rifles and
grenades. (Comment: While this argument has some merit, it
should be noted that the one terrorist captured alive was taken
after his companion was killed at a checkpoint by police armed
with revolvers. This illustrates that even revolvers can help
police incapacitate or kill well-armed attackers, if luck is on
their side. End comment.) Jain acknowledged the media reports
about procurement, but said that states were given wide latitude
to make specific purchases and there were no major obstacles.
According to Jain, the greatest needs are for better
bomb-detection and disposal equipment, as well as bullet-proof
vests capable of stopping AK-47 rounds.




7. (SBU) By contrast, non-governmental sources painted a much
more negative view of the police force, describing serious
shortcomings in equipment, training, and command structure.
Sources said plans for better weapons, equipment, and training
remain mostly on paper. Chitkala Zutshi, the former Home
Secretary who was trapped in the Taj Hotel during the first of
the attacks, said a Quick Response Team was formed after 9/11,
but was not functional at the time of the attacks, and played no
role in relieving the hotels. V. Balachandran, a retired senior
policeman and intelligence official who is heading an official
inquiry into the attacks for the state government, also noted
that the Quick Response Team had been neglected and was not in a
position to respond to the attacks; for instance, the unit
hadn't had any target practice since August 2007 due to lack of
ammunition, he claimed. This highlights the need for proper
training and follow-through to maintain operational
effectiveness, not just setting up commando units on paper, he
argued. Zutshi and Balachandran shared concern over purchasing
problems, noting that buying weapons and equipment was very
cumbersome because of an October to March purchasing cycle.
Balachandran pointed out that if the state Home department fails
to spend the money by March, the funds revert back to the

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central government. His report will recommend a two-year buying
cycle and giving state police forces the ability to make their
own purchases without permission from the center. Zutshi said
the timely purchase of equipment was also hindered by corruption
in the bureaucracy.




8. (SBU) Mr. Vikram Mahurkar, CEO of the security company
Checkmate, which has provided private guard services in
Maharashtra for 20 years, said the Mumbai police have gotten
much worse during that time. The police are demoralized, with
extremely low pay, lack of equipment and training, bad housing,
and poor working conditions. In the last 20 years, they have
been given more duties with fewer resources. He was on site at
the Taj Hotel on the night of the attacks and noted that there
was no clear command structure. In a separate conservation,
Satish Sahney, the former Mumbai Police Commissioner, agreed
that the command structure was completely ineffective due to
political interference in the police force. Sahney said not
much has changed since attacks, although there are some plans
for better training and equipment. He said the Indian police
need a complete overhaul, starting with recruitment.
Balachandran said that his report will emphasize the need for
better command and control during crises. (Note: For example,
the Taj Hotel Security Director told Conoff that the police in a
station near the first attack at Leopold's Cafe were unable to
access their weapons for several hours because the officer with
the key to unlock the storage cabinets was visiting relatives
outside the city. End Note.)




9. (SBU) Raghu Raman, CEO of the Mahindra Special Services
Group, said the central government gave the Maharashtra police
$75 million after the attacks, but it wasn't clear what happened
to the money. The police made some improvements to their
reactive capabilities by buying new vehicles, but did nothing to
increase their preventative capabilities, such as improving
intelligence. Raman, a former army officer with experience
fighting terrorists in Kashmir, said the police were "not so
much outgunned as out-trained" by the terrorists. He said the
Mumbai police used to be among the best in India, but have
deteriorated. The police are highly politicized and operate in
an atmosphere of corruption and organized crime, made worse by
smuggling since Mumbai is a port city. He noted the connection
between corruption and the opportunities for terrorists to
operate. Former Commissioner Sahney highlighted the same issue:
he claimed that organized crime is linked to terrorists in
Mumbai.



FORCE ONE / NSG COMMANDOS




10. (SBU) Local army units and Marine commandos were on the
scene of the attacks within five hours, but were pulled out
without being used. Units of the central government's National
Security Guard (NSG) commandos took more than ten hours to reach
the scene from New Delhi because of difficulties in procuring an
airplane, despite the fact that a plane was supposed to be on
standby at all times. Recognizing the need for some kind of
rapid reaction force, the Maharashtra government announced plans
to establish a new state-level commando unit, called Force One.
Force One has begun training in nearby Pune with the goal of
being stationed in Mumbai for rapid reaction to crises, but is
not yet ready for action. In May, the Indian Express reported
that 100 out of 350 recruits, who are taken from the regular
police force, had washed out due to the strenuous training.
This might indicate that Force One will be well-trained and
effective, but it does not bode well for the unit being ready in
the near future.




11. (SBU) According to Balachandran, his report will state that
NSG commandos took far too long to arrive at the site of the
attacks; as a consequence, the report recommends that such units
should be in every major city. Jain said Force One commandos
will start the next phase of training in Pune in June, but the

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location of the Mumbai base has not yet been determined.
Recruitment of physically fit men for the unit has not been a
problem, per Jain. The Maharashtrian government has also not
agreed on a local base for the NSG commandos. Balachandran said
young police officers should be taken into commando units,
rather than regular police who were more interested in "earning"
extra money (bribes) from normal police work in the city.
Elements of Force One should be placed at two or three different
locations throughout Mumbai, he recommended, because it can take
several hours to reach different parts of the city from any
single location. Zutshi, however, said there would only be one
base for Force One.



INTELLIGENCE




12. (SBU) On the issue of intelligence, Home Secretary Jain
said the newly-established National Investigation Agency (NIA)
will improve sharing of intelligence among state police forces.
He noted that there had been resistance in the past to a central
agency because policing is a state responsibility, but now that
it has been established it is moving forward. Rakesh Maria,
Joint Police Commissioner for Crime in Mumbai and the lead
investigator for the attacks, told Congenoffs that there has
been better intelligence sharing between the states and between
individual states and the center since 26/11. Balachandran's
report will find that police had no specific advanced
intelligence information about the attacks, although they did
have some general intelligence in August and September 2009
about an impending attack, which they expected to be a bombing
(fitting with the recent string of bombings across India). The
report will recommend better sharing of intelligence at all
levels of police and security forces, including the use of
open-source intelligence to trace patterns of terrorist activity.




13. (SBU) Former Commissioner Sahney characterized the
establishment of the NIA as a mistake, since India already has a
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The government should
have strengthened the CBI's intelligence capabilities rather
than starting a new agency, because it will take five years to
set up the new agency and make it effective. Sahney said
intelligence was the key to fighting terrorism, with a
particular need to know if there is local support. The police
force in Maharashtra is only 3-4 percent Muslim, which hampers
the police's ability to develop intelligence information about
possible cooperation with terrorists within the local Muslim
community. The police are not the agency best placed to deal
with terrorism because their training and focus doesn't give
them "the right reflexes." There should be a specially-designed
agency of non-uniformed anti-terror specialists, whose only job
is to cultivate intelligence contacts, he argued. While
intelligence bureaus share information, actions suffer due to
poor follow-up. The Mumbai police must react to daily
developments, such as strikes, unrest, or festivals, and aren't
prepared for more focused policing.



COASTAL PATROL




14. (SBU) Since the attacks, the central government has
confirmed that the navy will be responsible for coastal
protection, Jain said, with assistance from the police and coast
guard. Balachandran's report will find that coastal patrol was
ineffective before the attacks due to confused and overlapping
responsibilities, allowing the terrorists to enter from the sea
undetected. Sahney said the coast guard and navy have not
explained the failures that allowed the terrorists to enter, or
whether these agencies had seen the intelligence about a
potential landing from the sea. Several interlocutors claimed
that smugglers commonly bribe the coast guard to be able to land
in Mumbai and the surrounding coast; Raman said that local
fisherman commonly encounter smuggling boats with gunmen in the
seas off Mumbai, and would not have raised an alarm to
authorities. Authorities curbed pleasure boating off the coast

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for a time, but with little impact. (Comment: A Times of India
article on May 26, 2009, said the state had so far failed to
acquire speedboats to patrol the coast, and that local police
patrols were still taking place in fishing trawlers).



IS CHANGE AND REFORM POSSIBLE?




15. (SBU) Local sources agreed that the Maharashtra government
was not strongly committed to pushing through effective reform
of the police and emergency response forces. Regarding his
forthcoming report, Balachandran said he hopes the state
government will follow the recommendations, but the perennial
problem in India is that "people forget about the past too
quickly." According to Mahurkar, there is a widespread feeling
that it will take Maharashtra a long time to change. His
company anticipates problems whenever they have to work with the
Maharashtra government, particularly over the issue of licenses
for armed guards. States like Gujarat, Delhi, and Punjab are
much easier to deal with, he said.




16. (SBU) Mahindra's Raman believed it would take another
attack for real change to occur. He said the Maharashtra
government was focused on the just-concluded national elections,
leading to little progress on security issues. Now that the
elections are over with the Congress Party returned to power,
there will be at least continuity in government at the center.
However, Maharashtra suffers from weak leadership and Mumbai is
neglected because it is possible to win power in the state while
ignoring Mumbai and the industrial belt due to the electoral
weight of rural voters. Mumbai is simply a cash cow for the
state and for India, he said. Sahney said there was a feeling
that little had changed at the ground level. The police force
needs continuity to gain expertise and experience. However,
police leaders are selected purely by seniority, and short-term
chiefs often serve for just a few months because it's "their
turn" before retirement. The central government has been
preoccupied with the Indo-American civilian nuclear agreement,
and has neglected security issues such as the Naxalite
insurgency. He hoped the central government would take a
stronger line on security now that the Left parties are
marginalized after the elections.



PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR CHANGE?




17. (SBU) According to Raman, the average Mumbaikar's life is
so full of difficulties that three days of terrorist attacks
were not markedly worse than the other 362 days of the year. He
pointed out that despite all the outrage after the attacks,
there was a record low turnout in Mumbai for the just-concluded
national elections. (Note: Turnout in Mumbai was 41% in 2009,
compared to 47% in 2004; the national turnout rate in 2009 was
57%. Some point to the holiday weekend timing of the Mumbai
polls as a second reason for low turnout. End Note.) Raman
said the local and international business community has to
demand better security for all of India before real change will
happen. S.N. Desai, National Coordinator of the
right-of-the-center Forum for Integrated National Security, said
his group is hoping to raise awareness among the general public
about security. They have reached out to college and university
students, and are advocating that the National Cadet Corps
(similar to ROTC but not necessarily leading to military
commissions) be re-established at every college and university.



REAL CHANGE ELUSIVE




18. (SBU) Comment: By all accounts, the security situation has
not improved in the six months since the Mumbai attacks. Plans
exist on paper, but an unfocused bureaucracy and the lack of

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political will to push through reforms have stymied progress.
With a "caretaker" state Chief Minister, and successive rounds
of national and state elections, interlocutors don't expect any
improvements until at least next year. The public outrage
against the government's failings has faded, as evidenced by the
low voter turnout in Mumbai, and, so far, the absence of the
attacks as an election issue. One thing is for certain: the
state and central governments have a lot of history and inertia
to overcome if they are to make any real progress in protecting
Mumbai against future attacks. End Comment.
KAUFFMAN