Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW926
2009-04-13 03:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: DFM KARASIN ON RUSSIAN FORCE BUILD-UP,

Tags:  PREL PGOV OSCE RS GG 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2841
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RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000926 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV OSCE RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: DFM KARASIN ON RUSSIAN FORCE BUILD-UP,
GENEVA PROCESS AND RESPONSE TO QUAD DEMARCHE ON OSCE
MISSION MANDATE

REF: A. BEYRLE E-MAIL APRIL 8

B. STATE 034630

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000926

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV OSCE RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: DFM KARASIN ON RUSSIAN FORCE BUILD-UP,
GENEVA PROCESS AND RESPONSE TO QUAD DEMARCHE ON OSCE
MISSION MANDATE

REF: A. BEYRLE E-MAIL APRIL 8

B. STATE 034630

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador called DFM Karasin April 8
to express concern about the build-up of Russian forces in
Akhalgori, Gori, and Gali in advance of the planned April 9
demonstrations in Tbilisi (ref A). Karasin responded that
Russia's force buildup was "purely defensive/deterrent in
character against possible provocations." He also repeated
allegations of heavy build-up of Georgian forces, and said
that Russia did not know what to expect. Karasin said Russia
had agreed with EU envoy Morel's desire to move the next
meeting of the Geneva process up to May 13-14 (vice 18-19).
On April 9, members of the French, UK, German, and U.S.
Embassies delivered ref B demarche to Karasin on the OSCE
mandate for missions in Georgia. Karasin repeatedly pressed
us to accept the Russian proposal for two separate missions,
reporting to one center in Vienna, contending that nobody had
given a good reason why Moscow's proposal was not acceptable.
Saying that Russia agreed with most of the points in the
demarche, he stressed that Russia supported continuing the
OSCE mission in South Ossetia and wanted to see the Incident
Prevention Mechanism (IPM) go into effect (repeated in MFA
statement on April 10). When pressed on the need for
monitors to be able to cross the boundary line in response to
an incident, he said the April 14-15 discussions on the IPM
could consider the idea. End summary.

Russian Force Build-Up
--------------


2. (C) On April 8, the Ambassador called DFM Karasin to
express concern at the Russian build-up of forces in
Akhalgori, Gori, and Gali and to ask what the Russian intent
was. Karasin said the Ambassador's call was "timely,"
especially in light of the events in Chisinau which "could
serve as a bad example for some hotheads." Karasin contended
that over the last two-three months, Russia had told the
U.S., EU, OSCE, and UN of its concerns about heavy Georgian
force buildup in regions adjacent to South Ossetia and

Abkhazia, including "dozens of armored vehicles, 100s of
spetsnaz, patriotic youth camps", etc. In light of
"political uncertainty in Tbilisi and unpredictability of
Saakashvili," Moscow did not know what to expect. He added
that since Russia had assumed responsibility for assuring
security in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Russian force
buildup was purely defensive/deterrent in character against
possible provocations. Any suggestion forces would be used
offensively was "not serious," Karasin said. When pressed as
to whether he could ensure that local military commanders
would keep things purely defensive, Karasin replied
"absolutely." He reiterated that there was no danger from
Russian forces - the danger came from "Tbilisi leadership and
hotheads surrounding Saakashvili." Karasin assured
Ambassador Beyrle that "we got your message - and we hope you
got ours."


3. (C) Karasin did not mention that the build-up was part of
a "winter rotation" or "planned inspection," as other GOR
officials had claimed. Akhalgori was the area in which
Moscow expected the most provocations from the Georgian side,
so the "preventive force" buildup was highest there, he said.

Geneva Process
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador Beyrle noted the emphasis on the Geneva
process in the Obama-Medvedev Joint Statement, saying we
should not wait until late May or June for the next meeting.
Karasin said Russia had agreed with EU envoy Morel's desire
to move the next meeting up to May 13-14 (vice 18-19). This
would make sense, since it would come after the UN report on
May 9. If talks on the new mandate were successful, he said,
the need for heavy Russian presence around Gali would be
lessened. He added that South Ossetia was "a different case."

Quad Demarche
--------------


5. (C) The French and German Ambassadors and UK and U.S.

MOSCOW 00000926 002 OF 003


A/POL MC's delivered ref B demarche to Karasin on April 9.
Stressing that agreement on the OSCE mandate for the observer
missions would help address conflicting allegations of
build-up of forces by both sides, the French Ambassador urged
Karasin to accept the latest Greek OSCE CIO proposal.


6. (C) Expressing his "happiness" in meeting with the Quad,
Karasin intoned that "yesterday was the eight-month
anniversary of the moment when Russia helped South Ossetia
repel unwarranted aggression by Georgia against the people of
South Ossetia." This was important, Karasin said, because it
set the context in which the new mandate for the OSCE was
being discussed. He added that either we maintain and build
security and stability in the region, or we continue the
"political games" aimed at restoring through diplomatic means
the positions Georgia "forfeited" in 2008. There was still a
lot of nervousness in South Ossetia about Georgia's
intentions, even more so after the events in Moldova a few
days before.


7. (C) Russia agreed with most of the points in the demarche,
Karasin said, and believed we were "a step away" from an
agreement. Moscow had repeatedly stated its interest in
maintaining an international presence in South Ossetia, and
supported the Incident Prevention Mechanism and would
participate in the April 14-15 meetings on it, even though
Abkhazia was still refusing to let it commence until there
was a new UN Security Council Resolution on the monitors
there. He stressed that he would "hate to see the
consequences of withdrawal of the OSCE mission, which would
lead to a worse situation on the ground."


8. (C) In response to the French Ambassador's pressing him to
accept the latest Greek proposal, Karasin repeatedly said
nobody had explained adequately why we could not agree to
Russia's proposal for two separate missions, reporting to the
same center in Vienna. It would greatly strengthen the role
of the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, allow 20, "or
more" observers in Georgia and eight in South Ossetia, and
enable the Center to obtain and "unite" the information from
the two missions, and report to the CIO. The question of
names could be easily resolved. Karasin reiterated, however,
that South Ossetia would need to agree to the mission there.


9. (C) When pressed again to accept the latest Greek CIO
proposal, Karasin said South Ossetia could not accept one
mission with observers on both sides. He also objected to
the "zone of conflict" terminology in the Greek proposal,
saying there was no "conflict;" it had ended on Sept. 8 (he
ignored the German Ambassador's comment that the language
said "August zone of conflict"). He argued that we should
not "let the Georgians persuade us that the Russian proposal
somehow implicates the question of status of South Ossetia,"
or allow them to use this to undo the Aug/Sept 2008
agreements. He contended that we should not see this as an
issue of territorial integrity or lack thereof, and should
stop arguing over "perceptions of status," and focus on
achieving practical outcome. "We need a result; we need a
mission, not wording," he argued. The Russian proposal would
be the best way to accomplish this, Karasin insisted.


10. (C) When the German Ambassador explained that the problem
with the Russian proposal was that it did not allow the
monitors on one side to respond to an incident across the
boundary line, Karasin said this could be discussed in the
talks on the IPM on 4/14-15. He welcomed the idea that the
next Geneva meeting would address a non-use of force pledge.


11. (C) The French Ambassador noted that failure to agree was
risking our capacity to prevent another crisis in Georgia,
and that as our countries were beginning to improve relations
with each other, nobody wanted the situation in Georgia to
hamper this or to negatively affect other, very important
issues. He argued that Russia's and South Ossetia's
objections to the Greek proposal were "only based on
principle." Karasin said he understood the effort to
"condition this issue to larger international political
issues," but said we should try to find a practical solution.
We still have time; we should "exercise flexibility," not
try to "ram through" Greek proposal, he argued. Karasin
closed by saying we should "think again" and work to find a
compromise.

MOSCOW 00000926 003 OF 003



MFA Statement
--------------


12. (SBU) In a statement posted on the its website describing
the meeting, the MFA said that Russia "stressed that reaching
a compromise was being hampered by an unconstructive position
of a number of countries that were not prepared to take a
realistic approach to the present situation in the region,
were trying to substitute political maneuvering for the
urgent problems of strengthening security in the region. The
Russian Federation stands for the OSCE and other
international organizations to operate in full compliance
with the new political and legal reality in the region, and
is ready for constructive talks on mandates for the OSCE's
field presence in Georgia and South Ossetia. The possibility
of reaching a mutually acceptable solution is real and
depends on the flexibility and impartiality of approaches to
be chosen," the statement says.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) The force buildup in the region is likely designed to
create tension and put pressure on Saakashvili and his
advisers just when they look weakest and most vulnerable.
While we do not exclude that the military was trying to
provoke something from the Georgians to which they could
respond, Karasin and others at the MFA probably recognize
that any use of force by Russia would be condemned
internationally and would weaken opposition to Saakashvili
internally, at least in the short run. The Russian military,
of course, uses a different calculation.

BEYRLE