INDEPENDENT UNIONS FACE PRESSURE AND VIOLENCE FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000925

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2019
TAGS: ELAB ECON EIND PHUM PGOV SOCI RS
SUBJECT: INDEPENDENT UNIONS FACE PRESSURE AND VIOLENCE FROM
GOR AND EMPLOYERS

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Two of Russia's major, independent labor
confederations will merge this summer to strengthen their
position in terms of resources and membership. Independent
labor unions face aggressive opposition from local
authorities and employers in attempting to protect workers'
rights. Independent union representatives have suffered six
attacks, including two attempted murders, since last fall.
The GOR is trying to weaken these unions by setting up and
funding alternative organizations. Furthermore, independent
unions lack access to management level discussions on
companies, strategies to deal with the crisis. Meanwhile,
the major labor umbrella organization is hesitant to seek
reform owing to its close affiliation with the GOR. Experts
predict an increase in the number of strikes in 2009 compared
to 2008. However, Russian workers' preference for resolving
disputes directly with employers or through the courts, as
opposed to striking or protesting, indicates widespread
unrest is unlikely absent a significant deterioration in
their living situation. End summary.

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INDEPENDENT UNION CONFEDERATIONS TO MERGE
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2. (C) Russia's two major independent labor organizations,
the Confederation of Labor of Russia (KTR) and the All-Russia
Confederation of Labor (VKT) plan to merge by July 2009,
according to KTR President Alexander Shepel. VKT consists of
four nationwide and three interregional unions with
approximately 1.2 million members. KTR has four nationwide
and five interregional unions as well as four territorial
organizations, totaling around 900,000 members. The primary
objective of the merger is the consolidation of resources and
networks so as to counter what the VKT and KTR leadership
perceive as a growing tendency by the GOR, local
administrations, and the management of some major
corporations to suppress independent union activity during
the economic crisis.

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AUTHORITIES PRESSURE, DIVIDE UNIONS...
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3. (C) President of the All-Russia Confederation of Labor
Boris Kravchenko and other independent labor experts reported
that local authorities were using violent methods to silence
labor union activists. Kravchenko told us on March 5 that
six attacks on union representatives, including two attempted
murders, had taken place in the previous three months.
Unidentified assailants beat up Evgeniy Ivanov, leader of the
General Motors (GM) St. Petersburg chapter of the
Interregional Trade Union of Auto Industry Workers (MPRA),as
he was leaving his apartment on February 8. Ivanov sustained
a skull injury and a concussion along with numerous bruises.
Prior to the incident, Ivanov received several phone calls
threatening his family should he fail to cease his union
activities. Kravchenko claimed that the assault was
organized by the St. Petersburg "Office for Combating
Extremism," a shadowy organization he believed was linked to
the Internal Forces (MVD). Similar incidents took place in
Togliatti and Taganrog.


4. (C) Kravchenko alleged that the GOR was attempting to
divide and weaken the independent labor movement by setting
up alternative, competing "yellow8 unions. He contended
that the GOR assisted these groups with funds allocated for
civil society development and concluded "political
agreements" with them. In October 2008, one of Russia's
umbrella labor organizations, the All-Russia Union of Labor
Unions (Sotsprof)- with close ties to the GOR - concluded a
political protocol with the United Russia Party and also
received a 1.8 million ruble civil society support grant.
Kravchenko said Sotsprof has set up its own
auto-manufacturing unions at Ford and GM plants in
Vsevolozhsk and Saint Petersburg to compete with existing
chapters of the MPRA. He added that the GOR was trying to
establish a similar "yellow union8 at the Hyundai plant in
St. Petersburg.


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..AND SOME EMPLOYERS TURN ON THE HEAT
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5. (C) Kravchenko claimed that employers (often with the
backing of local governments) put indirect pressure on union
members and labor activists. For example, he said employers
tended to put union members' names at the top of lists of
employees slated to be laid off, and made particular
reference to the GM and GM-AvtoVaz plants in St. Petersburg
and Togliatti. MPRA's Evgeniy Ivanov claimed in a recent
internet interview that GM had intentionally closed two
production facilities where union activity was perceived to
be the strongest, transferring some of the employees and
putting them on part-time work schedules. (Note: In a
conversation with us, a local GM executive vehemently denied
that their company engaged in anti-union pressure tactics,
and contended that GM was fully cooperating with labor
unions. Likewise, a Ford Motor Company Russia official told
us Ford did not condone violence or discrimination against
its employees and maintained an open relationship with the
unions in accordance with the company's worldwide policy.
Other labor experts confirmed to us that Ford's relations
with the MPRA were exemplary, noting they were an exception
to the norm in Russia. End Note.)


6. (C) Independent labor unions in Russia are unable to
influence corporate decisions regarding anti-crisis measures.
KTR's President Alexander Shepel said his unions have been
shut out of discussions with management on addressing the
current economic crisis. In a March 16 meeting with us,
Elena Gerasimova and Eduard Vokhmin of the Center for Social
and Labor Rights (CSLR) claimed enterprises often implemented
lay-offs without discussing with unions the economic or
managerial rationale for their decisions, let alone offering
alternatives. They also emphasized unions' lack of access to
information on companies' financial standing (i.e. revenues,
sales, management bonuses, etc.) in both the public and
private sectors.

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THE FECKLESS FNPR
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7. (C) The Federation of Independent Unions of Russia (FNPR),
heir to the Soviet-era All-Union Central Council of Trade
Unions and Russia's largest labor organization, is limited in
its ability to press for reform owing to its close
connections with the government and the major employers,
according to many of our labor contacts. (Note: The FNPR is
the labor arm of the Tripartite Commission with the GOR and
the Union of Industrialists set up to conduct collective
bargaining on wages, etc. End Note.) CSLR's Gerasimova and
Vokhmin criticized the FNPR for collaborating with the GOR
and its reluctance to address the economic crisis
proactively. They compared the situation today to the 1990s,
when the FNPR and other unions focused on survival instead of
advancing strong labor programs.

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LIMITED WORKER SUPPORT FOR STRIKES
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8. (C) CSLR monitoring of protest activity revealed an
increase in the number of strikes in 2008, and Gerasimova and
Vokhmin expected an additional increase in 2009. KTR's
Shepel concurred. However, Gerasimova and Vokhmin noted
workers generally resorted to striking only in desperate
situations (i.e. not receiving a paycheck for six months).
Only four percent of Russians agreed with defending labor
rights through strikes and protests, according to a
"Tsirkon8 research group survey in December 2008.
Thirty-five percent preferred to solve problems in
consultation with management, while thirty-three percent
considered appeals to the courts more effective. Also,
workers' fear of losing their jobs - especially during the
slowdown - was a disincentive to strike, further eroding
labor unions' bargaining position with management.


9. (C) In addition to limited support from workers,
administrative barriers impede civic action to defend
workers' rights. Kravchenko contended legal strikes,
although theoretically possible under the labor code, were
practically impossible to carry out owing to innumerable
bureaucratic obstacles. Local authorities were able to find

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an administrative reason to deny a request for a
demonstration whenever it suited them, he maintained.
Kravchenko cited the GOR's successful deterrence of a strike
against AvtoVaz last summer, in which the regional governor
intervened to prevent the action.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) In the current economic and political environment,
labor unions are unlikely to facilitate significant
improvements in workers' rights or living conditions. FNPR,
which remains the main representative of labor to the GOR, is
supportive of the GOR's anti-crisis measures and advocates
resolving labor and wage disputes through a dialogue with
management rather than strike activity. The smaller,
independent unions are clearly unable to exert significant
influence on management decisions, and are often perceived as
a political threat by the authorities. Government motivated
threats and assaults against their activists further inhibit
independent unions. Continued economic decline in terms of
rising unemployment and falling incomes could change workers'
views on the appropriateness of strikes and protests.
However, even the severe decline in workers' living
conditions in the 1990s, during which time FNPR, VKT, and KTR
were all active, failed to compel workers to press for the
reforms that might have improved their situation today. End
Comment.
BEYRLE