Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW835
2009-04-02 09:14:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
RUSSIAN EXPERTS DISCUSS CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CIS
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000835
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL RS CH AF KZ ZK
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN EXPERTS DISCUSS CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CIS
WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR TO KAZAKHSTAN HOAGLAND
MOSCOW 00000835 001.2 OF 003
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000835
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL RS CH AF KZ ZK
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN EXPERTS DISCUSS CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CIS
WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR TO KAZAKHSTAN HOAGLAND
MOSCOW 00000835 001.2 OF 003
1. (U) This message is sensitive but unclassified and is
not intended for internet distribution.
2. (SBU) Summary. In conversations with U.S. Ambassador to
Kazakhstan Richard Hoagland March 23-24, Russian experts on
the CIS listed maintaining dominance in the region,
protecting Russia's economic interests, and preventing the
spillover effects of instability as the main forces driving
Russian policy in the post-Soviet space. They had divided
views on prospects for cooperation between the United States
and Russia in the CIS region, with some seeing the United
States challenging Russian interests in every sphere while
others point to Afghanistan and counter-narcotics as obvious
areas of coinciding interests. In the experts' view, China's
slow but determined expansion of influence in the Central
Asian economies and its increasing control of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) added to the complexity of
Russian policy in Central Asia. While many in the region
tended to differentiate Kazakhstan from the rest of Central
Asia, all five countries shared common challenges such as
water resource usage and regime survival. End summary.
3. (U) U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan Richard Hoagland, in
Moscow March 23-24 for consultations, met with a number of
Russian experts to discuss Russian foreign policy in the CIS
region. These experts included Director of the Carnegie
Moscow Center Dmitriy Trenin, the CIS Institute's Head of
Central Asia and Kazakhstan Section Andrey Grozin, Director
of the World Security Institute Ivan Safranchuk, head of the
Heritage Foundation's Moscow office Yevgeniy Volk, and
Carnegie Moscow Center analyst Aleksey Malashenko.
Russian Priorities in the CIS
--------------
4. (SBU) The Carnegie Moscow Center's Dmitriy Trenin divided
Russian interests in the CIS into three tiers of priorities.
At the top, Moscow did not want the CIS countries to form
alliances with third countries, whether it was the United
States and NATO today, or China tomorrow. At the second
tier, Moscow would like to ensure that no CIS country
deployed troops to third countries without its consent or
discriminated against Russian economic interests. At the
third tier, Russia would like to continue its cultural
influence in the CIS. If a CIS country ran counter to the
first tier of Russian interests, war might result, while
conflicts in the second-tier areas could lead to the cooling
of relations. In Trenin's view, Moscow wanted to maintain
its status as the ultimate insider in the region and to wield
veto rights on the top-tier issues.
5. (SBU) Andrey Grozin of the CIS Institute added that
Russian policy in the CIS was driven by the need to preserve
stability, often achieved through support for existing
regimes, and the desire to maintain Russian dominance in
specific sectors of the economy. In this regard, Moscow's
self-declared special and privileged relations with the CIS
countries were pragmatically focused on economic interests.
More specifically, the GOR would like to control transport,
hydrocarbon and metallurgical resources in the region, and to
develop Central Asia's dependence on Russia as the main
transit corridor for its raw material exports.
6. (SBU) Looking at Central Asia specifically, Ivan
Safranchuk pointed out that Russia had no choice but to
maintain a forward policy in the region, since it had no
constructed land border with Kazakhstan to keep out the
spillover effects of instability, radical ideology and "other
diseases" down south. To construct such a border would cost
more than $18 billion, including staffing costs for customs
and immigration officials. However, both Grozin and
Safranchuk believed that the GOR lacked a coherent,
conceptualized approach to dealing with the specific
challenges in Central Asia. This problem was compounded by
the reality that the five countries in the region share more
differences than similarities these days, and they treat the
MOSCOW 00000835 002.2 OF 003
tools of regional integration, such as the Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEc) and the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO),more as protocol opportunities than
channels for resolving problems.
Cooperation and Competition with the U.S.
--------------
7. (SBU) The experts had divided views on whether the
United States and Russia could develop a truly cooperative
relationship in the CIS sphere. Yevgeniy Volk of the
Heritage Foundation commented that at each of the three tiers
of interests articulated by Dmitriy Trenin, Russia was being
challenged by the United States through NATO expansion,
competition for energy resources, and increasing American
cultural influence. In his view, it seemed inevitable that
the core of Russia's CIS policy would be to contain the
United States. He warned both sides against expecting too
much from a "reset" in the bilateral relationship: Russia
thinks about the United States much more than vice versa,
because it is important for Moscow to be acknowledged as a
superpower again. With such a mindset, disappointment was
bound to happen.
8. (SBU) Ivan Safranchuk agreed, noting that looking at
U.S. policy in Central Asia through the eyes of those
suspicious of Washington's motives, it would appear that the
United States was encouraging the Central Asian countries'
political and economic independence from Russia. U.S.
efforts to diversify the Central Asian economies and their
oil and gas export routes would not directly benefit the U.S.
economy -- Europe would be the greater beneficiary. To some
in the Russian leadership, this was proof enough that the
real intent of U.S. policy was to counter Russian influences
and take Central Asia away from Moscow.
9. (SBU) Andrey Grozin, on the other hand, believed that
there was wide room for Russia to cooperate with the United
States in maintaining stability in Central Asia.
Afghanistan, drug trafficking, and countering extremism were
the obvious areas where our interests coincided, especially
because Russia would be expected to clean up any major
problems in the region, including the spillover effects from
Afghanistan. The United States, he asserted, also wanted a
stable Central Asia, if for no other reason than to protect
the economic interests of the American companies there.
Cooperation and Competition with China
--------------
10. (SBU) The experts pointed out that no discussion about
Russian policies in Central Asia should ignore China's role.
Andrey Grozin, in discussing the GOR's desire to maintain
special and privileged relations with the former Soviet
republics, stated that such a policy was also meant to check
China's slow but determined expansion of its interests in the
raw materials sector in Central Asia. While supportive of
maintaining good relations with China, Grozin at the same
time believed Russia should keep its distance. Otherwise, he
argued, China, being the larger, stronger, and more unified
country, would make Russia the junior partner in any attempt
to form an alliance.
11. (SBU) The Carnegie Moscow Center's Aleksey Malashenko
supported Grozin's view, stating that increasingly, the SCO
was becoming a China-controlled organization and was looking
at effective ways to address emergency situations. In
contrast, the CSTO, designed to maintain Russian political
and military influence over the CIS countries, appeared
anemic under Russian leadership, and it would be difficult to
envision the CSTO playing a key role in a serious crisis. To
Malashenko, this was a sign that Russian influence in the
post-Soviet space was waning.
Central Asia and Kazakhstan
--------------
MOSCOW 00000835 003.2 OF 003
12. (SBU) The experts agreed with Ambassador Hoagland's
observation that many in the region tended to divide Central
Asia into two parts, Kazakhstan and the rest. Grozin stated
that most Russians considered Kazakhstan the leader of the
five countries, more developed and sophisticated, with more
serious economic potential. Malashenko asserted that
whenever one went to Central Asia, one could feel an
immediate difference between Astana and Almaty on the one
hand, and Tashkent and Bishkek on the other.
13. (SBU) Nevertheless, the region shared some similar
problems, among them the division of water resources and
complicated internal political struggles. In Grozin's view,
water has emerged as a serious regional issue in the last
five years. While ideas such as an international consortium
to manage water resources sounded good on paper, the Central
Asian leaders were too locked into a mentality of competition
with each other to make it a reality. On the political
front, regime survival was a central issue in each of the
five countries, with leaders capitalizing on their
populations' fear of instability and arguing for the
consolidation of power as a way to weather the current
financial crisis. In countries such as Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan, the opposition is too split and "has no flesh" to
their movement. Speaking about the reported $300 million
loan from Russia that would form part of the $2.3 billion
assistance package for Bishkek, Grozin assessed that most of
it would be spent on food and other social programs designed
to address the Kyrgyz population's discontent so as to
stabilize the regime in advance of the presidential elections
and to ensure a Bakiyev victory.
14. (U) Ambassador Hoagland has cleared this cable.
BEYRLE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL RS CH AF KZ ZK
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN EXPERTS DISCUSS CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CIS
WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR TO KAZAKHSTAN HOAGLAND
MOSCOW 00000835 001.2 OF 003
1. (U) This message is sensitive but unclassified and is
not intended for internet distribution.
2. (SBU) Summary. In conversations with U.S. Ambassador to
Kazakhstan Richard Hoagland March 23-24, Russian experts on
the CIS listed maintaining dominance in the region,
protecting Russia's economic interests, and preventing the
spillover effects of instability as the main forces driving
Russian policy in the post-Soviet space. They had divided
views on prospects for cooperation between the United States
and Russia in the CIS region, with some seeing the United
States challenging Russian interests in every sphere while
others point to Afghanistan and counter-narcotics as obvious
areas of coinciding interests. In the experts' view, China's
slow but determined expansion of influence in the Central
Asian economies and its increasing control of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) added to the complexity of
Russian policy in Central Asia. While many in the region
tended to differentiate Kazakhstan from the rest of Central
Asia, all five countries shared common challenges such as
water resource usage and regime survival. End summary.
3. (U) U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan Richard Hoagland, in
Moscow March 23-24 for consultations, met with a number of
Russian experts to discuss Russian foreign policy in the CIS
region. These experts included Director of the Carnegie
Moscow Center Dmitriy Trenin, the CIS Institute's Head of
Central Asia and Kazakhstan Section Andrey Grozin, Director
of the World Security Institute Ivan Safranchuk, head of the
Heritage Foundation's Moscow office Yevgeniy Volk, and
Carnegie Moscow Center analyst Aleksey Malashenko.
Russian Priorities in the CIS
--------------
4. (SBU) The Carnegie Moscow Center's Dmitriy Trenin divided
Russian interests in the CIS into three tiers of priorities.
At the top, Moscow did not want the CIS countries to form
alliances with third countries, whether it was the United
States and NATO today, or China tomorrow. At the second
tier, Moscow would like to ensure that no CIS country
deployed troops to third countries without its consent or
discriminated against Russian economic interests. At the
third tier, Russia would like to continue its cultural
influence in the CIS. If a CIS country ran counter to the
first tier of Russian interests, war might result, while
conflicts in the second-tier areas could lead to the cooling
of relations. In Trenin's view, Moscow wanted to maintain
its status as the ultimate insider in the region and to wield
veto rights on the top-tier issues.
5. (SBU) Andrey Grozin of the CIS Institute added that
Russian policy in the CIS was driven by the need to preserve
stability, often achieved through support for existing
regimes, and the desire to maintain Russian dominance in
specific sectors of the economy. In this regard, Moscow's
self-declared special and privileged relations with the CIS
countries were pragmatically focused on economic interests.
More specifically, the GOR would like to control transport,
hydrocarbon and metallurgical resources in the region, and to
develop Central Asia's dependence on Russia as the main
transit corridor for its raw material exports.
6. (SBU) Looking at Central Asia specifically, Ivan
Safranchuk pointed out that Russia had no choice but to
maintain a forward policy in the region, since it had no
constructed land border with Kazakhstan to keep out the
spillover effects of instability, radical ideology and "other
diseases" down south. To construct such a border would cost
more than $18 billion, including staffing costs for customs
and immigration officials. However, both Grozin and
Safranchuk believed that the GOR lacked a coherent,
conceptualized approach to dealing with the specific
challenges in Central Asia. This problem was compounded by
the reality that the five countries in the region share more
differences than similarities these days, and they treat the
MOSCOW 00000835 002.2 OF 003
tools of regional integration, such as the Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEc) and the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO),more as protocol opportunities than
channels for resolving problems.
Cooperation and Competition with the U.S.
--------------
7. (SBU) The experts had divided views on whether the
United States and Russia could develop a truly cooperative
relationship in the CIS sphere. Yevgeniy Volk of the
Heritage Foundation commented that at each of the three tiers
of interests articulated by Dmitriy Trenin, Russia was being
challenged by the United States through NATO expansion,
competition for energy resources, and increasing American
cultural influence. In his view, it seemed inevitable that
the core of Russia's CIS policy would be to contain the
United States. He warned both sides against expecting too
much from a "reset" in the bilateral relationship: Russia
thinks about the United States much more than vice versa,
because it is important for Moscow to be acknowledged as a
superpower again. With such a mindset, disappointment was
bound to happen.
8. (SBU) Ivan Safranchuk agreed, noting that looking at
U.S. policy in Central Asia through the eyes of those
suspicious of Washington's motives, it would appear that the
United States was encouraging the Central Asian countries'
political and economic independence from Russia. U.S.
efforts to diversify the Central Asian economies and their
oil and gas export routes would not directly benefit the U.S.
economy -- Europe would be the greater beneficiary. To some
in the Russian leadership, this was proof enough that the
real intent of U.S. policy was to counter Russian influences
and take Central Asia away from Moscow.
9. (SBU) Andrey Grozin, on the other hand, believed that
there was wide room for Russia to cooperate with the United
States in maintaining stability in Central Asia.
Afghanistan, drug trafficking, and countering extremism were
the obvious areas where our interests coincided, especially
because Russia would be expected to clean up any major
problems in the region, including the spillover effects from
Afghanistan. The United States, he asserted, also wanted a
stable Central Asia, if for no other reason than to protect
the economic interests of the American companies there.
Cooperation and Competition with China
--------------
10. (SBU) The experts pointed out that no discussion about
Russian policies in Central Asia should ignore China's role.
Andrey Grozin, in discussing the GOR's desire to maintain
special and privileged relations with the former Soviet
republics, stated that such a policy was also meant to check
China's slow but determined expansion of its interests in the
raw materials sector in Central Asia. While supportive of
maintaining good relations with China, Grozin at the same
time believed Russia should keep its distance. Otherwise, he
argued, China, being the larger, stronger, and more unified
country, would make Russia the junior partner in any attempt
to form an alliance.
11. (SBU) The Carnegie Moscow Center's Aleksey Malashenko
supported Grozin's view, stating that increasingly, the SCO
was becoming a China-controlled organization and was looking
at effective ways to address emergency situations. In
contrast, the CSTO, designed to maintain Russian political
and military influence over the CIS countries, appeared
anemic under Russian leadership, and it would be difficult to
envision the CSTO playing a key role in a serious crisis. To
Malashenko, this was a sign that Russian influence in the
post-Soviet space was waning.
Central Asia and Kazakhstan
--------------
MOSCOW 00000835 003.2 OF 003
12. (SBU) The experts agreed with Ambassador Hoagland's
observation that many in the region tended to divide Central
Asia into two parts, Kazakhstan and the rest. Grozin stated
that most Russians considered Kazakhstan the leader of the
five countries, more developed and sophisticated, with more
serious economic potential. Malashenko asserted that
whenever one went to Central Asia, one could feel an
immediate difference between Astana and Almaty on the one
hand, and Tashkent and Bishkek on the other.
13. (SBU) Nevertheless, the region shared some similar
problems, among them the division of water resources and
complicated internal political struggles. In Grozin's view,
water has emerged as a serious regional issue in the last
five years. While ideas such as an international consortium
to manage water resources sounded good on paper, the Central
Asian leaders were too locked into a mentality of competition
with each other to make it a reality. On the political
front, regime survival was a central issue in each of the
five countries, with leaders capitalizing on their
populations' fear of instability and arguing for the
consolidation of power as a way to weather the current
financial crisis. In countries such as Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan, the opposition is too split and "has no flesh" to
their movement. Speaking about the reported $300 million
loan from Russia that would form part of the $2.3 billion
assistance package for Bishkek, Grozin assessed that most of
it would be spent on food and other social programs designed
to address the Kyrgyz population's discontent so as to
stabilize the regime in advance of the presidential elections
and to ensure a Bakiyev victory.
14. (U) Ambassador Hoagland has cleared this cable.
BEYRLE