RUSSIA-TURKEY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: NO ZERO-SUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000834

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ENRG RS TU AJ AM
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-TURKEY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: NO ZERO-SUM

REF: A. MOSCOW 684

B. ANKARA 456

Classified By: Pol M/C Alice Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Russia has shown little concern about
Turkey's recent diplomatic push in the South Caucasus,
including the GOT's rapprochement with Armenia, offer to help
resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and proposal for a
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Russian
officials told us the GOR seeks a "strategic partnership"
with Turkey, while analysts downplay feelings of competition
in the region. Russia is playing each issue to its own
advantage, bolstering its historic ties with Armenia while
pursuing closer cooperation with Turkey's traditional ally
Azerbaijan. Russia's recent efforts to mediate the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, while continuing to support the
Minsk Group process, deny Turkey a principal role in the
conflict resolution process. While increasing bilateral
energy and other cooperation with Turkey, Russia is open to
Turkey's proposed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform
and sees the Black Sea Defense Ministerial as a vehicle to
reduce U.S. influence in the region. End Summary.

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Turkish activism in the South Caucasus
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2. (C) Russia has shown little concern with Turkey's
stepped-up activity in the South Caucasus following the
August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. GOT initiatives include
the apparently imminent opening of the Turkish border to
Armenian trade, offers to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, and proposals for a multinational Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform and Black Sea Defense
Ministerial. Turkey has also sought to exploit its position
as a key energy transit country to both ensure its own
supplies and garner gains from transit.

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Russia's Opponent or Ally?
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3. (C) Given that the South Caucasus is solidly located
within Russia's declared "area of privileged interests," the
GOR is factoring Turkey into its own South Caucasus policies.
The MFA's Turkey Desk told us that Russia sought a
"strategic partnership" with Turkey, including "greater
cooperation with Turkey" in the European-Asian region and the
Black Sea. Analysts agree that Russia does not feel
threatened by Turkey and is seeking to cooperate with Turkey
where possible. Russia's strong engagement in the South
Caucasus avoids letting Turkey seize the initiative in the
region and ensures that Russian-Turkish regional cooperation
happens on Russia's terms.

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Armenia: Turkey's newest friend
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4. (C) In conversations with us, the MFA has welcomed the
recent warming of relations between Turkey and Armenia,
stating that because Armenia was a "strategic partner,"
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement would not reduce Russian
influence in Armenia. Analysts agree Russia has no need to
fear Turkey's emerging partnership with Armenia. In addition
to Russia's deep historical, cultural, and religious ties
with Armenia, Moscow has taken recent action to ensure
Armenia stays close. Russia's military presence in Armenia,
the two countries' cooperation in the CSTO alliance, and
(alleged) Russian arms sales to Armenia keep Yerevan in
Russia's military orbit. Russia's USD 500 million loan offer
is designed to have the same effect in the economic sphere,
while Armenia's dependence on remittances from Armenian guest
workers in Russia will grow stronger as the financial crisis
wears on. Russian support for Armenia's new communication
and transport opportunities with Turkey aids Russian goals by
reducing Georgia's importance to the GOAZ and ensures
Armenia's allegiance. The MFA told us that the GOR stood
ready to refurbish old railway lines between Turkey and
Armenia, and link both countries up to Russia's electrical
grid.

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Azerbaijan: Russia pursuing closer ties
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5. (C) Russia's engagement with Azerbaijan matches several
objectives -- expanding Moscow's influence in the CIS,
strengthening Russia's mediating position in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and increasing energy security.
The GOR has used frequent high-level government visits to
offer the GOAZ the creation of an economic cooperation
organization modeled on the Black Sea Economic Forum,
cooperation on security in the region, and/or a convention on
the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Russia has also sought
use of Azerbaijan's Gabala radar station past 2012, and
deepened cooperation on culture and promotion of the Russian
language (Ref A). Gazprom's imminent negotiations on
purchasing Azeri gas at "market prices" are aimed directly at
preventing additional gas from flowing west and maintaining
Russian control over as much of the gas flow to Europe as
possible. Despite turbulence in the relationship generated
by allegations of large Russian arms sales to Yerevan,
analysts expect Aliyev and Moscow to pragmatically work
through differences and view warming Turkish-Armenian ties as
a further spur to Baku to shore up its strategic partnership
with Moscow.

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Nagorno-Karabakh: intractable conflict
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6. (C) The MFA's Azerbaijan desk told us Russia welcomed
Turkey's offers to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, but suggested that Russia's support for the
U.S.-Russia-France-led Minsk Group and its efforts to mediate
between Azerbaijan and Armenia crowd out any actual Turkish
engagement. Analysts thought Turkey's attempted involvement
mattered little to Russia, given the "intractable" nature of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, the MFA told us it
was concerned that, if Turkey de-links its demands that
Armenia drop its 1915 genocide charges and withdraw its
troops from the occupied areas of Azerbaijan, Armenia could
harden its position on Nagorno-Karabakh.

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Multilateral initiatives: Russia will consider
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7. (C) While details on Turkey's Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform remain sparse, the MFA has expressed
doubts about the wisdom of attempting to unite antagonists
such as Georgia and Russia or Armenia and Azerbaijan in one
group. Nevertheless, Russia has been open to discussions on
the initiative, most recently during the February 12-15 visit
of Turkish President Gul to Moscow. Analysts told us
Turkey's intentions for a Black Sea Defense Ministerial (Ref
B) open only to littoral states would find favorable
consideration from Russia as a vehicle to reduce U.S.
influence in the region.

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Russia-Turkey: No zero-sum
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8. (C) Thanks to the 15 million-strong Turkic population in
Russia, along with Russia's need to factor Turkey into its
hydrocarbon transport plans, and Turkish dependency on Russia
for trade and energy, Moscow has abandoned its traditional
zero-sum mentality regarding influence in the region.
Russian assistance in constructing a civil nuclear energy
plant in Turkey and the revived "Blue Stream" gas pipeline
project under the Black Sea are examples of Russian attempts
to expand cooperation with Turkey while pursuing Russia's own
energy objectives in the region. With the MFA defining
Turkey-Russia relations to us as "moving toward strategic
partnership," we expect to see more Russian engagement with
Turkey that will serve Russia's interests in the South
Caucasus while allowing Turkey to flex its muscle in the
region.
BEYRLE