Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW746
2009-03-25 12:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

MEDVEDEV APPROVES EXPANDED COOPERATION ON

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER MARR AF RS 
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VZCZCXRO9374
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHMO #0746/01 0841217
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251217Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2546
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000746 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MARR AF RS
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV APPROVES EXPANDED COOPERATION ON
AFGHANISTAN, LAVROV VISITS KABUL

REF: MOSCOW 416

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000746

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MARR AF RS
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV APPROVES EXPANDED COOPERATION ON
AFGHANISTAN, LAVROV VISITS KABUL

REF: MOSCOW 416

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: President Medvedev has approved a proposal by
FM Lavrov to expand Russian cooperation with the U.S. and
NATO to stabilize Afghanistan. Lavrov made the formal
proposal to Medvedev following his successful first meeting
with Secretary Clinton, drawing the suggested areas for
cooperation from our recent bilateral consultations on
Afghanistan. The FM plans to lay out Russian intentions
during the March 31 conference on Afghanistan in the Hague,
and will propose that Russia be included in future meetings
of contributors to ISAF. The Afghans responded positively to
the GOR's plan to expand Russia's role in Afghan
stabilization during Lavrov's March 16 visit to Kabul,
according to the MFA. Lavrov agreed to an Afghan request to
provide the National Police with AK-47s, although the GOR has
not determined through what means to supply the weapons.
Lavrov urged the Afghans to overcome their differences
regarding the timing of the Presidential election, and said
it was crucial that Karzai be allowed to serve as interim
President, should there be a gap in Presidential terms.
Russia does not see an alternative to another Karzai
presidency, despite frustrations with the Afghan leader, and
is concerned that the Taliban's formation of a shadow
government indicates that national reconciliation will not
work and the Taliban intend a full return to power. End
summary.

Medvedev Signs-off on Expanded Cooperation on Afghanistan
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Acting MFA Afghan desk chief Vitaly Rugalyov told us
on March 24 that President Medvedev had approved a letter
from FM Lavrov proposing specific areas for increased Russian
cooperation with the U.S. and NATO to stabilize Afghanistan.
Lavrov determined to take this formal step after his March 6
meeting with Secretary Clinton, who had convinced Lavrov that
the U.S. welcomed a Russian role with her overview of the
situation in Afghanistan and explanation of the

Administration's policy review. The areas Lavrov specified
to Medvedev for enhanced cooperation were the NATO transit
agreement, counter-narcotics efforts, and infrastructure and
development projects in Afghanistan, which had been discussed
during the February bilateral consultations on Afghanistan in
Moscow (reftel). Rugalyov said Lavrov would raise these
issues during the March 31 International Conference on
Afghanistan in the Hague.

No Hard Feelings Over Hague Conference
--------------


3. (C) Rugalyov explained that the GOR considered the Hague
conference a U.S. initiative, particularly after they first
learned of it from a speech by the Secretary. The timing of
the event, on the heels of the March 27 Russian-hosted
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) conference on
Afghanistan, had raised suspicion within the MFA department
responsible for the SCO that this was a deliberate U.S.
attempt to draw attention from the Russian event, but those
responsible for Afghanistan policy argued that the signals
from Washington, which included sending a delegation to the
SCO conference, suggested otherwise. This viewpoint
prevailed, and Lavrov indicated that he saw the SCO
conference as an event narrowly focused on addressing threats
to Afghanistan's neighbors that would result in a SCO action
plan, whereas the Hague conference would cover Afghanistan
more globally and allow for broader discussion of Russian
cooperation with the U.S. and NATO (septel).


4. (C) According to Rugalyov, Lavrov will use his appearance
at the Hague conference to reiterate that as Russia's support
for the NATO role in Afghanistan increases, Russia should be
included in meetings of contributors to ISAF, which includes
non-troop contributing countries such as Japan (reftel). The
GOR believes this forum could avoid misunderstandings by
acting as a mechanism to discuss Russian support for ISAF and
Kabul.

Lavrov's Trip to Kabul
--------------


5. (C) Rugalyov said that during Lavrov's March 16 trip to
Kabul, the Afghans responded positively to the prospect of
increased Russian support for Afghan stabilization. The
Russians were concerned, however, by some of the "naive"
requests made by the Afghans, such as for Moscow to provide
Kabul direct budgetary support. Rugalyov said that Russia

MOSCOW 00000746 002 OF 002


preferred to funnel aid through international organizations
to ensure accountability and avoid the money disappearing as
a result of Afghan corruption. The GOR would consider
providing assistance along the lines of the $2 million it
gave to the World Bank in 2008 to support Afghan education
programs.

Russia Will Provide AK-47s
--------------


6. (C) Rugalyov confirmed that Russia would supply the Afghan
National Police (ANP) with AK-47s in response to a request
made to Lavrov in Kabul by Minister of the Interior Atmar,
but had yet to determine how the weapons would be supplied to
the ANP. In response to our question about possible Russian
arms donations to Afghanistan, Rugalyov reiterated that the
Russian Ministry of Defense preferred arms sales, a position
taken in response to the purchase of non-licensed AK-47s for
the Afghans from Eastern Europe and possibly China. When we
explained that the vast majority of weapons, including
AK-47s, were donated to the Afghans and not purchased,
Rugalyov responded that Russian sources suggested otherwise.

Russia on Afghan Presidential Election
--------------


7. (C) Rugalyov explained that during Lavrov's March 16
meetings with Karzai, FM Spanta, MinInt Atmar, and
parliamentary leaders, he explained that Russia would not
take a position on potential presidential candidates, but did
urge Karzai and Parliament to overcome their differences and
go forward with the election as originally scheduled. Their
quarrels would only be exploited by the Taliban, which would
argue (with some truth, in the GOR's assessment) that leaders
in Kabul were more concerned with their own political
fortunes than the state of the country. Should there be a
gap between the end of Karzai's term and a new presidential
term, Lavrov urged that Karzai be allowed to serve as
interim President in order to avoid a leadership vacuum that
could be exploited by the Taliban.


8. (C) Rugalyov told us that the GOR presently saw no
realistic alternative to Karzai, despite Moscow's concerns
with what it characterized as his unwillingness to tackle the
insurgency head on. The GOR was impressed by MinInt Atmar,
who had proven himself a capable manager in confronting
substantial challenges in the MOI. The GOR was not sure,
however, whether he was ready to take on the political
responsibilities of President, and Atmar made no indication
to Lavrov that he was considering running.

Russians Think Afghans Skeptical of Reconciliation
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Rugalyov thought that the Afghans were coming round to
the Russian argument that national reconciliation would allow
the Taliban to return to power. While in Kabul, Lavrov
raised Russian concern with reports that the Taliban had
established a shadow government, which indicated that the
insurgents had no intention of negotiating with Kabul and
wanted to return to full power. The GOR thought it
particularly troubling that the shadow Minister of Finance
was an Al-Quaeda representative. According to Rugalyov, the
Afghans accepted Lavrov's assessment and appeared to be
moving closer to the Russian position that supposed reformed
senior Taliban should not be allowed into the central
government. Speaker of the Upper House of Parliament and
head of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission
Mojaddedi indicated to Lavrov that he was skeptical national
reconciliation could work.
BEYRLE