RUSSIA RECEPTIVE TO OSCE/UNOMIG COMPROMISE;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000072

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON RS GG
SUBJECT: RUSSIA RECEPTIVE TO OSCE/UNOMIG COMPROMISE;
PRESSES ON GAS; REJECTS ABKHAZ BORDER REVISION

Classified By: Pol M/C Alice Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a January 14 meeting to brief on the
U.S.-Georgia Charter, MFA Fourth CIS Director Kelin welcomed
the recent compromise formula proposed by Greece to establish
branch OSCE offices in Tskhinvali and Tbilisi, with the
mission headquartered in Vienna, although he flagged Russian
opposition to the proposed names. Arguing it was not "in
anyone's interest" to shutter the OSCE, Kelin also maintained
that Russia saw the benefit of a continued UNOMIG presence
and speculated that a similar compromise could be reached.
He did not rule out a technical rollover of the UNOMIG
mandate, in the event serious negotiations were underway.
Kelin appealed for U.S. assistance in resolving the gas
cutoff to South Ossetia, reiterating Gazprom assurances of
the pipeline's operability, which he maintained that an OSCE
expert also had confirmed. Conceding that the Geneva
meetings will extend beyond February, Kelin argued for their
reduced frequency, with stepped up activity by mediators.
Kelin confirmed that Russia would reject any efforts by the
Abkhaz to extend its "borders" beyond Soviet administrative
boundaries. End Summary.

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U.S.-Georgia Charter
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2. (C) In a January 14 meeting to review the recently
concluded U.S.-Georgia Charter, MFA Fourth CIS Director
Andrei Kelin did not repeat concerns raised by Russian
Ambassador to the U.S. Sergei Kislyak in his January 9
meeting with DAS David Merkel. Instead, Kelin questioned
whether the Charter was patterned on U.S. bilateral efforts
to prepare the Baltic states for NATO membership. We
responded that the Charter was faithful to the
Administration's policy of supporting NATO membership for
Georgia, underscoring the bipartisan support for Georgian
territorial integrity and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

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OSCE Monitors Needed
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3. (C) In contrast to previous meetings where Russian
skepticism towards the viability of an OSCE monitoring
mission inside South Ossetia had been stressed, Kelin
welcomed the latest compromise formula put forth by the Greek
OSCE chairmanship in Vienna on January 13. (Kelin's tone was
in line with a January 13 MFA statement, where DFM Karasin
emphasized the role of the OSCE in resolving the South
Ossetian gas dispute, during a meeting with South Ossetian
"Ambassador" Medoyev.) Stressing that it was "not in
anyone's interest" to fully terminate the OSCE mission in
Georgia, Kelin expressed interest in the proposal to create
OSCE branch offices in Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, with a field
presence of eight and 20 observers respectively, reporting to
a mission headquartered in Vienna. Russia could "work on
that basis," although Kelin underscored that the current
Greek formulation for the names of the mission branches was
unacceptable. An "OSCE Mission to Tskhinvali" had to
parallel an "OSCE Mission to Tbilisi" (and not, as Greece
proposed, an "OSCE Mission to Georgia"). Kelin evinced
confidence that the South Ossetians would follow Russia's
lead in supporting a compromise format.

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UNOMIG Compromise Possible
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4. (C) Speaking "preliminarily," Kelin suggested that a
compromise along the lines proposed for the OSCE could be
envisioned for the UNOMIG mission in Abkhazia. When pressed,
Kelin maintained that Russia benefited from both the UNOMIG
and OSCE presence, since Russia had "influence" in both
international bodies. In contrast, he expressed frustration
over the EUMM, questioning the capacity of the unarmed EU
observers, their restricted mandate, and their ability to
exert control when there was no agreement with Georgia
limiting troop levels. Kelin did not rule out a technical
rollover of the UNOMIG mandate, in the event that discussions
were underway on a compromise formula, noting that it would
take time to renegotiate mission parameters and navigate
Georgian redlines on territorial integrity. However, Kelin
underscored that a technical rollover was not Russia's
preference. Noting that UN Representative for Georgia Johann
Verbeke had submitted several suggestions for a new UNOMIG
mandate, Kelin said it was premature to predict Russia's
position in advance of the February 5 discussions. While
complaining about the lack of cooperation between UNOMIG,
OSCE and EU observers, Kelin was skeptical that the EU would

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agree to uniting the EU and UNOMIG missions under the UN
umbrella, and said Verbeke's suggestion to establish a
full-scale peacekeeping mission would be rejected by Abkhazia.

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Gas: Georgia Stonewalling
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5. (C) Kelin reiterated Russian appeals for U.S. assistance
in ensuring the resumption of gas flows to South Ossetia.
Rejecting claims the pipeline had been successfully tested,
Kelin asserted that only air and not gas had been sent
through the pipes. He pointed to the analysis of an Austrian
gas expert accompanying OSCE Ambassador Christopoulos to
South Ossetia, who had examined the pipeline and found it
undamaged. Kelin stressed that Gazprom experts had made all
necessary repairs in October 2008 along the 7 km stretch of
pipeline and stood by its security guarantee. Noting that
South Ossetia had already paid the bill Georgia had submitted
for gas at the price of $400 per thousand cubic meters, Kelin
castigated Georgia's failure to resume gas deliveries as
unacceptable. We affirmed that the resumption of gas
deliveries, as well as the spring 2009 provision of potable
water to Georgian villages, was a humanitarian issue, but
pressed for security guarantees for OSCE experts to complete
a comprehensive survey. Kelin maintained that he had
personally seen copies of the letters South Ossetian "deputy
prime minister" Boris Chochiev, extending security guarantees
to the experts.


6. (C) Kelin charged that Tbilisi's more pragmatic approach
to Abkhazia was matched by intransigence towards South
Ossetia. Stating that Georgia had made 27 exclusions to its
ban on economic activity by Georgian firms on Abkhaz
territory (including the agreement with RAO UES to manage the
Enguri electricity plant),Kelin noted that Tbilisi had yet
to make any for Georgian gas exporters to operate inside
South Ossetia. Kelin argued that this was a problem the U.S.
and Russia could settle.

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Geneva Process Will Continue
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7. (C) Outlining next steps on Georgia, Kelin listed the
upcoming visits to Moscow by EU special envoy Pierre Morel
January 28-29 and chief of the EU investigation commission
Heidi Tagliavini February 3-4, followed by Morel visits to
Tbilisi, Tskhinvali, and Sukhumi before the next round of
Geneva talks February 17-18. In the meantime, Kelin warned,
South Ossetian "foreign minister" Murat Dzhioyev would visit
Moscow January 20 on his first "official" visit, in order to
exchange instruments of ratification of the Russia-South
Ossetia "Big Treaty" and sign an MOU between the Russian and
South Ossetian foreign ministries, similar to Abkhaz "foreign
minister" Shamba's visit December 22-23, 2008.


8. (C) Kelin walked back his December statements in Geneva
that the February round of talks should be the last. While
substantive talks should continue, he conceded, they should
do so at a reduced frequency, with mediators working more
between the meetings to secure concrete results. Kelin
underlined that the talks should not become a permanent
institution. He expressed hope that a paper on the proposed
"Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism" could be agreed
at the February meeting.

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Abkhaz Border Fixed
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9. (C) In response to our strong concern over the October
2008 Abkhaz "Parliament" announcement defining the southern
"border" of Abkhazia as the Enguri River, Kelin stressed that
Russia already had rejected Abkhaz claims when it pressured
the leadership in September 2008 to cede the parcels of
territory at the northern and southern ends of Enguri river.
When pressed to further clarify Russia's position in light of
the subsequent Abkhaz announcement, Kelin confirmed that
Russia would reject any efforts by Abkhazia to redraw the
borders or make territorial gains beyond the Soviet
administrative boundaries recognized by Moscow as the new
"borders."

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Comment
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10. (C) Kelin's tone marks a sharp departure from our
previous sessions. As conflicts mount and the need for

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regular mediation between all the parties becomes more
apparent, Russia may be prepared to exert more pressure on
the South Ossetia leadership to meet the demands of the
August 12 Agreement.
RUBIN