GOR TO WOO PUBLIC AFTER COMMUNISTS INFLUENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000695

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MCAP KDEM PHUM RS
SUBJECT: GOR TO WOO PUBLIC AFTER COMMUNISTS INFLUENCE
MILITARY REFORM DEBATE

Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor David Kostelancik fo
r reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Communist Party's (KPRF) vocal and
consistent opposition to military reform plans has likely
influenced President Medvedev's decision to revise how the
GOR approaches the reforms. Communist leaders have
criticized the reforms, especially plans to reduce the size
of the military, for their perceived haste and lack of
transparency, which the party has predicted will threaten
Russian national security. The KPRF also has used the issue
to bolster its membership among the armed forces and
veterans, an already large KPRF constituency. KPRF's
anti-reform tactics have included letters to Medvedev from
party leaders and veteran groups, combined with rallies
across Russia calling for Serdyukov's resignation and a halt
to reforms. Although the regime will ultimately decide the
course of military reform, the KPRF has been able to stir up
opposition because the GOR has made little effort to win
public support on the issue. In response, GOR officials have
followed the Communists' lead by warning of an increasing
U.S. "regional threat" and by beginning an "unprecedented"
national outreach effort on March 23 to garner public
support. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
GOR Follows KPRF Lead With Talk of U.S. Threat, PR Campaign
-------------- --------------


2. (C) After Communist Party opposition to reducing the size
of the military and other reforms recently gained momentum,
the GOR has followed the KPRF's lead in warning of an
increased U.S. "regional threat." Just three days after KPRF
Central Committee member General-Major E.I. Kopyshev's March
14 letter to President Medvedev warned of an increasing U.S.
"threat" to Russia, MinDef Serdyukov delivered similar
remarks to military leaders. The Communists also had called
for reforms to be supported by the Russian public, and on
March 17 Medvedev delivered a speech to the Defense Ministry
Board in which he noted that the government would seek just
such support. On March 19, Aleksandr Machevskiy (press
secretary for First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov) told
us that Shuvalov and other leaders would begin an
"unprecedented" and large-scale public outreach campaign
across Russia to begin March 23. The first step, Machevskiy
explained, would be a tour of five cities (including Voronezh
and Vladivostok) in four days that will focus on rallying
support for government policies, including military reform
and anti-crisis measures. This approach contrasts with
Serdyukov's ham-fisted and opaque reform-by-fiat approach,
which has included the prohibition of those in uniform from
publicly discussing the issue of military reform. Experts
doubt, however, that the GOR will change its plans for
military reform, but rather that it recognized the need to
improve its salemanship.

-------------- --------------
Communists Condemn Opacity and Haste, Offer No Alternative
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Since MinDef Serdyukov's August 2008 announcement of
plans for "a new image of the armed forces," the Communist
Party has provided the most vocal and consistent opposition
to what KPRF chairman Gennadiy Zyuganov has called
"ill-prepared if not adventurous" military reforms. In
particular, the Communists have criticized the lack of
outside input and transparency in the reform process, as well
as the haste with which reforms have been pursued. The
concern about limited outside input speaks to the Communists'
complete lack of confidence in Serdyukov, whose own lack of
service in the armed forces has been widely ridiculed -- most
recently by KPRF Duma Deputy Ilyukhin in a March 13 interview
and by KPRF Duma Deputy Vladimir Komoyedov in our March 17
meeting. Opponents derisively refer to Serdyukov as "the
furniture salesman" because he managed a network of furniture
stores during the Soviet era. Explaining why he is not
confident in an opaque reform process, Zyuganov stressed that
it is "extremely important to hear the views of top military
experts who are not directly dependent on the Ministry of
Defense," adding that a new "expert council" under the
president could provide leadership to objectively assess the
state of the armed forces. KPRF's General-Major Kopyshev
agreed, maintaining that military reform should be carried
out "with the most experienced military leaders and

MOSCOW 00000695 002 OF 003


scientists and with veterans."


4. (C) The concern over the speed of the reforms stems from
the government's delay in issuing its new military and
national security doctrine, which reportedly will be
completed by summer 2009. KPRF head Gennadiy Zyuganov argued
in a March 11 letter to Medvedev that pushing reforms before
completing the doctrine "puts the cart before the horse" and
will result in reforms shaping doctrine rather than vice
versa. Zyuganov added that he is "confident" that "the
destruction of the armed forces may be irreversible" if
reforms are allowed to continue before the doctrine's
release. The existing doctrine is inadequate for shaping
reforms, Zyuganov has contended, because it "is not based on
rigorous and comprehensive assessments of existing and
potential threats."


5. (C) The Communists have not proposed an alternative plan
for military reforms. Aside from calling for Serdyukov's
resignation, the Communists have pressed only for the
government to suspend the reform process and re-assess it
with input from outside experts. A first step, KPRF has
proposed, would be to enact a Federal Law on Military Reform
to identify the objectives, timing, and methods of carrying
out military reforms. Combined with the upcoming military
and national security doctrine, the Communists have argued
that such a law would lay the framework for a dialogue on
military reform with defense experts and with Russian society.

--------------
Opposing Military Reform Speaks to Party Base
--------------


6. (C) Another key reason for Communists to oppose military
reform is that the armed forces and veterans constitute key
constituencies whose jobs and benefits are threatened by
reforms. The Head of the Heritage Foundation in Moscow
Yevgeniy Volk told us that a strong military was a source of
Soviet pride, and Serdyukov's reforms do not sit well with
veterans who remember "the good old days." The Communists,
he argued, have been effective in harnessing veterans'
discontent to garner support.


7. (C) KPRF Duma Deputy Komoyedov (and former commander of
the Black Sea Fleet) told us March 17 that party rolls were
swelling due to the economic crisis, but also because
veterans and people currently serving in the armed forces are
concerned about reforms. Komoyedov concluded that KPRF is
the favorite party of those serving in the military, and the
Communists' March 9 protest in Berdsk (see para 9)
demonstrated that they have influence within the armed forces
community to rally public support.

-------------- --------------
Reforms Would Weaken National Security, Bankrupt Russia
-------------- --------------


8. (C) KPRF has contended that the opacity and haste of the
military reform process would imperil Russia's national
security by depleting military rolls and ignoring threats
from the U.S. and elsewhere. A March 7 article in the KPRF
periodical "Soviet Russia" proposed that "external military
threats to Russia are becoming increasingly acute" and that
"our partners and neighbors are actively building up their
forces, rapidly changing the balance of power not in favor of
Russia." General-Major E.I. Kopyshev, a member of the KPRF
Central Committee, wrote in a March 14 letter to Medvedev
that there is a "high chance that the U.S. and its allies in
NATO will be looking for a way out of the global
financial-economic crisis" through military adventures aimed
at Russia's natural resources. On March 17, Komoyedov told
us that threats abound on all of Russia's borders, including
NATO enlargement, U.S. plans for missile defense,
overwhelming population inequality on the two sides of the
Russia-China border, Georgian revanchism, and Japanese claims
to the Kurile Islands. These threats, Komoyedov argued,
necessitate a vigilant, strong, and large military. "Soviet
Russia" added as another threat "the inevitable U.S. military
bases in Georgia."


9. (C) Other KPRF concerns with reforms focus on operational
and financial limitations that reforms entail. KPRF has
argued, for example, that current reforms would disrupt
military command and control, undermine mobilization

MOSCOW 00000695 003 OF 003


readiness, destroy the military education system by closing
and consolidating military schools and academies, demoralize
the officer corps, and bankrupt the budget.

-------------- -
Communists Use Public Rallies To Build Support
-------------- -


10. (SBU) As the only political party speaking widely about
military reform, the Communists have been able to influence
public opinion on the issue. On January 31, Zyuganov
delivered a wide-ranging tirade on a snowy Moscow square,
which included calls to halt military reform and fire
Serdyukov. On the February 23 Defenders Day holiday
(formerly Soviet Army Day),KPRF held rallies in dozens of
cities across Russia to protest military reforms. Then on
March 9, the KPRF with approval from local government
authorities organized a rally in the town of Berdsk (outside
of Novosibirsk) to protest the planned elimination of the
67th GRU special forces brigade stationed there. Claiming
that this would eliminate 2,000 jobs from the town, the
Communists rallied 1,000 people to protest the closure.
(Note: Media reports provided conflicting information about
whether active-duty military personnel participated or were
prohibited from doing so by local commanders. If they did
participate, this would be the first instance of active-duty
soldiers protesting Serdyukov's reforms, according to
experts.) Other veterans' groups have staged smaller rallies
against military reform, most notably the Union of Soviet
Officers whose protests in December and January garnered
media attention.

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (C) Despite limited mass media access and a relatively
small Duma faction, the Communists have demonstrated they
still can sound the alarm on issues affecting their core
constituencies. During the current economic crisis, the
Communists have been emboldened in their opposition to the
regime. The GOR, however, has approached this as a tactical
rather than a strategic error: the problem must lie not with
the reforms themselves (which most military experts and our
contacts agree are necessary),but with how they were
presented and implemented. The Communists' opposition likely
will not alter the substance of the proposed reforms, but
some in the government have been chastened into seeking
public approval and casting the U.S. "regional threat" in
starker terms. The Communists' hand should not be
overestimated; they continue to operate with strictly
circumscribed limits on their opposition role, and their
success in shaping opinion on other vital issues (such as
anti-crisis measures) remains marginal.
BEYRLE