SECURITY DIALOGUE DISCUSSIONS, MOSCOW, RUSSIA,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 MOSCOW 000068

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KACT PARM MARR RS
SUBJECT: SECURITY DIALOGUE DISCUSSIONS, MOSCOW, RUSSIA,
DECEMBER 15, 2008

REF: MOSCOW 3153

Classified By: Charge d/Affaires Eric Rubin, reasons 1.4(a),(b) and (d
)


1. (C) Summary. Acting U/S Rood and DFM Ryabkov led U.S. and
Russian delegation security discussions in Moscow December

15. The discussion focused heavily on the proposed U.S.
missile defense (MD) deployment in eastern Europe and the
Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) offered
by the U.S., and a post-START Treaty, with little headway on
either issue. Reiterating Russian insistence that the MD
system not be deployed at all and that Iran was years away
from becoming a threat, Moscow appeared to walk back from the
Sochi Strategic Framework Declaration statement that if the
TCBMs were agreed and implemented, it would be important and
useful in assuaging Russian concerns over the deployment.
Ryabkov argued the Russian countermeasures were not contrary
to the Sochi Declaration, and claimed Secretary Gates said
Russia's use of countermeasures was acceptable. Ryabkov said
the only condition for Russia not to target Poland and the
Czech Republic with missiles deployed in the Kaliningrad
enclave was for the U.S. not to place the MD system in those
two countries. While continuing to object to the insistence
on reciprocity for U.S., Polish and Czech officials at
Russian sites, Ryabkov said it might be possible for them to
visit Russian Iskander sites, though when questioned, said he
had been talking off the top of his head. (Note: both MFA
North America Director Neverov and DVBR Deputy Director
Koshelev told us December 16 this had taken them by surprise.
End Note) While emphasizing U.S. assurances regarding the
MD system, Rood asked why we should try to reach agreement on
the TCBMs if there would be no change in Russian behavior.
On post-START, U/S Rood sought greater clarity on Russia's
desired outcome for the Treaty. Ryabkov repeated Moscow's
insistence that conventional offensive strategic weapons be
covered under the treaty, both warheads and delivery vehicles
be counted, and weapons be deployed only on national
territory. He handed over a seven-page response (in Russian)
to the U.S. draft treaty text, but in response to Rood's
query how the START counting rules could be used to count
both warheads and delivery vehicles at the reduced 1700-2200
number, Ryabkov indicated Russia did not want to use the
exact START warhead attribution rules, but wanted to discuss
warhead attribution, amongst other things, in expert
meetings. Ryabkov did not support the desire by other
non-U.S. START Parties, particularly Ukraine, to be parties
to the new Treaty, and noted that Ukraine was beginning to
hint that it might need to rethink its decision to give up
its non-nuclear weapons status. The two sides also briefly
touched on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,
the Bratislava Initiative, the radioactive sources in
Sukhumi, the Georgian highly-enriched uranium (HEU) sample
currently in U.S. custody, and Russian membership in the
Australia Group. Delegation lists at paras 29 and 30. End
summary.


2. (C) Missile defense and a post-START Treaty arrangement
dominated discussions December 15 in Moscow between U.S. and
Russian delegations led by Acting Under Secretary for Arms
Control and Security John Rood and Deputy Foreign Minister
Sergey Ryabkov. Both sides noted the importance of the
U.S.-Russia relationship and the importance of the security
dialogue channel. Commenting that this was the eleventh
meeting on security issues he had conducted in this channel
(though the first with Ryabkov),U/S Rood stressed the need
to seek to reduce the differences between us, particularly on
MD and post-START, and to make progress on a positive agenda,
using the Sochi Declaration as a basis. Ryabkov concurred,
emphasizing that failure to reach agreement on these two key
issues would impede positive progress in the overall
U.S.-Russia relationship. Stressing that Moscow would
continue the discussions on both MD and post-START with the
new Administration, Ryabkov asked whether Russia would need
to start from scratch with the new team. Rood said he did
not think so as most of Russia's positions were well known to
members of the incoming Administration, and many U.S.
delegation members would remain in place after the
Administration changed.

--------------
Missile Defense
--------------

Russia Still Opposed, Iran not an Imminent Threat

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3. (C) Ryabkov said that even though the differences between
the U.S. and Russia on MD were still "obvious and
considerable," and he did not anticipate being able to bridge
them during the meeting, it was still useful to hold the
dialogue so as to solidify the core problems and seek ways
forward. Russia still objected strongly to the U.S. proposal
to deploy an MD system in eastern Europe, and the latest U.S.
paper on TCBMs did not remove Russia's major concerns. The
sites in Poland and the Czech Republic threatened Russia.
U.S. leaders had talked about the further development of
missile defense. Therefore, as the U.S. gained new
operational capabilities over time, it would make additions
to the MD architecture. Once these sites existed, they
eventually could be modified to have offensive capability.
The Communique from the December 3-4 NATO Ministerial had
shown that alliance support for the project had solidified
and NATO members were moving into a phase in which they would
be closer to an integrated, MD architecture in Europe.


4. (S) Ryabkov said Russia was concerned by the threat
emanating from missile proliferation and wanted to work to
counter that threat through various existing formats. He
proposed to the U.S. a joint effort to evaluate the threat
and discuss how to deal with it, based on data held by our
respective agencies. But he questioned the usefulness of the
MD deployment in eastern Europe, saying that while Russian
intelligence agencies had similar information to the U.S. on
Iranian missile development, the U.S. and Russian analyses of
consequent Iranian capabilities and intentions were very
different. Moscow did not believe that Iran's leaders
intended to use its capabilities against countries in the
region, and believed that Iran was years away from acquiring
missiles with a range to threaten the U.S. He said that if
Iran developed nuclear weapons, it would "mean dramatic
changes in the international environment regarding Iran."
Russia did not believe Iran would seek to destabilize the
situation and create a risk such that countries that felt
threatened by Iran would develop countermeasures against it.
Russia was skeptical that the U.S. missile defense system
would work effectively against an Iranian threat, thus, it
was much more likely the system was aimed at Russia.


5. (S) U/S Rood said that all seven proposals for cooperation
on an MD architecture remained on the table. He reiterated
that the system was not aimed at Russia, and that if the
threat from Iran disappeared, there would be no need to
deploy the system. He agreed that we needed to share data on
the Iranian threat, and stressed that the U.S. had already
exchanged an unprecedented amount of intelligence on the
Iranian threat with Russia. The U.S. had seen an increase in
Iranian capabilities in recent months, including the flight
test of a "Safir" space launch vehicle in August, and the
launch of a two-stage solid propellant ballistic missile on
November 12, which Iran claimed had a range of 2000
kilometers. Efforts to develop such longer-range missiles
indicated to us the intent to reach longer-range targets.
Iran already had the ability to reach Israel; we could only
conclude from such efforts to develop longer-range missiles
that Iran wanted to be able to reach Europe. Saying Iran had
no intent to target the U.S. was not what we were seeing.
Even if the Iranians were years away from achieving that
goal, the ballistic missile defense system was also years
away from being operational. Therefore, we needed to engage
in prudent planning. In a previous meeting, General
Venentsev had told us that Moscow might consider the threat
differently if Iran demonstrated the ability to launch solid
rocket, two-stage missiles. In response to U/S Rood's
question, Ryabkov said Russia had monitored both flight
tests, but it did not change Moscow's perception of the
threat from Iran. Flight tests and attempts to put objects
in orbit were different from what was needed for military
purposes. Ryabkov reiterated arguments that Iran also was
not able to get the necessary technologies because of
international and unilateral sanctions, and had budget and
personnel constraints preventing them from reaching a
technically operative capability.

TCBMs Will Not Prevent Countermeasures
--------------


6. (C) In what became the most heavily debated issue, Rood
said the U.S. had understood from the Sochi Declaration that
the TCBMs, if agreed and implemented, would be important and

MOSCOW 00000068 003 OF 008


useful in assuaging Russian concerns. The U.S. therefore
expected that Russia would not need to follow through on its
military-technical countermeasures such as to deploy Iskander
missiles in Kaliningrad aimed at Poland and the Czech
Republic if the two sides were able to agree on the TCBMs.
Ryabkov responded that the two sides were not closer to a
political agreement. The TCBMs proposed by the U.S. did not
remove Russian concerns, and the problem was more fundamental
than disagreement over the TCBMs. The number one issue for
Russia was not transparency and confidence at the sites, but
how to deal with the problem in a way that would bring Russia
and the U.S. into alignment. In theory, the two sides could
discuss many things, but in practice it was more difficult.
The fundamental problem was that the construction of the site
could not be offset by any of the TCBMs offered by the U.S.
Russia wanted to start from scratch, with a joint discussion
of the threat, followed by common development of an MD
architecture and joint data exchange centers. Russia simply
could not agree to the deployment of the system in the
proposed region.


7. (C) In response to Rood's question, Ryabkov stressed that
the only condition for Russia not deploying the Iskanders was
non-deployment of the system in eastern Europe. U/S Rood
pressed the point, saying our Ministers had deliberately
chosen the term "assuage," not "eliminate," and it was the
U.S.' understanding that if Russia's concerns were assuaged,
this would mean Russia would no longer feel threatened, would
no longer make threatening statements, and would no longer
deploy the military-technical countermeasures. Ryabkov said
Russia had agreed at Sochi that the TCBMs would not
eliminate, but would somewhat assuage Russia's concerns. He
pointed out that the U.S. had removed elements previously
proposed by Secretary Gates and added new requirements such
as reciprocity. Even so, whatever TCBMs were agreed would
not remove Russia's basic concern with the deployment.


8. (C) General Buzhinskiy, saying he was giving the "military
justification," added that the ideal situation would be for
the U.S. to cancel its plans for the "third site." Russia
was not against the U.S. developing the potential to address
threats from the Middle East, but the choice of location was
wrong. At the proposed sites, the U.S. would not be able to
intercept Iranian missiles, but would have the ability to
intercept Russian missiles. Regarding U.S. assurances that
the sites would not be significantly modified without
consultation with Russia, Buzhinskiy said the U.S. had told
Moscow three years previously it would not take a decision on
the MD deployment without consulting Russia, and then had
done just that, informing Russia that the deployment had been
decided. While the TCBMs were good, they were not agreed,
and some raised doubts. For example, a number of them
required Polish or Czech agreement, but officials from those
two countries had told Moscow the sites could be used against
Russia. That was why President Medvedev had said Russia
would need to deploy countermeasures. Russia would prefer
more concrete obligations from the U.S.


9. (C) Rood said the Sochi Declaration was clear: "if the
TCBMs were agreed, they would assuage." The U.S. did not
conduct military responses if it believed its concerns were
assuaged. If Iran stopped its effort to develop long-range
missiles, the U.S. would not need to address such a threat.
He said the U.S. viewed the Russian explanation as a major
retreat from what was agreed at Sochi, and asked what the
purpose of discussing the TCBMs was if Russia would not
modify its behavior if they were adopted.


10. (C) Ryabkov responded that the focus of these discussions
was correct; they gave both sides a better understanding of
the other's position. Whatever different interpretations
there may be of the Sochi Declaration, it was important to
continue to try to agree on something that would assuage
Russia's concerns. But, he noted, there was nothing in the
Sochi Declaration that committed Russia to change its
behavior. Ryabkov claimed Secretary Gates said Russia's use
of countermeasures was acceptable. Moscow had not changed
its position nor was it threatening anyone; the statement
that Russia would deploy Iskanders if the MD system was
constructed was a factual one. When asked how Russia defined
"assuage its concerns," Ryabkov responded, "To us, assuage
means our concerns are being addressed in a serious manner,
but not removed."

Questions on TCBMs

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--------------


11. (C) Turning to specific questions, Ryabkov noted that the
paper indicated that "major developments" at the site would
be taken only after consultation with Russia, but what types
of developments were considered "major," he asked. He
stressed that there was no information on how the U.S.
envisioned future development of the site, and no indication
that the U.S. intended to limit the capabilities of the
system in any way. Therefore, Russia had concluded that the
U.S. could decide to install other elements of its global MD
system, possibly including early-warning radars, anti-radar
systems, and new land- or sea-based systems near Russia's
borders. Furthermore, while it might be difficult to modify
the site to allow offensive weapons now, there was no
guarantee this would not be possible in the future. Ryabkov
said he did not understand the TCBM that said the U.S. would
not conduct long-range ground-based interceptor flight tests
from Polish territory. If the U.S. was going to conduct such
flight tests in California, what difference did it make? He
also asked for clarification of the term "militarily useful
payload capacity," with respect to Iranian missile launches.
He said that the TCBM document did not answer all of the
questions Russia had asked in its non-paper, and Moscow might
seek additional answers in the future.


12. (C) U/S Rood responded that the U.S. perceived "major
developments" to be those that had a material bearing on or
would change the character of the facility. A "minor
development," which would not require consultation, would be
something like regular operational maintenance, replacement
of parts, a new covering on the radar, and certain software
upgrades. However, software upgrades that changed the nature
of the facility could be considered "major." Regarding
future use of the sites, Rood said there was currently no
intention to place more than 10 interceptors at the site in
Poland. The U.S. could not convert the sites into facilities
capable of fielding offensive weapons because the legal
agreements with the two countries prohibited it.
Furthermore, it would require enlarging the silos, and
Russian liaison officers would quickly see what was
happening. While he could not rule out that there could be
changes to the system in the future if the global environment
changed, Rood said the U.S. would continue discussions with
Russia, and these TCBMs would enable Russia to assess the
capabilities of the sites and to have assurances that the
sites were not being significantly modified without Russian
knowledge. Rood said the U.S. definition of "militarily
significant payload" was one which would produce a
"militarily significant effect" on the adversary. If Russia
had a different definition, we would appreciate getting it.
Rood repeatedly told Ryabkov he was prepared to answer any
and all questions related to the TCBMs.

Reciprocity at Iskander Sites?
--------------


13. (C) Ryabkov reiterated Russian comments that Moscow did
not understand the concept of reciprocal visits to Russian MD
sites, and it was causing a lot of political problems in
Moscow. Russia did not have any sites targeted at other
states, including Poland or the Czech Republic, so what
purpose would be served by giving them access to the Russian
sites? The U.S. proposal concerned reciprocal, not
symmetrical, visits, Rood replied. In response to his
comment that Russian statements that Moscow would need to
place Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad aimed at Poland and
the Czech Republic could be seen as threatening the two
countries, Ryabkov said if the two countries were concerned
by these statements, perhaps Russia could let them visit
Iskander sites. After Rood said that could be a way to
resolve the issue over reciprocity, Ryabkov immediately
backtracked, saying he had just been thinking aloud (note:
both MFA North America Director Neverov and DVBR Deputy
Director Koshelev told us separately the next day that they
had been taken by surprise by Ryabkov's suggestion. It
appears it had not been proposed or cleared by the
interagency prior to the meeting. End note).

--------------
Post-START
--------------


14. (C) Ryabkov said Russia's goal was to reach agreement on
a new treaty to succeed START I before the end of 2009.

MOSCOW 00000068 005 OF 008


Moscow had thoroughly analyzed the U.S. draft text provided
on October 24, 2008 (ref A). He handed over a seven-page
non-paper in Russian with a summary of Moscow's response,
which the U.S. could consider as "an authoritative reply" to
the U.S. proposal (ref B). Ryabkov repeated Russia's
argument that conventional offensive strategic weapons should
be covered under the treaty, both warheads and delivery
vehicles should be counted, and strategic weapons should be
deployed only on national territory. In a response to a
question from Rood on the relationship between warhead and
launcher numbers, Ryabkov said that Russia did not want to
use the exact START attribution rules. However, launcher
attribution was one of the issues that needed to be discussed
by the experts in the future. Moscow wanted to take the most
important elements of the START Treaty. It was necessary to
count both warheads and delivery vehicles because it was
impossible to identify whether a missile at the time of
launch was armed with a nuclear or non-nuclear warhead. The
concept of using the 2002 Moscow Treaty limits of 1700-2200
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads did not
give Russia a clear picture of how the U.S.' strategic
potential would develop, and would not continue a decrease in
warheads. The U.S. proposal did not correspond to the Sochi
Declaration's commitment to have a treaty that would
reinforce strategic stability.


15. (C) Ryabkov rejected the desire by the other members of
START, particularly Ukraine, to be parties to the new treaty.
He noted Ukraine was beginning to hint that it might need to
rethink its decision to give up its nuclear status if it was
excluded from the post-START treaty. Ukrainian officials had
told Moscow they believed they had given up their status as
the world's third largest nuclear power for nothing.
Kazakhstan and Belarus were also raising questions, but were
not as outspoken as Ukraine. He added that Moscow considered
it important to take into account the upcoming
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference in 2010. If
there were no new treaty, the context for the conference
would be very different and it would be difficult to achieve
meaningful results. U/S Rood shared Ryabkov's concern
regarding Ukraine's comments at JCIC to walk back NPT
commitments.


16. (C) DVBR Director Antonov complained that the U.S. text
did not include any of the proposals put forward by Russia in
2007, except for one: that the treaty be legally-binding. If
the U.S. was not willing to agree that all strategic
offensive systems had to be deployed on national territory,
Moscow could wake up one day and find U.S. offensive weapons
in Georgia. Russia wanted to be certain the U.S. would not
deploy such weapons close to Russia. Russia would be
satisfied if the agreement simply said "there will be no
deployment on foreign territory." Russia proposed that all
strategic offensive weapons be deployed at START-declared
facilities. Moscow was also concerned by U.S. use of heavy
bombers. The U.S. had deployed such bombers at the start of
the Iraq war, but had not informed Russia as required by the
START Treaty. He also asked what definitions would be used
and did the term "offensive weapons" mean the same in English
as in Russian. Citing Washington's opposition to Russian
membership in the Australia Group, Antonov argued that
although Washington had said the U.S. and Russia were
partners, Russia had not seen a partner's attitude in the way
the U.S. approached issues with Russia. He also said that
deterrence still existed. Therefore, we needed to take the
best of START's verification measures into account.


17. (C) Rood emphasized that the U.S. needed a better
understanding of Russia's desired outcome for a post-START
agreement. We believed the U.S. and Russia were moving away
from an adversarial relationship and the U.S. was seeking to
reach an agreement that would not regulate hostility, the way
START had, but would provide transparency, predictability and
confidence. The U.S. saw the purpose of the new treaty as
fundamentally different from START. The treaty text the U.S.
had provided to Russia was a substantial step forward and
would enable the two sides to carry out their commitment to
reach the lowest possible levels of nuclear weapons
consistent with our national security requirements and
alliance obligations. It also provided significant insight
into each other's capabilities through the transparency
measures such as data exchanges, visits, inspections,
telemetry and the like. The U.S. was trying to move away
from reliance on nuclear weapons and to increase conventional
capabilities, and Moscow should welcome this. But the U.S.

MOSCOW 00000068 006 OF 008


did not want to agree to a structure that would impede its
ability to reduce or eliminate its nuclear forces. Focusing
on a phantom number of warheads would not increase
transparency. Rood agreed that the U.S. did not see a need
for the other three countries to be part of the new treaty,
noting that the circumstances that had led to them being part
of START no longer existed. He said the U.S. would share
Russia's concerns if Ukraine sought to reacquire nuclear
weapons.


18. (C) In response to Antonov's complaint that the U.S. had
not included Russian proposals, Rood countered that the U.S.
had Russian elements such as a reduction in the number of
strategic offensive weapons; aggregate numbers of strategic
arms and the platforms attributed to them; data exchanges;
launch notifications; visits; exhibitions; etc. The U.S. had
not addressed deployments outside national territory because
the purpose of this treaty was different. He added that the
U.S. would not be able to place offensive weapons in Georgia
without Russia knowing it because the data provisions would
preclude it. Antonov declaimed, "I don't care about your
plans; I care about your capabilities. Unless it's
prohibited, you can deploy your weapons wherever you want,
even if you tell Russia about them." He said while the U.S.
was talking about TCBMs, Russia was talking about limitations.


19. (C) Rood asked how Russia expected to use START's
counting rules to reach the goal of 1700-2200 nuclear
warheads. He pointed out that the START Treaty had used
attributed counting rules because it had been determined it
was impossible to accurately verify the number of warheads.
If Russia insisted on counting both warheads and delivery
vehicles, the new treaty would be a completely different
instrument from START. U.S. calculations had shown that
Russia would need to make significant cuts in its delivery
vehicles to meet the 1700-2200 figure. Was Russia prepared
to do that? Clearly unprepared to respond to the question,
Ryabkov said Russia operated on the assumption that it was
possible to set limits for both warheads and delivery
vehicles, but the limits on delivery systems and warheads
would not be related by the exact START attribution rules.
He said Russia did not want to inhibit U.S. development of
conventional forces, but Russia's concerns needed to be
addressed. There was currently a lack of trust between our
countries, but fundamentally the U.S. and Russian positions
were different. Moscow did not require that weapons kept in
storage be counted, but since the U.S. was working on
rearming strategic delivery vehicles with conventional arms,
Russia wanted a regime that would assuage its concerns. He
said that operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
did not take into account the warhead uploading problem.
Moscow wanted experts from both sides to meet to review the
START Treaty, article by article, and determine what was
usable from the Treaty, including discussing verification
provisions. (Note: in a meeting the following day, DVBR
Deputy Director Koshelev said Russia's experts had said the
verification provisions in the U.S. text appeared workable.
End Note)


20. (C) DVBR Director Antonov stated the U.S. did not
incorporate any Russian provisions outlined in the Russian
Congruent Approaches paper into the draft treaty text. U/S
Rood denied this and asked VCI SI Director Jerry Taylor to
provide examples where many Russian considerations had been
incorporated. Taylor explained that the data exchange
provisions in the U.S. text were taken from the START Treaty
and would be updated every six months through notifications
sent via the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. It would include
the number, disaggregated by type, and if appropriate,
category, of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy
bombers, based at each location specified in the treaty.


21. (C) Rood said that it would be a challenge to negotiate
and ratify a new treaty before the current treaty expired at
the end of 2009. He described the process for appointing new
political leadership; negotiating the new treaty; and
obtaining the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. These
steps may take longer than twelve months. Both sides agreed
that there would need to be intensive work undertaken to
reach agreement before the START Treaty expired. If an
agreement were not reached in time, Rood asked whether Russia
would prefer to extend the START Treaty or to have no treaty
in place. Ryabkov did not respond, saying just that Russia
was considering the possibility there could be nothing to
replace START when it expired. He said Russia was working on

MOSCOW 00000068 007 OF 008


their version of a post-START treaty and would provide it in
mid-January 2009. Ryabkov said Russia did not want to simply
extend the current START Treaty for a year or other short
time period, but rather wanted to work on a new agreement.

-------------- --------------
Other Issues: GICNT, Sukhumi, Georgian HEU, AG, AK-47's
-------------- --------------


22. (C) U/S Rood quickly highlighted several important
remaining issues. These were the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT),the Bratislava Initiative, the
radioactive sources in Sukhumi, the Georgian highly-enriched
uranium (HEU) sample currently in U.S. custody, and Russian
membership in the Australia Group.


23. (C) In response to U/S Rood's comments, DFM Ryabkov
stated that he agreed that the GICNT has gained momentum
since its inception, but that we needed to look at how it
could be made even better. He indicated that he was
particularly interested in getting other member nations to do
more. Ryabkov elaborated that "through table-top exercises
and video-conferences, we can achieve much." Ryabkov said
that, while Russia was a co-founder and co-chair of the
GICNT, "other partners needed to assume such duties. Antonov
asked whether it was not time for the U.S. and Russia to
relinquish their co-chairmanship of the group, but Ryabkov
quickly noted that the two sides could compare notes prior to
the next event, an expert's meeting in the Netherlands in
February 2009.


24. (C) On the sources in Sukhumi, Antonov said "we know
about these sources and are working on it. We will provide
an answer."


25. (S) Regarding the sample of HEU originally interdicted in
Georgia, Ryabkov said that it was a technical issue whether a
Russian plane came to the U.S. and picked it up or other
means of transportation were used, and they would need to
look into the issue further.


26. (C) Ryabkov pressed the U.S. to be more responsive to
Russia's wish to join the Australia Group, emphasizing that
Russian membership would be beneficial to everyone. He
called for additional meetings at the expert level.


27. (C) In response to Ryabkov's concern about unlicensed
production of AK-47's in the U.S., Rood said the U.S. had
been unable to find any evidence of such production but would
look into the matter if Moscow would provide specific
information. Ryabkov said Moscow understood there was a
joint U.S.-Bulgarian enterprise named Arsenal producing such
weapons in Nevada, but they would pass on the specific
information to the U.S.

Comment
--------------


28. (C) Russia is clearly hoping that the new Administration
will alter the policy approach on both missile defense and
post-START. Russia likely will re-evaluate its policies and
strategies once it gains a better understanding of the new
Administration's policy positions. Until then, we expect
Russia to remain firm on its basic positions.

Delegation Lists
--------------


29. (U) U.S. Delegation: Department of State: John Rood,
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security; Anita Friedt, Director, EUR/PRA; James Timbie,
Senior Advisor to the Acting Under Secretary (T); Tim
Katsapis, Senior Advisor to the Acting Under Secretary (T);
Jerry Taylor, Director, VCI/SI; William Shobert, Delegation
Executive Secretary; Yuir Shkeyrov, interpreter. National
Security Council: Michael Allen, Special Assistant and
Senior Director Counterproliferation Strategy; Michael Hayes,
Director for Security Cooperation and International
Agreements. Department of Defense: Van Kinney, Missile
Defense Policy Expert; Michael Yaguchi, START Treaty Policy
Analyst; Lt. Col. Christopher Comeau, Joint Staff Plans; Paul
Bigelman, Missile Defense Agency; Richard Trout, Regional
expert. Embassy: Ambassador John Beyrle; Alice Wells,
Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs; Cmdr Robert Kettle,
Assistant Naval Attache; Margaret Hawthorne, Chief, Political

MOSCOW 00000068 008 OF 008


External Unit; Michael Dunkley, EST Officer.


30. (U) Russian Delegation: Sergey Alekseyevich Ryabkov,
Deputy Foreign Minister; General Yevgeniy Petrovich
Buzhinskiy, Chief, International Treaty Directorate, MOD;
Igor Svyatoslavovich Neverov, Director, MFA North America
Dept.; Anatoliy Ivanovich Antonov, Director, MFA Security and
Disarmament Dept. (DVBR); Oleg Nikolayevich Burmistrov,
Deputy Director, MFA North America Dept.; Sergey Mikhailovich
Koshelev, Deputy Director, DVBR; Vladimir Ivanovich Yermakov,
Section Chief, DVBR; Col. Yevgeniy Yuriyevich Il'in, Head of
Bureau, International Treaty Directorate, MOD; Aleksandr
Mikhailovich Trifonov, Senior Counselor, DVBR; Oleg
Kovalenko, Senior Counselor, DVBR; Aleksey Yuriyevich Ivanov,
First Secretary, MFA North America Dept.; Denis Nikolayevich
Kolesnik, Attache, MFA North America Dept.


31. (U) Acting U/S Rood cleared this cable.
RUBIN