GOR WALKS A FINE LINE ON POSSIBLE DPRK MISSILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000659

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PREL RS KS KN
SUBJECT: GOR WALKS A FINE LINE ON POSSIBLE DPRK MISSILE
LAUNCH

REF: A. USUN 197

B. MOSCOW 291

Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor David Kostelancik fo
r reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. The possible test firing of a North Korean
long range missile has put the GOR in a delicate position.
On the one hand, Moscow appears to be providing North Korea
breathing room by urging all parties to exercise restraint
and to provide Pyongyang the benefit of the doubt. It has
also indicated that it would ask for a thorough technical
analysis in the event of a DPRK launch before agreeing to any
Security Council action. On the other hand, MFA officials
acknowledge concern over the North Korean course of action
and tell us that the GOR has repeatedly urged the DPRK to
reconsider. In pursuing these two seemingly contradictory
approaches, the GOR may be balancing its interest in
Northeast Asian peace and security with the need to be seen
as a DPRK "champion" so that it could remain relevant on
Korean Peninsula issues. End Summary.

Seeking Breathing Room for DPRK
--------------


2. (C) The GOR has been walking a fine line since North
Korea announced its intention to launch a "space satellite,"
which some in the Russian press are predicting will occur
between April 4 and April 8. On the one hand, MFA public
reaction has been muted in general and appears to seek
breathing room for the DPRK regime. Foreign Minister Lavrov
on March 3 told journalists that the GOR was following the
situation and hoped all parties would "demonstrate restraint
and adherence to the relevant resolution of the UN Security
Council." Asserting the GOR position that UNSC Resolution
1718 did not ban satellite launches, he stated that it would
be important to understand first what kind of rocket would
carry the satellite into space. A subsequent MFA statement
following a March 10 telephone conversation between Lavrov
and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, during which North
Korea was one of the issues discussed, repeated the same
message, that Russia urged "relevant states to exercise
restraint and composure and refrain from any steps that could
undermine security and stability in (the) region." At a more
working level, Director of the First Asia Department
Konstantin Vnukov has made it clear that the GOR will reserve
judgment until the DPRK carries through with the rocket
launch and does not consider it appropriate to make public
statements that imply a prejudging of the outcome.


3. (C) In the UN context, Russia will likely seek to
protect North Korea from strong and swift UNSC action in the
event of a missile launch. The MFA has pledged in general
terms a willingness to work together in the Security Council
should the U.S., Japan, and South Korea seek UN involvement.
However, consistent with the position voiced by Russian
Deputy Permanent Representative Dolgov in New York (Ref A),
Vnukov has indicated that the GOR will likely ask that a
thorough technical analysis of the launch be conducted first
before the Security Council makes any judgments or takes
action.

But Privately Dismayed at DPRK Action
--------------


4. (C) On the other hand, MFA officials privately concede
that DPRK's stated intentions are likely a front for the test
firing of a long-range Taepodong-2 missile, and appear to be
working behind the scenes to discourage North Korea from
carrying out the launch. Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey
Borodavkin indicated in meetings with us that the GOR
realized the true nature of North Korean plans and was
following with concern reports of the launch preparations, as
the last DPRK missile test had missed Russia's economic zone
by a mere ten kilometers (Ref B). He relayed that during his
last trip to Pyongyang, he asked the North Koreans to refrain
from such provocative action. The South Korean Embassy also
reports that Borodavkin met with the North Korean ambassador
on February 27, during which Borodavkin reportedly warned
that a DPRK rocket launch at this time, regardless whether
it's for peaceful space exploration, would lead to negative
consequences in the Korean Peninsula, as well as a worsening
of the security situation in Northeast Asia. He reportedly
again asked North Korea to reconsider.


MOSCOW 00000659 002 OF 002


Why the Two Positions?
--------------


5. (C) The GOR's public attempts to provide breathing space
for the North Korean regime and its private efforts to
dissuade Pyongyang from carrying out the missile test are not
necessarily contradictory. Due to its geographical
proximity, Russia has obvious interests in a non-nuclear
North Korea that will not have intercontinental ballistic
missile capabilities. Also important to Russia is the
maintenance of peace and security in Northeast Asia. Moscow
neither wishes a North Korean missile test that would provoke
sharp reactions from the U.S., Japan, and South Korea and
further cement the U.S. alliances in the region, nor an even
more belligerent North Korea as a result of international
reactions, especially at a delicate time when the health of
Kim Jong-Il and his possible successor are still open
questions. In fact, the only Russian statements so far that
came close to resembling strong words came from MFA Spokesman
Andrey Nesterenko, when referring to reports that "some
countries" were considering shooting down the rocket
immediately after its launch and North Korean statements that
it would exact revenge for such a step. In his words, "such
explosive escalation would have calamitous consequences."
The MFA therefore publicly calls for restraint from all sides
while working in private to discourage a DPRK missile test.



6. (C) Also important in the GOR calculus is the need to
maintain good relations with an easily offendable Pyongyang,
so that it could remain relevant in Northeast Asian security
issues. As some Russian analysts have pointed out, Russia's
role in North Korea has been vague, with little real leverage
over the regime. "We can sell or not sell anti-missile
systems to Iran, and thus apply pressure. We're not selling
anything to North Korea; there is virtually no influence,"
stated Alexander Khramchikhin, the head of the analytical
department at the Institute for Political and Military
Analysis. In this context, the GOR, already cognizant of its
declining influence and its relatively weak claim to
relevance vis-a-vis the other Six Party partners, needs to be
seen as continuing to have close relations with Pyongyang.
Acting as a champion of sorts for North Korea in the UN
Security Council and providing the regime with some breathing
space in the face of almost certain international
condemnation may be one way for Moscow to ensure that it will
not be cut out from discussions on North Korean issues.

BEYRLE