Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW635
2009-03-16 14:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

GOR PREOCCUPIED BY TENSIONS WITH SOUTH OSSETIA,

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR ECON RS GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161456Z MAR 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2407
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000635 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON RS GG
SUBJECT: GOR PREOCCUPIED BY TENSIONS WITH SOUTH OSSETIA,
NOT GEORGIA

REF: TBILISI 408

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000635

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON RS GG
SUBJECT: GOR PREOCCUPIED BY TENSIONS WITH SOUTH OSSETIA,
NOT GEORGIA

REF: TBILISI 408

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: At a time when tensions near the
administrative borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are on
the rise, Duma officials and well-connected Russian experts
do not see signs of a spring offensive between Russia and
Georgia. What has generated greater interest are the public
signs of tension between Russia and South Ossetia, as
evidenced in Moscow's efforts to rein in South Ossetian
corruption and misuse of Russian passports. We do not rule
out South Ossetian efforts to deflect Russian pressure by
raising tensions locally. End Summary.

--------------
No expectation of war
--------------


2. (C) Despite the rising number of incidents on Georgia's
administrative borders with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, few
Russian observers share Georgian concerns that a new war
could break out soon (reftel). Several prominent Duma
members have downplayed prospects of renewed conflict, with
pro-Kremlin Duma member Sergey Markov insisting to us there
"will be no war with Georgia." On March 6, Duma
International Relations Committee Chair Konstantin Kosachev
stated there was no question of aggression on Russia's part,
"not even at a hypothetical level." Kosachev called Russia's
alleged desire to return Georgia into its sphere of influence
a "myth."


3. (C) Analysts also do not see Russia planning a new
military intervention in Georgia in the near future, but
reiterate disinterest in improving bilateral relations as
long as Saakashvili remains President in Georgia. Pavel
Zolotarev, retired General and Deputy Director of
U.S.A.-Canada Institute, told us neither Russia nor Georgia
could afford a war during this time of economic crisis.
Despite Putin's animosity toward Saakashvili, Ekho Moskvy
Chief Editor Aleksey Venediktov argued that Russia could not
again use Georgia to divert attention from its domestic
problems, noting that Putin was more concerned about tensions
with Ukraine during the upcoming presidential elections
there. Assessing the likelihood of Russian aggression
against Georgia as very low, Ivan Safranchuk of the World
Security Institute commented that Russia did not want to
"take responsibility" for the enclaves' actions, but felt the
need to protect them and would respond with force if
attacked. Artem Malgin from MGIMO suggested the GOR was
well-advised to "stay silent" during this time of
accusations, and make quiet progress on peacefully improving
conditions in the regions.

--------------
Russia-South Ossetia tensions
--------------


4. (C) Instead of friction between Russia and Georgia, the
focus here is on tensions between Russia and South Ossetia.
Georgian Charge d'Affaires Givi Shugarov told us March 13
that Russian DFM Karasin had admitted in a private meeting
that the South Ossetians were "causing Russia problems," both
in the context of the Geneva Process, and elsewhere. One
indicator of the new discord between Russia and South Ossetia
is Moscow's demand for a new mechanism to more accountably
disburse the remaining USD 8.5 billion of the USD 10 billion
in aid Prime Minister Putin had allocated for assistance to
South Ossetia in August 2008.


5. (U) The March 2 suspension of the issuance of new Russian
passports to South Ossetian residents has also been picked up
in the Russian press, which South Ossetian "president"
Kokoity attributed to the result of high demand for passport
renewals. Yulia Latynina in a March 7 Ekho Moskviy program
sided with Aleksandr Gabuyev's March 3 charge in Kommersant,
concluding that corruption in South Ossetia was the reason
for Moscow's discontent. While both accused South Ossetia of
siphoning off monies from the first tranche of aid disbursed
late last year, Latynina noted that 2000 unclaimed Russian
passports in South Ossetia had been used to illegally draw
pensions and wages, causing Russia to cut off the issuance of
new passports.

--------------

MOSCOW 00000635 002 OF 002


Comment
--------------


6. (C) Russia's sparring with South Ossetia over assistance
suggests that Moscow is preoccupied with managing a difficult
protege on issues that pertain to the continuation of the
status quo. South Ossetia's insistence that military
tensions with Georgia are rising might be an attempt to
divert attention away from its own problems of corruption and
discord with Russia.
BEYRLE