DFM RYABKOV ON IRANIAN POLICY REVIEW, S-300S

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000611


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR RS IR

SUBJECT: DFM RYABKOV ON IRANIAN POLICY REVIEW, S-300S

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle: Reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (S) Summary: In a March 13 meeting with the Ambassador,
DFM Ryabkov said that the March 3 P5 1 joint statement at the
IAEA, coupled with Russia's decision to delay delivery of the
S-300s, had sent a clear message to Tehran of the
international community's common purpose. Ryabkov expressed
concern over U.S. "signals" that a diplomatic initiative to
Iran would fail, arguing that all efforts needed to be
concentrated on convincing the Supreme Leader that the
prospective U.S. change of course was serious, and also laid
down a marker against countervailing U.S. arms sales.
Calling Iran a "top three" issue for Medvedev's meeting with
the President, Ryabkov reinforced Russian unhappiness over
the Iranian rocket launch, which the Ambassador noted had
been raised by the Russian President in his March 10 meeting
with the Hart-Hagel Study Group. Russia does not expect the
Iranian elections to produce an internal "course correction,"
leaving it incumbent on the international community to change
Iran's behavior. End Summary.


2. (C) In a March 13 meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister
Sergey Ryabkov, the Ambassador reinforced the expectation
that as the U.S. prepared to invest heavily in the diplomatic
track with Iran, we would look to our partners to provide
additional pressure should Tehran rebuff a renewed U.S.
approach. The Ambassador acknowledged the skepticism,
expressed by President Medvedev on March 10 to members of
Hart-Hagel Study Group, on the effectiveness of sanctions on
Iran, but stressed that it was time for Tehran to signal that
it sought to be a responsible member of the international
community. Ryabkov responded that the joint statement issued
at the IAEA March 3 meeting had sent a clear message to Iran
of the P5 1's common purpose and removed any illusions the
Iranian leadership may have had about cracks in the alliance.
Ryabkov underscored Medvedev's message to the Study Group
members that Russia could not tolerate Iran's emergence as a
nuclear weapons state.


3. (C) Ryabkov expressed concern, however, over "signals"
that senior U.S. officials did not believe that the U.S.
diplomatic initiative would succeed. Preemptively suggesting
that the diplomatic opening was "doomed on arrival" was the
wrong approach; instead, Ryabkov argued that all of the
Administration's energies should be focused on "penetrating
the walls around the Supreme Leader" to reinforce that now
was the time for Iran to engage in meaningful dialogue. If
the U.S. inadvertently gave the impression that the effort
was not serious, then its failure was inevitable. Ryabkov
renewed his complaints that the UK Political Director's
pessimistic approach during the last P5 1 meeting was
defeatist. The Ambassador agreed that the U.S. needed to
send a clear message, but reiterated the importance of Russia
joining the U.S. in revising its tactics to achieve the
strategic goal of a non-nuclear Iran. Just as the U.S.
geared up for tough, direct diplomacy, Russia needed to
review how it could it strengthen its contribution to the
dual-track strategy.


4. (S) Ryabkov underscored that Moscow had heard the U.S.
message, as evidenced by developments -- or lack thereof --
in the delivery of S-300s. Russian restraint in not
proceeding with the delivery, coupled with its support for
the P5 1 statement at the IAEA, had been noticed by Tehran.
Nevertheless, Ryabkov expressed concern over policy papers
circulated by a Washington think tank advocating U.S. arms
sales to Israel to counter a potential S-300 transfer. The
Ambassador welcomed Russia's decision to defer delivery of
the S-300s and urged continued restraint. While noting
long-standing concerns over aspects of Russian arms
transfers, the Ambassador distinguished think tank policy
papers from official U.S. policies.


5. (C) The question of Iran, and proliferation more
broadly, would figure high on Medvedev's agenda in his
meeting with the President, with Ryabkov calling it a "top
three" issue. Acknowledging the Administration's "sense of
urgency," Ryabkov emphasized that the Iranian rocket launch
had been poorly received by the Russian leadership. The
Ambassador welcomed Medvedev's candid discussion of the
Iranian threat with the Hart-Hagel Study Group, noting the
Russian President's characterization that the rocket launch
had made a "heavy impression," as well as his readiness to
link the issue of European security to Iranian nuclear
developments. Ryabkov stressed that there should be no
ambiguity over Russian reactions to Iranian and DPRK efforts
to advance their missile technology, noting FM Lavrov's
explicit instructions to the media that Russia was not
"relaxed" by either the Iranian launch or prospective DPRK
satellite test. While this was a factual statement, Ryabkov
commented, it also sent a clear message to the regimes.


6. (C) In the period leading up to the Iranian presidential
elections, Ryabkov said there would be no surprises on the
Russian side in terms of engagement with Tehran. There were
no plans for high-level meetings in the next three months, as
Iran entered the "crucial phase" of its campaign period.
Ryabkov said it would be a mistake to underestimate President
Ahmadinejad's prospects, with Iranian internal dynamics not
indicating a dramatic change or policy course correction.
Ryabkov predicted that "more or less" the same policy line
would emerge from the presidential elections, forcing the
P5 1 and international community to influence Iran from the
outside, since the likelihood of reform from within would
remain low.
BEYRLE


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