RUSSIA AND NATO AFTER GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000511

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA AND NATO AFTER GEORGIA

REF: MOSCOW 355

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: As the Alliance debates the nature and
future of the NATO-Russia relationship, and with the more
positive approach by the U.S. and Russia, we have an
opportunity now to set NATO-Russia relations on a new path
that acknowledges our common commitment to strengthening
transatlantic security, rebuilding confidence, and breaking
down the barriers between us. To do this, the NATO-Russia
Council (NRC) will need to be less a "tool to manage Russia,"
and more a means of developing common approaches to joint
challenges, addressing Moscow's security concerns and seeking
to manage crises before they escalate. As we consider the
proposal for a joint review of NRC structure and priorities,
we should look at reorienting the NRC to elicit a more
constructive pattern of engagement with Russia, including
addressing not just "fair weather" issues, but also matters
such as missile defense, arms control/non-proliferation
(including CFE),and Medvedev's European Security Treaty
proposal. Without accepting Russian assertions of
"privileged spheres of influence" in the post-Soviet space,
the NRC could also test Russia's willingness to strengthen
cooperation on Afghanistan by seeking to leverage Moscow's
claims of influence to encourage greater engagement by
Central Asian states. We should revive robust mil-mil
cooperation, including in such areas as counter-piracy and
counterterrorism. Deflecting efforts to move the NRC into
unhelpful channels, we should still consider using the NRC as
a crisis-management forum to help identify and defuse future
tensions. Although this may cause concern in Tbilisi and
Kiev, we can balance it through continued support for
Georgian and Ukrainian security and aspirations to eventual
NATO membership. Moscow will not be an easy partner, but we
should seize this opportunity to set a new path with Russia,
aimed initially at securing more constructive engagement from
Moscow, and eventually at establishing a more positive and
cooperative relationship. End Summary.

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A Genuine Partnership
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2. (C) The NATO-Russia discussion at the March 4-5
Ministerial gives the Alliance the opportunity to assess
whether and how to restructure or reorient the NRC in the
post-Georgia conflict environment. Before the Georgia
conflict, both Alliance members and Russia often lamented
that there were few ideas for practical joint cooperation,
apart from Afghanistan and some military exercises, and that
NATO-Russia meetings often lacked real substance. We should
encourage Russia to make good on its arguments that the NRC
is neither a "gift to Russia," nor a "tool to manage Russia,"
but a means of establishing a "genuine partnership" focused
on issues of concern to all participants. Building
confidence in the NATO-Russian partnership will require
working towards the goal of NRC meetings being "at 27," not
"26-plus-1," with members willing to discuss not just the
issues NATO is concerned about, but also Russia's security
concerns, such as Georgia, missile defense, and NATO
enlargement. While Russia will often be a difficult partner
and seek to set the agenda it wants, willingness to consult
on issues of concern to Moscow can enable us to make the NRC
a forum for more substantive cooperation.


3. (C) GOR officials acknowledge that the recent NRC informal
sessions are "steps in the right direction." Speaking
publicly in Moscow February 26, Russian Ambassador Rogozin
said that both sides were "satisfied with the pace of
re-establishing the work of the NRC." In remarks to the
Spanish press March 1, President Medvedev lauded cooperation
on Afghanistan and called for increased efforts. The MFA
agrees that NATO and Russia should not wait until the next
crisis to step up cooperation. In addition to Afghanistan,
they envision the NRC serving as a forum to cooperate on
missile defense, the Cooperative Threat Initiative,
counternarcotics, counterterrorism, piracy, and migration.
However, they stress that Russia is not NATO's "lap dog," to
answer only when the Alliance dictates when dialogue with the
GOR should take place.

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NRC as a Crisis Management Tool
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4. (C) Moscow argues that the August war in Georgia revealed
a major defect in NATO's relationship with Russia. By siding
with Georgia and subsequently suspending NATO-Russia Council
meetings for five months, the argument goes, NATO
demonstrated that there was not a "true partnership" with
Russia. MFA officials contend that the Georgia crisis might
have been prevented if NATO had allowed Russia to discuss its
concerns about Georgia in the NRC prior to the August
conflict. They argue that if NATO had known about Georgia's
plan to attack South Ossetia, it should have notified the
GOR; if NATO did not know of Saakashvili's plans, then the
Georgian president interpreted the Intensified Dialogue as
carte blanche to launch his attack. They complain that
during the conflict, it was not clear what NATO's role was.


5. (C) Rather than rehashing this fruitless debate, we need
to refocus Moscow on future crisis management. The NRC could
serve as a forum for doing so, while recognizing it is not a
substitute for the UN Security Council. Such efforts would
be complicated by Russia's desire to revisit the events of
August, in order to present Moscow's side of the issue, which
it believes was suppressed. However, Russian concern that
the current situation in the South Caucasus not lead to a
repeat of last summer's military escalation is a hook for
reorienting our conversation, and can reinforce OSCE, EU and
UN dialogues.

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Managing Contentious Issues
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6. (C) Even given the more positive rhetoric of late, Russia
remains resolutely opposed to Georgian, and particularly
Ukrainian, membership in NATO. GOR officials have welcomed
statements by the Secretary that the two countries are not
ready for NATO membership (even though former Secretary Rice
also said the same),and interpret this as a willingness by
the new Administration to go slower in pressing for a NATO
Membership Action Plan for the two. DFM Grushko told the
Ambassador that Georgia and Ukraine's NATO aspirations were
not about their right to choose their own alliances, but
about Russia's "sphere of security" and military-industrial
interests (reftel). While not conceding Russia's "sphere" of
interests, and continuing support for the two countries
through continued political and security support under the
Charters and engagement in the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia
Councils, we should also seek to lower the rhetoric,
stressing the importance of restoring stability in the
region. We have consistently been the force for new ideas
and initiatives in the NRC. Strengthening our partnership
and adding content to NATO-Russia military and
counterterrorism operations will reduce suspicions over the
NATO-Georgia and NATO-Ukraine Councils.

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The European Security Treaty
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7. (C) Many have questioned whether Medvedev's proposed
European Security Treaty (EST) is intended to replace or
weaken NATO, despite GOR disclaimers it is not. Russia
insists that the world does not need the "NATO of yesterday,"
which, officials argue, represents a division of Europe and
cannot serve as a sufficient guarantor of peace, but wants
the Alliance to become more open and inclusive. Medvedev's
proposal, they contend, is intended to address the gaps and
failures in European security, which NATO, the OSCE, EU,
CSTO, and individual nations cannot satisfactorily guarantee.
While there are many unanswered questions as to the impact
such a treaty would have on NATO and the other existing
structures, efforts to establish a more effective partnership
in the NRC and enhancements in the OSCE's hard security role
could help us steer the EST proposal in a more positive
direction.

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Adding Content to the Relationship
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8. (C) We have an opportunity to reorient the NRC to make
Russia a more constructive contributor. We have already made
progress on cooperation on Afghanistan, and the NRC would be
a good forum for testing Russia's stated willingness to do
more, including using its influence to encourage greater
engagement by Central Asian nations (this would not be
conceding Russia's ability to dominate the region, but

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leveraging Moscow's influence to obtain a mutually-desired
outcome). As the U.S. continues its review of missile
defense, and arms control and non-proliferation goals, we
could consider reviving the former discussions, and adding
the latter, including CFE, in NRC discussions. In addition
to the OSCE, the NRC could also be a forum for addressing the
EST proposal, enabling us to identify ways to include some of
the EST ideas in the two institutions, thereby eliminating
some of Moscow's arguments in favor of an entirely new
treaty. The Alliance is already looking to restart mil-mil
cooperation, and we should look for new areas for practical
endeavors, such as counter-piracy and counterterrorism.


9. (C) We should also consider using the NRC more effectively
as a crisis management tool. Although there are differences
of opinion over whether the NRC would have been an
appropriate forum for discussing the growing tensions in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia prior to the Georgia conflict,
using the NRC as such a forum in the future may help identify
and defuse such tensions more quickly.


10. (C) Moscow values the NRC as giving Russia a voice in the
most powerful military alliance in the world, even if it does
not have the veto it would prefer. Russia will not be an
easy partner, and will often complicate our efforts by
pressing for unacceptable agenda items, avoiding those it
would prefer not to address, or using anti-NATO rhetoric to
maintain support domestically for a strong military in
difficult economic times. But, with the positive focus now
between the U.S. and Russia, we should take advantage of the
proposal to conduct a joint review of the structure and
priorities of the NRC, seizing the opportunity to set
NATO-Russian relations on a new path, one that acknowledges
our common commitment to strengthening transatlantic
security, rebuilding confidence, and breaking down the
barriers between us.
BEYRLE