RUSSIA SET ON A MOSCOW MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000496

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE IR IS SY RS XF
SUBJECT: RUSSIA SET ON A MOSCOW MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE,
DESPITE LIMITED INFLUENCE IN THE REGION

REF: USUN 159

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Lavrov's February 15-19
visit to the Middle East reinforced Russia's intention to
convene a Moscow Middle East conference (and ward off
Sarkozy's entry into the race for MEPP summitry). The GOR
now aims to hold an April or May meeting that Russian
officials argue will restart the Israel-Palestine track after
its violent disruption in Gaza, while also advancing the
Syrian and Lebanese tracks. Lavrov is likely to urge Quartet
partners to agree to a date at the March 2 meeting in Sharm
al-Sheikh. Despite some minor successes in the region,
Russian claims to have a real impact in the Middle East have
been diminished by an inability or unwillingness to convince
its friends in Damascus and Tehran to rein in Hizbollah and
Hamas. Russian Middle East diplomacy remains geared toward
enhancing Moscow's profile on the international stage and
potential economic benefits resulting from closer engagement
with regional governments. Ironically, the one Middle
Eastern country with whom traditionally Arab-friendly Russia
presently enjoys a genuinely warm relationship is Israel,
although this has not prevented Moscow from pushing Tel Aviv
to agree to its conference at the same time the GOR denies
Israeli calls for Russia to take a harder line on the threats
presented by Syria and Iran. End summary.

Gaza Crisis Offers Russia Hope
--------------


2. (C) FM Lavrov toured Middle Eastern capitals February
15-19 to take the pulse of the region following the Gaza
crisis and rally support for a Moscow Middle East conference
that the GOR is now considering for late April or May.
Despite Israel's military incursion into Gaza, combined with
failed Palestinian reconciliation and political uncertainty
in Israel, the GOR contends that Gaza has given the Moscow
conference a new lease on life. MFA officials have been
telling us since January that the GOR felt strongly that a
Moscow conference could revive the peace process once the
dust settled in Gaza. While Lavrov had previously scheduled
bilaterals with the Egyptians, he used the temporary
cease-fire to embark on a broader trip intended to catch Arab
and Israeli leaders while the region remained in a state of
flux and the post-Gaza positions of regional capitals had yet
to harden. Unfortunately for Lavrov, he reached Tel Aviv
before it was clear which party leader would form the next
government, and came away with mixed signals on the level of
Israeli support for a Moscow conference. Livni maintained a
more open attitude toward the conference than Netanyahu,
according to the GOR, although neither indicated whether or
not Israel would attend under a government they headed. When
we quizzed the MFA about the utility of holding a Middle East
conference in the current environment, officials were quick
to point out that UNSCR 1860 commits the Quartet to
"consider" a Moscow meeting in 2009, and Lavrov will raise
the issue at the Quartet meeting in Sharm al-Sheikh.

Inspires a Broader Agenda
--------------


3. (C) The GOR is determined to pursue an ambitious agenda
for its Middle East conference. Whereas in January, when
fighting continued in Gaza, the MFA said the meeting would
focus on restarting the Israel-Palestine track after its
violent interruption, Russian officials now say that the
conference will include the Lebanon and Syria tracks. DFM
Saltanov recently underscored that the Moscow conference
should be an opportunity to "resume work on all the tracks"
of the peace process, while Perm Rep Churkin told the UNSC
that the GOR would not limit potential topics for discussion
(reftel). How Moscow will square this with Tel Aviv's
reluctance to allow Russia such comprehensive involvement in
its negotiations with Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon remains
to be seen.

Moscow Has Been Waiting a Long Time
--------------


4. (C) The GOR began seriously pursuing the idea of a Moscow
Middle East conference in 2007, although the concept had been
kicking around since then-President Putin first proposed a
Moscow meeting on the Middle East in 2005. Moscow claimed
that its relations with Damascus and Hamas meant that Russia
was uniquely qualified to play this role in the peace
process, although it understood that the Israel-Palestine
track was the key to settling the other issues and would
remain the focus of the meeting. Following FM Lavrov's 2008
trip to the region, the GOR claimed that Russia had support
from the Arab states and Israel to hold a conference that

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would continue the momentum begun at Annapolis. Moscow's
rationale for hosting a conference took a hit when the
Turkish-mediated discussions between Israel and Syria became
public and Egypt's work toward Palestinian reconciliation
appeared to bear fruit. Although the GOR praised these
efforts, it was clear that Russian officials saw their chance
to play a leading role in the peace process slipping away,
particularly after Tel Aviv made it clear to Moscow that it
did not want outside intervention in ongoing bilateral
negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. The Gaza crisis
gave Russia a pretext to argue that a Moscow conference would
restart the peace process, but also presented the threat of
Sarkozy's proposed ME conference, which would have stolen
Moscow's thunder and made Lavrov's recent regional trip a
priority.

The Limits of Russian Diplomacy in the Middle East
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Russian diplomatic efforts in the region are a mixed
bag - the GOR maintains close relations with Syria and has a
line of communication open with Hamas, but has shown limited
success in influencing their behavior. Although Russia did
not play a role in the diplomatic efforts resulting in the
Israel-Hamas cease-fire, DFM Saltanov may have had some
impact when he personally urged Hamas leader Mesha'al to be
more flexible and understand that it was necessary to provide
Israel with the prospect halting Hamas rocket fire and
smuggling weapons into Gaza. More typically, however,
regular regional trips by Lavrov, Saltanov, and other Russian
officials demonstrate the limited nature of Russian influence
in the region. This was especially the case during the 2008
political crisis in Lebanon, when the U.S. and others looked
to Russia to call upon Damascus and Tehran to allow a
settlement in Beirut. While Moscow may have sent a stern
message to both capitals, the MFA admitted that there were
limits to Russian influence on Syria and Iran, both of which
valued Hizbollah for its ability to confront Israel. In the
case of Syria, the GOR has been unwilling to threaten a
cutoff of military sales to increase its leverage over its
primary Arab ally in the region. Russian observers argue
that so long as Russia is unwilling to spend such political
capital, or spend financially by providing aid to the region,
it will remain on the sidelines as the U.S. continues to
dominate Middle Eastern diplomacy.

Parochial Interests Behind Russian Efforts
--------------


6. (C) Russia's diplomatic efforts in the Middle East are
driven by the dual goals of enhancing Russia's international
stature and advancing its economic interests. Putin's
"historic" trips to the region as President marked the
opening of a diplomatic offensive that saw Moscow
reinvigorate ties to the region that had atrophied under the
"weak Russia" of the 1990s. The return of Russia as a player
in the region was intended to raise Moscow's international
profile and help fulfill its self-appointed role of serving
as a "bridge" between the West and the Muslim world.


7. (C) Greater access to Middle Eastern markets has also been
a goal of Russian diplomacy, and Putin was accompanied to the
region by Russian business leaders looking for energy,
transportation, and arms deals. Success for Moscow has,
however, been more elusive than it first appeared: a much
touted contract to build a new Saudi railway was canceled in
2008, the same year that Algeria returned what it claimed
were poor quality MIGs. Russian analysts argue that many of
the contracts Russian firms "won" were actually given by Arab
governments that want to appear to balance relations with the
U.S. in an attempt to appeal to the anti-American sentiments
of their populace. Defense analysts dismiss Russian claims
to have increased military sales to the region, with Syria
remaining the only significant market for Russian arms. The
bright spot remains the energy sector, where Russian
cooperation with the Gulf States can benefit both sides, and
Israel may become a major consumer of Russian gas.

Strong Ties to Israel...
--------------


8. (C) The close ties Russia developed with Israel under
Putin play an increasingly important part in Russian activity
in the Middle East, and has transformed Russia from its
traditional pro-Arab stance of the Soviet era. The GOR
maintained an evenhanded approach to the recent crisis in
Gaza by calling upon both sides to refrain from harming
civilians, while the Russian public's sympathy for Israel was
interpreted as an echo of Russia's own experience fighting
Islamic extremists in the Caucasus. Israeli politicians and
diplomats are a regular presence in Moscow and Sochi, where

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they meet Medvedev, Putin, and Lavrov, typically to stress
Israeli concern over Iran and Syria as well as to discuss
bilateral matters. Trade has increased significantly, from
$700 million in 2003 to around $2.5 billion today. Israel's
large Russian-speaking population and regular travel by
Russians and Israelis have made the relationship one of
personal contacts as much as official channels. The return
to Russia in 2008 of historic property in Jerusalem
originally acquired during the Czarist era will allow the
establishment of a new Russian cultural center and consulate,
expanding Moscow's physical presence at a time when recently
inaugurated visa free travel will increase Russian travel to
Israel, and vice versa.

...Only Go So Far
--------------


9. (C) Close ties to Israel have not prevented Moscow from
maintaining its pragmatic approach to Syria and Iran, both of
which remain potential customers for Russian anti-aircraft
systems despite Moscow's assurances to Washington and Tel
Aviv that it will not sell weapons that would destabilize the
region. The GOR recently offered to donate 10 MIG-29s to the
Lebanese military, arguing it was a positive move in support
of Beirut, despite Israeli opposition. Russia's ability to
balance a warm relationship with Israel with pragmatic
relations with Arab states and Iran demonstrates an ability
to compartmentalize in the interests of maintaining the few
diplomatic tools that allows Russia to remain engaged in the
region.
BEYRLE