Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW488
2009-02-27 11:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN MFA ON GENEVA TALKS ABOUT GEORGIA CONFLICT

Tags:  PREL PGOV RS GG OSCE UN 
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271120Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2151
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000488 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG OSCE UN
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON GENEVA TALKS ABOUT GEORGIA CONFLICT

Classified By: Pol M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000488

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG OSCE UN
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON GENEVA TALKS ABOUT GEORGIA CONFLICT

Classified By: Pol M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: MFA CIS Fourth Department Conflicts
Division Chief Aleksey Dvinyanin February 26 characterized
the incident response and prevention mechanism as the first
concrete result of the February 17-18 Geneva process. He
expressed disappointment that the humanitarian working group
did not achieve results, but stressed that Russia's priority
was to create a secure process for the return of "refugees"
rather than access for humanitarian aid from the south. He
saw no need to advance the next meeting from June,
reiterating Russia's arguments that the issues could better
be handled in other fora such as the UN, and contended we
should evaluate how the new incident mechanism was working
first. Calling Czech warnings to Belarus about recognizing
Abkhazia and South Ossetia "irresponsible," Dvinyanin said it
had placed the entire Geneva process in jeopardy.
Reaffirming Moscow's support for its proposals on OSCE and UN
mandates, Dvinyanin was optimistic about the renegotiation of
a UN observer mandate, but pessimistic regarding the OSCE
mission. Dvinyanin accused the EU monitoring mission of
failing to notice the strong Georgian military presence near
South Ossetia. He confirmed that Russian embassies would be
prepared to represent Abkhaz and South Ossetian interests if
asked to do so, in accordance with the December inter-MFA
MOUs with the breakaway regions. He assured us that the sole
purpose of the upcoming border demarcation was to delineate
the borders to Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russia as they
had been during the time of the Soviet Union. End Summary.

--------------
Geneva Process
--------------

Working Group 1: Purposeful vagueness
--------------


2. (C) MFA CIS Fourth Department Conflicts Division Chief
Aleksey Dvinyanin saw the results of the February 17-18
Geneva talks as making some progress, characterizing the
agreement on incident response and prevention as the first
concrete result of the Geneva process and the first practical
agreement since the August conflict. He lauded the U.S.
delegation and specifically A/S Fried's role in the talks.

Explaining that the agreement had been purposely left vague
and "flexible" to allow the "participants in the field" to
flesh out practical details such as varying the number of
participant parties according to the nature of meetings
(e.g., just South Ossetians and Georgians to exchange
information, or Russia, the OSCE, and the EU joining the two
parties in other contexts),Dvinyanin voiced hope that the
mechanism "would actually be used."

Working Group 2: Wrong priority
--------------


3. (C) Dvinyanin expressed disappointment with the lack of
tangible outcomes in the second working group on refugees and
IDPs. He asserted that too much time and attention had been
focused on deliveries of humanitarian aid, and lack of access
from the south. Russia would prefer the working group to
focus on the return of IDPs and refugees, which was a more
critical issue. Russia had "different priorities" because
its aid already "fully sufficed" to cover the humanitarian
needs in the breakaway regions. As examples, he named
financial assistance and the rebuilding of villages,
including those inhabited by ethnic Georgians. Russia did
not mind if South Ossetia chose to ask for international
assistance, but understood its sensitivities to the route by
which aid might be delivered.


4. (C) Russia's humanitarian priority, Dvinyanin stated, was
to create a secure process for the return of "refugees."
Therefore, Russia supported South Ossetian special
representative Chochiev's proposal that the two Geneva
working groups on security and IDP return meet jointly or be
merged, or that the issue be discussed in a broad session
"with all participants," though he steered clear of calling
it a plenary session. Dvinyanin underscored that verifying
refugee status for those claiming it was also important.
Stabilizing the situation on the borders and "liquidating
hatred" were the most pressing requirements for progress on
humanitarian issues.

Next meeting
--------------


5. (C) Despite the need for progress on security, Dvinyanin
questioned the need for a new meeting in Geneva before June.
Calling the Geneva process "informal talks," he asserted that
other international fora such as the UN were better equipped

MOSCOW 00000488 002 OF 003


to address the issues of security and humanitarian
assistance. He suggested that we should evaluate how the new
incident prevention mechanism was working before scheduling
another round. He intimated that holding the next Geneva
meeting in June at the same time as discussions on the
renewal of the UN and OSCE mandates would make sense.


6. (C) Describing Czech Foreign Minister Karel
Schwarzenberg's February 23 statement that Belarus would
incur difficulties in its relationship to the EU if it were
to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "irresponsible,"
Dvinyanin said the Russian MFA had taken note at the highest
level and sent a report to Prime Minister Putin. Dvinyanin
noted that Abkhazia was now threatening not to participate in
another round of Geneva talks unless the Czechs apologized,
and added that such types of statements could jeopardize the
entire Geneva process.


7. (C) When asked about the possibility of working group
meetings in the interim, Dvinyanin stated that it was
Russia's "principled position" that there should be no
separate meetings, both due to the interlinkage of the
groups' issues, and due to the strain it would impose on the
Abkhaz and South Ossetians to staff frequent meetings.

--------------
Observer mandates
--------------


8. (C) While Dvinyanin was downbeat on the prospects for
renegotiating an OSCE observer mandate because of South
Ossetian distrust of the OSCE, he was more sanguine regarding
the UN observer mission in Abkhazia, because Sukhumi wanted
international monitors.

OSCE
--------------


9. (C) Elaborating on the OSCE mission renewal, Dvinyanin
noted South Ossetian disapproval of the OSCE observers'
performance during the August conflict as well as now, and
said that the South Ossetian views were colored by
"antipathy." Russia therefore could not do much to change
the South Ossetian position that there would be no OSCE
observers in South Ossetia until the OSCE agreed to equal
field presences in Tskhinvali and Tbilisi that were
independent from one another.


10. (C) Despite our protests, Dvinyanin criticized the Greek
OSCE efforts as too inflexible. Russia's earlier proposals
for equal presences in Tbilisi and Tskhinvali for political,
economic, and humanitarian support still stood, Dvinyanin
maintained, as Russia did not see how to deviate from the
proposal's main points. Citing the examples of OSCE missions
in Chechnya and pre-independence Kosovo, he insisted that a
mission in Tskhinvali equal to and independent from Tbilisi's
would not constitute recognition of South Ossetian
independence.

UN
--


11. (C) Dvinyanin praised UNSCR 1866 as "useful," as its
provisions "avoided" the questions of territorial integrity
and status. If that approach were maintained until June, he
thought it would be "simple" to draft a new mandate that
focused on the non-use of force and human rights. He noted
that Russia stood by its proposals containing "various new
options" for a mission, despite their rejection by the U.S.
in New York.

No progress without recognition
--------------


12. (C) Noting Vice President Biden's remark in Munich about
"pressing the reset button" in U.S.-Russia relations,
Dvinyanin wrapped up his views on the Geneva talks by stating
Georgia should not become an obstacle in the greater
U.S.-Russia agenda.

--------------
Border situation
--------------


13. (C) Dvinyanin accused the EU monitoring mission of
failing to notice the strong Georgian military presence --
"including tanks and rocket launchers" -- near the
administrative border to South Ossetia since it signed an MOU
with the Georgian Defense Ministry on January 26. We pushed
back, noting the reports of separate UNOMIG and EU no-notice
inspections of the border areas during the week of February

MOSCOW 00000488 003 OF 003


17, in which both missions did not detect any force levels in
excess of the agreed numbers. Dvinyanin remained skeptical,
but could only point out that no-notice inspections were not
part of the MOU. He stated that Russia was considering joint
inspections or invoking the incident response and prevention
mechanism.

--------------
Interest sections
--------------


14. (C) In response to reports about Russian plans to set up
Abkhaz and South Ossetian interest sections in Russian
embassies overseas, Dvinyanin explained that one of the
provisions in the inter-MFA memoranda of understanding signed
during the working visits of "Foreign Ministers" Shamba and
Dzhioev in December allowed the Russian MFA to represent
South Ossetian or Abkhaz interests abroad "if the need arose,
or if requested." Given that South Ossetia and Abkhazia were
"small countries" with little means and staff, Dvinyanin
surmised that Russian diplomats would initially represent the
two enclaves' interests, but in any case expected it would
take time for the MOU to "fully come into force."

--------------
Border delineation
--------------


15. (C) Dvinyanin told us that Alexander Golovin, special
presidential envoy for the delimitation and demarcation of
the state border with neighboring CIS countries, would not
personally get involved with the demarcation of the "state
borders" between Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which he
had announced on February 17 to begin this year. Dvinyanin
assured us that the sole purpose of the demarcation exercise
was to delineate the borders as they had been during the time
of the Soviet Union, and not shift them.
BEYRLE