EU TROIKA TO RUSSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000473

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2019
TAGS: PREL EU RS
SUBJECT: EU TROIKA TO RUSSIA

Classified By: Political MC Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
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1. (C) During the Russia-EU Troika dialogue on February 11,
Lavrov charged that Georgian troops were massing on the
boundaries with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The MFA later
called the EU's reports dismissing these claims as a
"snapshot" that did not measure "true" Georgian intentions.
Lavrov justified the presence of Russian troops in the two
break-away territories as necessary to hold back Georgian
forces. Lavrov failed to convince the Troika members that
Medvedev's proposed European Security Treaty was an
"unstoppable train," but declared the GOR's readiness to
discuss the proposal at the OSCE and the NRC. Despite
earlier criticism, Russia only sought information on the
European Partnership Initiative and did not seek to attend
the proposed May summit in Prague. The GOR offered to
conclude a framework agreement with the EU on crisis
management that would more easily permit the GOR to deploy
forces in support of EU missions. End summary.

Off the Agenda
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2. (C) The Russia-EU Troika meetings in Moscow on February
11 were a mix of Russian bluster and cooperation, but
diverged from the planned agenda. Trade and the Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement negotiations did not figure
prominently in the meeting, as they had been addressed by the
European Commission and President Barroso during their visit
to Moscow on February 6 (septel).

Georgia on my mind, Lavrov
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3. (C) FM Lavrov reportedly took charge of the meeting and
used it to go on the offensive regarding Georgia. He said
that Russia was very concerned with reports that "Georgian
special forces" were massing at the border without clear
intentions and in violation of existing agreements. The GOR
was also disappointed with the lack of EU monitors' reports
and efforts to liaise with Russian forces. The Russian
Foreign Minister justified the presence of Russian forces,
saying that they were there to protect people and now needed
to remain in order to hold back Georgian forces. In a
meeting with us February 24, the MFA's Head of the EU Unit
Petr Plikhin called the EU Monitors' reports which dismissed
Russian charges that Georgian forces were massing on the
boundaries with South Ossetia and Abkhazia as inconclusive
and a "snapshot" of the situation that did not measure "true"
Georgian intentions.

European Security Treaty (EST)
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4. (C) On the EST, Lavrov likened it to an "unstoppable
train," arguing that the proposal had momentum. In addition
to DFM Grushko's presentation at the joint PC-FSC February
18, Russia was prepared to address the issue at the OSCE's
Annual Security Review Conference, at a proposed special
summit under the Kazakh Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010, and
at the NRC. Lavrov was reported to say that dialogue at
these multilateral fora would be complimented by bilateral
meetings and consultation with European countries, the U.S.,
and Canada, (Note: Swedish Director General Bjorn Lyrvall
told the Ambassador that Lavrov said that Russia was already
in consultations with the U.S. on the EST.) Lavrov wanted to
put aside concerns raised at the recent Munich Security
Conference that the EST would undermine the Helsinki Final
Act and was quoted to say that this "was not a Helsinki II
but a Helsinki plus."

Eastern Partnership Initiative (EPI)
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5. (C) The EU's Troika was prepared for a spirited
discussion of its EPI, but found the GOR to be less negative
than expected. Lavrov did not request observer status for
Russia at the proposed May summit in Prague, but reportedly
probed into the concept. He underlined that the EPI should
not come at the expense of relations between Russia and
partner countries. Plikhin elaborated that the GOR was eager
to understand the proposal and the extent to which the
initiative was open for others, including Russia, to
participate.

Crisis Management
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6. (C) Lavrov praised the deployment of Russian helicopters

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and crews to support the EU's mission to Chad and the Central
African Republic, and proposed that the EU and Russia draft a
framework agreement that would allow for the quick deployment
of Russian assets in support of other EU missions. The MFA's
Plikhin denied the reports of EU diplomats that Russia
offered to train additional Afghan police officers at its own
expense. The GOR also showed an interest in coordinating
anti-piracy efforts with the EU, with Lavrov saying that it
preferred working with the EU rather than under a NATO
umbrella.

Comment
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7. (C) By pushing hard on Georgia and thereby seizing the
agenda of the meeting, Lavrov put the EU's Troika off-balance
-- a tactic that continued with Russia offering deepened
cooperation on EU missions and foregoing the opportunity to
pounce on the EPI. GOR efforts to convince interlocutors
that the EST had momentum and should rise to the level of a
ministerial discussion fell flat when participants compared
notes with us and others who Lavrov claimed were ready to
work with Russia on the EST.
BEYRLE