Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW462
2009-02-25 12:50:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

ACEQ - MOSCOW, YEKATERINGBURG, AND VLADIVOSTOK

Tags:  ASEC KSAC 
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P 251250Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2122
INFO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
UNCLAS MOSCOW 000462 


FOR DS/IP, DS/CIS, DS/IP/EUR, DS/SPC/MSG, DS/DSS/OSAC, DS/DSS/ICI,
DS/ICI/CAS, DS/ICI/PSS, DS/CIS/PSP, DS/PSP/FPD, DS/PSP/PSSD,
DS/DSS/ITA, DS/AO/PMD, DS/IP/FPO, DSERCC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC KSAC
SUBJECT: ACEQ - MOSCOW, YEKATERINGBURG, AND VLADIVOSTOK

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000462


FOR DS/IP, DS/CIS, DS/IP/EUR, DS/SPC/MSG, DS/DSS/OSAC, DS/DSS/ICI,
DS/ICI/CAS, DS/ICI/PSS, DS/CIS/PSP, DS/PSP/FPD, DS/PSP/PSSD,
DS/DSS/ITA, DS/AO/PMD, DS/IP/FPO, DSERCC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC KSAC
SUBJECT: ACEQ - MOSCOW, YEKATERINGBURG, AND VLADIVOSTOK


1. Crime mobility - Response F

Gangs and other criminal elements roam freely day or night, and
target Embassy officials (Emboff) and affluent residential areas for
burglary.

Narrative: The increasing number of violent robberies against
American and Locally Engaged (LES) employees reported to RSO in 2008
continued the trend from 2007. These crimes include an increased
number of strong-arm robberies where pickpockets used force instead
of surreptitious theft. The number of racially and ethnically
motivated assaults, and anti-American assaults and harassment,
remained high. Russia saw at least 120 racially motivated murders
in 2008, including another decapitation of an immigrant laborer in
December with photos taken by the perpetrators sent to the press to
claim credit for the act. An African American exchange student was
stabbed in December in an apparent racially motivated crime.


2. Crime ambiance around Emboff neighborhoods - Response D

Embassy neighborhoods are within walking distance (approximately one
mile),of areas in which bands of criminals freely operate and where
street and residential crimes frequently result in violence to
residents.

Narrative: All off-compound embassy housing is gated and secured by
guards, either provided by the Russian UpDK organization or by
private security. Overall, the host government pays a great deal of
attention to these housing areas, including surveillance cameras,
smart-card access devices, and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
key fobs. However, outside of these residential compounds, there
are no dedicated security measures. Embassy employees are typically
not specifically targeted based on their diplomatic status, rather,
criminal acts directed toward official Americans tend to be the
result of the perception of wealth, anti-American sentiment, or
crimes of opportunity.


3. Aggressiveness of Criminals - response C

Criminals commit street crimes and burglaries, and are not deterred
by risk of confrontation with occupants during burglaries.

Narrative: Residential security measures employed by the embassy in
conjunction with host nation provided security prevent most
burglaries. More often perpetrators commit crimes outside of
residential compounds rather than risk entering a building with
active security measures such as guards and CCTV cameras. For this

reason, most crimes against embassy personnel are robberies and
burglary from/of vehicles. However, there have been incidents
reported by non-official Americans of burglaries and home invasion
robberies. Incidents in nightclubs and bars do occur and can
quickly escalate into assualt, sometimes with racial motivations.


4. Arming of Criminals - response C

Criminal perpetrators are usually carrying firearms, (handguns and
shoulder weapons) and knives.

Narrative: Both official and private Americans have been robbed at
gunpoint, knifepoint, and clubbed unconscious with blunt objects.
Criminals have easy access to firearms and knives.


5. Aggregation of Criminals - response D

Criminal perpetrators usually operate in groups of greater than four
individuals, are disposed frequently to be confrontational and
gratuitously violent.

Narrative: Organized criminal groups are extremely widespread in
Russia. Local police have responded by arresting an increased
number of members of extremist groups targeting ethnic minorities.
Groups of disenfranchised and often intoxicated youth frequently
engage in harassment and violence against American visitors. Some
groups continue to engage in shootings and bombings of competitors.
The use of violence in the protection racket appears to be falling,
however, this may be in part due to the success corrupt law
enforcement groups have had in taking over the industry. Robberies
of individuals are typically conducted by two or three males.
Pickpocket teams work the Metro stations and areas frequented by
tourists, and vary in size from one or two up to more than a dozen.



6. Deterrence/Response of Police - response C

Local police or neighborhood associations are generally ineffective
at deterring crime, and response to alarms or emergency calls are
often too slow (15 minutes or longer) to disrupt burglaries or
invasive crimes in progress in Emboff neighborhoods; police have a
mediocre record in apprehending suspects after the fact.

Narrative: Few of the criminal acts involving the American
diplomatic community result in arrests or prosecutions. Most of the
incidents involving theft or physical assaults on official Americans
are rarely reported to the police due to historically poor
responses. Individuals who do report crimes frequently describe a
lack of interest on the part of the police, active discouragement of
making an official report, and even extortion of bribes from the
victim.



7. Training/Professionalism of Police - response F

Police are a negative factor; police are unprofessional,
ill-trained, generally inept, uncaring, and they are corrupt and may
collaborate with criminal elements, or carry out crimes themselves
under protection of their official status.

Narrative: The F rating reflects the general state of law
enforcement in Russia. While Militia officers who work with the
embassy or are in liaison positions are generally professional and
reasonably well-trained, a significant number if not the majority of
police officers in Russia use their occupation to extract bribes.

The efforts of the professional officers are undermined by the vast
extent of corruption within the ranks. RSO receives several reports
per year from official American employees who are solicited by
police officers for bribes, most often when stopped for traffic
infractions or by police in public parks or tourist areas. Private
citizens and embassy employees with limited immunity more often
report solicitation and extortion efforts by police. In 2008,
Transparency International reported that the level of corruption in
Russia rose for the eighth straight year. The organization also
documented the high level of corruption within the Russian courts in
2007, quoting the chairman of the constitutional court, Valery
Zorkin, who told the newspaper Izvesti that, "...bribe taking in the
courts has become one of the biggest corruption markets in Russia."


A large number of Russian businesses are forced to pay a percentage
of their revenue to a "krysha" or "roof." This payment is intended
to ensure the criminal ring soliciting the money will not harm the
proprietor or business, and to defend the business against other
extortion attempts. This system is so lucrative that groups from
many of the law enforcement agencies have entered the protection
racket, illegally using their official authority and equipment to
collect protection money.

President Medvedev has again recently addressed the issue of
official corruption, including an enforcement sweep which resulted
in the arrest of many law enforcement officers. One new approach
brought forward by the Duma was the banning of officers from
inspecting small and medium-sized businesses due to rampant
extortion. Unfortunately to date the benefits of such efforts have
not yet been observed.

BEYRLE