RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE ON AFGHANISTAN: LETHAL TRANSIT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000457

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE ON AFGHANISTAN: LETHAL TRANSIT,
MANAS

REF: A. MOSCOW 270

B. MOSCOW 220

C. MOSCOW 357

D. 08 MOSCOW 3655

E. BISHKEK 131

F. STATE 14097

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Russia has repeatedly signaled its
openness to considering additional transit agreements to
Afghanistan, with the implication these could include
lethal equipment. As we begin shipments of non-lethal
supplies through the Northern Dimension Network (NDN),and
with the future of U.S. presence at the Manas air base
still unclear, such an agreement could significantly
reinforce our supply routes, potentially leverage Moscow's
influence with Central Asian nations, and enhance
U.S.-Russian cooperation in an area of vital national
security interest to both countries. German and French air
transit of lethal equipment, pursuant to their bilateral
agreements, has been going smoothly for years, according to
their Embassy officials. However, Russia is not a
substitute for Manas, Russia may try to attach one or
several price tags to such cooperation: suspension of
missile defense deployment, slowdown in NATO enlargement to
Ukraine and Georgia, use of Russian airlift and/or payment
of air navigation fees. While Russian motivations may
include demonstrating that "all roads to Central Asia lead
through Moscow," Russia's desire to be a co-equal player
with the U.S. on a matter of global importance and to be
considered as essential to our success in Afghanistan may
produce more constructive cooperation. Opening a dialogue
on lethal transit will enable us to gauge the willingness
of Moscow to cooperate as well as the costs. At the same
time, if we want to try to keep Manas, we can test Moscow's
claim that the base is a U.S.-Kyrgyz issue that Russia has
not tried to influence. End summary.

Russia Wants to Help - Sort of
--------------


2. (C) As we have noted (ref A),while Russia has
emphasized its interest in cooperating more closely on
Afghanistan and stressed the threat to Russia of
instability there, Moscow places a strategic priority on
consolidating its influence over Central Asia (ref B).
Thus, while Russian officials have told us they recognize
the importance of the Manas Air Base to Washington's
efforts in Afghanistan, it is widely believed that Moscow
(despite GOR denials) linked its aid package to Kyrgyzstan
to eviction of the U.S. from Manas. Russia wants to be
seen as the dominant player in the region, but this does
not mean that we cannot seek to enlist more cooperation on
Afghanistan, and potentially on Manas.

GOR Open to Considering Lethal Transit Agreement
-------------- ---


3. (C) Citing Medvedev in the February 12 meeting with U/S
Burns, NSC Senior Director for Russia McFaul, and Amb.
Beyrle, FM Lavrov said that Russia was "ready to consider
virtually all options on transit" (ref C). DFM Borodavkin
urged that Russian overtures on Afghanistan not be allowed
to lapse, and hinted that we should not delay. On February
11 (almost immediately following the U.S.-Russian
consultations on Afghanistan February 10-11 and reports
that transit across Russia of U.S. non-lethal supplies for
ISAF would begin soon),FM Lavrov responded to a press
question whether Russia would allow transit of weapons by
saying "additional steps are also possible." He added that
Russia and NATO had discussed in March and April 2008 the
possibility of using Russian military transport for ISAF's
needs. "There could be other agreements too," Lavrov
said. MFA Deputy Director for NATO Gorlach also indicated
that Moscow would be open to considering an agreement on
transit of lethal supplies, similar to what the French and
Germans had, but cautioned that such an agreement would
require Duma approval. While Russian overtures have been
framed in a bilateral context, a lethal transit agreement
could also be explored or expanded in a NATO-Russia Council
context.

MOSCOW 00000457 002 OF 003



German, French Lethal Transit Going Smoothly
--------------


4. (C) In his meeting with Burns and McFaul, Lavrov noted
the ease of the German and French transit arrangements for
lethal equipment and personnel. German and French
colleagues confirmed to us that their bilateral
arrangements for such transit have been going smoothly for
years. (The German shipment for dangerous goods was halted
this week because of new demands by Uzbekistan for 30-day
advance notification). The Germans have one-two flights a
week that carry personnel and overfly Russia, without
landing. They also have one-two flights per week that
carry lethal goods (e.g. ammunition) which land in
Krasnodar, are inspected, refuel, fly out to Uzbekistan and
then return through Russia to Germany. The French also fly
into Krasnodar, and then on to Kyrgyzstan. In order to
avoid problems, the Germans station a military officer in
Krasnodar, and invite all the relevant officials to their
Embassy for a meeting once a year. Our German colleague
confirmed that the GoG paid overflight and navigation fees,
in addition to landing and fuel taxes. She added that
Germany also has an agreement to ship lethal equipment by
ground but has never used it. They planned to start
earlier this year (ref D),to ship airplane fuel, but were
told by the MFA to use the NATO commercial arrangement
instead, as it would be "easier." We understand that the
French and German bilateral agreements required Duma
approval. President Medvedev is set to sign a similar
agreement with the Spanish during his upcoming visit to
Madrid.

Working with Russia on Manas?
--------------


5. (C) A dialogue on transit for lethal goods could also
allow us to test Moscow's willingness to work with us on
Manas, as suggested by Embassy Bishkek (ref E). Despite
what appears a clear effort by Russia to get the U.S. out
of Central Asia, when pressed on the importance of Manas,
GOR officials claim that Russia wants "to consult on the
need for U.S. presence in Central Asia," implying that
Russia may not be completely opposed to such a presence,
but wants to have a voice in the decision.

Caveats
--------------


6. (C) We are not suggesting that transit across Russia is
a substitute for Manas. Geography, political and financial
considerations preclude a neat substitution. The state
flights issue alone, in which Moscow is demanding the U.S.
pay air navigation fees for all USG flights, including
military, could impose a prohibitive cost on operations,
unless resolved.


7. (C) Additionally, in his press comments, FM Lavrov said
that an agreement on lethal transit might be possible "if
the broader relationship between Moscow and the West
improves." Some interpret this as meaning "if the U.S.
suspends its missile defense plans and efforts to enlarge
NATO to Georgia and Ukraine." We will not know what the
trade-off will be until and unless we engage.


8. (C) There are also officials and commentators who see
the U.S. and Russia as engaged in a zero-sum game in
Central Asia, and who will therefore see such a deal as the
U.S. conceding Russia's influence over the region and
acknowledging that "all roads to Central Asia lead through
Moscow." But, Moscow clearly has - and will use - weapons
at its disposal (e.g. financial) to sway Central Asian
nations towards its orbit and away from the U.S. Given
palpable Russian interest in building up strategic
cooperation on Afghanistan as a new leg to U.S.-Russian
relations, we should explore whether we can leverage
Moscow's influence with these countries to obtain what we
want. Uzbekistan, for instance, has told us it would not
agree to transit of lethal goods. But Russia and the U.S.
working together to seek Uzbekistan's cooperation will be a
much more powerful case than if we are on opposite sides.


MOSCOW 00000457 003 OF 003


Comment: No Harm in Talking
--------------


9. (C) The GOR has publicly played up its cooperation in
allowing transit of non-lethal supplies across Russia to
ISAF, and indicated its willingness to consider transit of
lethal equipment. Cooperation on such a public,
high-profile issue plays into Russia's desire to be taken
seriously as a major power and to be seen as an "equal"
with the U.S. At the same time, a dialogue on lethal
transit could allow us to more fully explain U.S. military
intentions in Central Asia and gauge Moscow's willingness
to change course on Manas. While ultimately the price
Russia may exact for such a deal may be too high, we lose
nothing by exploring the possibility.

BEYRLE