DEMARCHE DELIVERED: NPT BACKGROUND INFO AND RUSSIAN POC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000423

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
UNVIE FOR IAEA
USUN FOR POL
USNATO FOR POL
USEU FOR POL

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA IAEA
NPT

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: NPT BACKGROUND INFO AND RUSSIAN POC

REF: A. STATE 6970

B. 08 MOSCOW 1169


1. (SBU) Summary: On February 18 we delivered ref A demarche to MFA
DVBR Division Head and NPT point of contact Aleksey Karpov, who said
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was a major priority for the GOR
and Russia wanted to see it strengthened. For the current review
cycle, he said Russia would focus on multilateral cooperation and
peaceful uses for nuclear power, and urged the U.S. not to make Iran
a major focus of the upcoming third PrepCom, or the 2010 Review
Conference. He suggested we not seek to get a Joint Statement from
the PrepCom, but rely on the Statement from the second PrepCom.
While reiterating that states have the right to enrich and reprocess
uranium, he noted Russia's desire to strengthen participation in the
Angarsk Center and international nuclear fuel bank to help prevent
proliferation of nuclear materials. Russia saw P-5 consultations as
the most effective way of setting NPT priorities, and urged a P-5
meeting prior to the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies (CNS) meeting March 13-14 in Annecy, France (near Geneva).
It would be a positive impetus going into the Review Conference if
the U.S. signed on to the CTBT, and if the U.S. and Russia were able
to reach agreement on a post-START Treaty. Karpov suggested that
the U.S. and Russia jointly issue the U.S.-drafted paper on
"Expanding International Civil Nuclear Cooperation," but noted the
GOR had never received a response to its edits to the document. End
summary.

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GOR Goals for the NPT
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2. (SBU) On February 18 MFA DVBR Division Head and NPT point of
contact Aleksey Karpov told us the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) was a major priority for the GOR. Russia, he said, wanted
very much to reach an agreement on how to strengthen the treaty.


3. (SBU) Karpov said that for this current review process, Russia
would focus on peaceful uses for nuclear power and multilateral
cooperation. Arguing that there was great interest among many
countries to develop nuclear power, Karpov mentioned the
international uranium enrichment center (IUEC) in Angarsk, which was
currently looking to expand uranium enrichment capabilities to
include customers outside of Russia, and the international nuclear
fuel bank as evidence of Russia's willingness to cooperate with
other countries as they safely take advantage of nuclear power. He
pointed out that Kazakhstan had signed up to the IUEC, and that
Ukraine and Armenia may soon join as well. The international
nuclear fuel bank, he said, could be located in Russia, but would be
managed by the IAEA.

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Dealing with Iran, North Korea, India, and Pakistan
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4. (SBU) While acknowledging concern about non-NPT members, Karpov
urged that Iran not be the main focus of the current review process.
He argued that many states have different approaches to Iran, and
disagreement on this one issue would prevent the parties from
reaching agreement on a myriad of other issues. IAEA inspections,
he argued were the best way to insure Iranian enrichment programs
were peaceful in nature. North Korea was being handled in the
Six-Party talks, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group was an effective
forum for handling issues concerning India and Pakistan.

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The Prospect of Parties Violating the Treaty
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5. (SBU) Karpov told us the prospect of countries violating and then
withdrawing from the NPT was not an issue the GOR was focused on.
He said that, during the 2005 session, the GOR circulated a paper,
but never received a response. He said that the GOR still
considered this paper a topic for discussion. The GOR's positions
laid out in the paper have not changed, he said. He said the GOR
otherwise had no comment on prospect of countries violating and then
withdrawing from the NPT.
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Pursuing Negotiations Relating To Nuclear Disarmament
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6. (SBU) Karpov said that the GOR urges countries to sign on to the
NPT in its bilateral relations with countries. He reiterated
Russia's position that sovereign countries have the right to enrich
and reprocess uranium. Russia, he said, can offer alternatives,
such as use of the Angarsk Center or the international nuclear fuel
bank.


7. (SBU) Karpov argued for continued P-5 consultations, and
suggested a meeting could be held prior to the March 13-14 CNS
Annecy Workshop. The possibility of the U.S. signing on to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),as well as if the U.S. and
Russia could agree on a post-START Treaty, would be an important
impetus for the Review Conference.

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Lack of Safeguards' Universality
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8. (SBU) Karpov said the GOR would like to see NPT safeguards
agreements become universal, and agreed it should be discussed soon.


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What the GOR Wants from the U.S.
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9. (SBU) Karpov said the GOR would like a response to its proposed
amendments to the U.S. paper "Expanding International Civil Nuclear
Cooperation" and suggested we consider releasing this paper as a
joint U.S.-Russia document during the PrepCom (ref B). He said the
GOR had no objection if other countries wished to sign on to the
document as well.


10. (SBU) Karpov said the U.S. and Russia could cooperate in many
areas to promote nonproliferation. The Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terror, he said, was a success, with 75 countries now signed
on. He also suggested the CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
as other areas where the U.S. and Russia could eventually
cooperate.

BEYRLE