DFM GRUSHKO ON GEORGIA, ENERGY SECURITY, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000355

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: MARR PINS PREL ENRG EU GG RS
SUBJECT: DFM GRUSHKO ON GEORGIA, ENERGY SECURITY, AND
EUROPEAN SECURITY

REF: STATE 11363

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In a wide-ranging meeting February 10, Deputy Foreign
Minister Grushko told the Ambassador the GOR had concluded
that the only way to guarantee security in Georgia was
through the presence of Russian troops. He said a renewed
OSCE mandate would have to take into account South Ossetian
views and Russia's rejection of Georgia's territorial
integrity. The GOR was concerned that the EU's memorandum
with Georgia on the movement of security forces undermined
Georgian commitments made in the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement.
Events in Georgia had paralyzed NATO-Russia cooperation, and
in rebuilding confidence, Russia needed to consider its own
security and military-industrial interests with regard to
Georgia's and Ukraine's NATO aspirations. Grushko accused
the OSCE and CFE of having failed, and said that Medvedev's
proposed European Security Treaty (EST) was a "more open and
inclusive mechanism" to discuss security issues but cautioned
against developing concrete proposals on the EST at this
time. Grushko projected that the EU and Russia might
conclude new agreements on pipeline projects. The GOR
welcomed the proposed interlinkage of electrical grids with
Europe, but accused the EU of being in material breach of its
commitment to conclude a nuclear material trade agreement.
Russia expected the U.S. to refrain from statements
cautioning Europe against reliance on Russian energy
supplies. Grushko praised the "fresh" and "pragmatic" tone
in U.S.-Russian relations set by the Vice President at
Wehrkunde. End Summary.

Georgia
--------------


2. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko told the
Ambassador February 10 that Georgia was "an example of the
problems in European security," saying Russia had concluded
that the only way to guarantee security in the area was
through the presence of Russian troops, similar to the
presence of Turkish forces on Cyprus. When the Ambassador
pushed back, saying that this was a dangerous line of logic
with implications throughout the region, Grushko countered
that Russia was bound by commitments not to deploy troops in
CIS countries without their consent, with the exception of
Transnistria, where it was "trapped."


3. (C) Grushko claimed Russia was acting in Georgia in
accordance with the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreements. He said
that Russia did not object to the return of the eight OSCE
monitors to South Ossetia under a new mandate, but that the
mandate would have to take into account South Ossetian views
and Russia's rejection of calls to restore Georgia's
territorial integrity. Calling it a difficult issue, Grushko
demanded that monitors should not inspect Russian military
bases and that the revived mission would need to find ways to
cooperate with local authorities, "without the political
hangups."


4. (C) Grushko objected to the Ambassador's support for
continued Geneva process talks, saying that meetings should
focus on results, not frequency. He also charged that Russia
was receiving troubling information that Georgian security
and paramilitary forces were moving towards the border.
Grushko charged that the recent memorandum of understanding
between the EU and Georgia on the presence of security forces
undermined commitments made in the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement
that required Georgian forces to return to their usual
barracks. The new agreement permitted the movement of a
Georgian battalion and tanks, he said, while "our military
presence was not a result of Russian Federation policy, but
of Georgian actions."

NATO
--------------


5. (C) In reply to the Ambassador's question on engaging at
the NATO-Russia Council (NRC),Grushko judged that the NRC
failed when it denied Russia the opportunity to present its
side during the crisis in Georgia. Russian cooperation in
the NRC was "paralyzed" as a result of NATO's "bias," but
Grushko said that Russia was now in the phase of rebuilding
confidence, which included understanding who started the

MOSCOW 00000355 002 OF 003


conflict. While noting the Russia did not challenge a
state's right of association, Grushko said that in regards to
Georgia and Ukraine's NATO aspirations, "it was not about
their right to choose," but about Russian security and
military-industrial interests. "This was about our sphere of
security," he underlined. Ambassador commented that the U.S.
and EU partners rejected the "security sphere" concept.

European Security Treaty
--------------


6. (C) Preparing his case for Medvedev's European Security
Treaty (EST) which he will present to the OSCE February 18,
Grushko said the OSCE had lost its role in the security
dialogue, and needed to be reformed "to better link the
behavior of regimes to consequences," or replaced. He
similarly charged that "the CFE has hit a wall and is stuck,"
and warned "we might lose the whole mechanism." The long
delay in the Adapted CFE has made it less relevant, as "we
missed the chance" to discuss lowering ceilings for the
Baltics. He questioned the need for a Cold War-era structure
that burdened Russia with over 3,000 inspections a year. He
believed that these problems could be overcome if there was a
reengagement on the political level on "real security"
issues. The Ambassador countered that it was difficult to
have a dialogue when Russia had suspended its participation
in the CFE, although we had tried to bridge gaps through the
parallel actions package. Grushko replied that this was a
problem of action versus promises -- "Russia was to make
withdrawals and NATO was to fulfill promises" -- but that
movement forward was possible through new approaches.


7. (C) As a result of the failures of the CFE, OSCE, as well
as gaps in European security, including energy security,
Grushko advocated for Medvedev's proposed EST (reftel),
arguing that energy security, the Arctic, cyber-security,
territorial integrity, the use of force, and instruments of
arms control needed to be discussed in a more open and
inclusive mechanism. However, Russia did not intend to
produce more detailed proposals at this time, preferring a
"bottom-up" process that agreed upon basic rules of
Euro-Atlantic security, which in turn would create an
incentive for Russia to cooperate.


8. (C) Grushko pleaded for any efforts on security to be
undertaken in cooperation with the UN, "unlike NATO's
actions," but said that Russia was realistic and asked that
whatever was created would permit "freedom of action" for
security groupings and not undermine them. Calling the EST a
"romantic notion," he said that "we should not rely only on
NATO and the CSTO to solve common challenges and threats."
Ambassador replied that it appeared Russian ideas on the EST
were still in a formative stage, and suggested more informal
"Track-2" discussions ahead of elaboration of any more formal
positions.

EU-Russian Relations
--------------


9. (C) While Russia had discussed the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the European Commission
delegation on February 6, Grushko said he was hesitant to
call that "progress," as negotiations had been repeatedly
delayed. Russia, however, was serious in its efforts on all
four common spaces under discussion -- economic security;
freedom, security, and justice; external security; and
research and education. He said that the main task was to
identify areas where Russia and the EU could act as partners,
and areas where the two acted as competitors "on the basis of
rules."


10. (C) Russia and the EU were drawing lessons and
conclusions from the January gas crisis, Grushko said. In
the GOR's view, energy security between the Europe and Russia
was a pillar of the European security dialogue, separated
from ideological struggle and based upon the technical and
financial feasibility of projects and contracts. Russia,
however, needed EU guarantees that it had a market for gas
and oil, and surmised that the solution may be a
legally-binding regime. The Ambassador called for the GOR to
open upstream development of gas and oil to foreign
companies, arguing that this expansion of investment could
assist Gazprom in meeting its contractual commitments.
Grushko agreed this would increase energy security, and said
Russia would consider investments and projects, but also
improved efficiencies.

MOSCOW 00000355 003 OF 003




11. (C) As Gazprom worked to complete North and South
Stream, Grushko said that Russia stood ready to provide
guarantees to Poland and other transit states that there
would be no decrease in transit fees. He dismissed Ukrainian
PM Tymoshenko's presentation at the Munich conference, where
she urged European countries to judge Ukraine as a reliable
partner, and to reconsider developing alternative pipelines
bypassing the country and instead increase capacity through
Ukraine because of cost.


12. (C) Grushko welcomed plans to interlink Russian and EU
electrical grids (discussed during the recent visit of the EC
Commission to Russia),although he allowed that significant
technical challenges remained. However, he accused the EU of
being in "material breach" of the existing PCA on nuclear
energy cooperation. In the GOR's view, the EU failed in its
PCA commitment to conclude with Russia an agreement on trade
in nuclear materials by January 1, 1997. This commitment was
part of the assurances given to the GOR when signing the EU
Energy Charter Treaty (which the GOR has not yet ratified).


13. (C) The Ambassador offered that there were additional
areas for U.S.-Russian cooperation in clean coal technology
and energy efficiency. While agreeing, Grushko urged the
U.S. to refrain from statements cautioning the EU against
relying on Russian energy supplies. He said that once the
subject of energy security moves to "classic security"
venues, ideological competition and jostling over spheres of
influence arise. The Ambassador responded that the U.S.
commitment to energy security in Europe included
diversification of supply, which should not be misconstrued
as "anti-Russian."

U.S.-Russian Relations: Munich Atmospherics
--------------


14. (C) Grushko said that the U.S. delegation's remarks at
the Munich Security Conference, led by Vice President Biden,
had met Russia's high expectations for the new U.S.
administration. While noting that there were differing
points of view, he called the U.S. delegation's approach
"fresh" and "pragmatic," and concluded that the U.S. and
Russia could find ways to deepen cooperation, particularly on
Afghanistan. He welcomed the U.S. delegation's stated desire
to find a mechanism for U.S.-Russian relations and that the
reminder of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission was taken
"without connotations."
BEYRLE