AFGHAN LETHAL TRANSIT TALKS STALL OVER ICAO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003120

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR EAIR RS AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN LETHAL TRANSIT TALKS STALL OVER ICAO
STANDARDS

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Susan M. Elliott for reas
ons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a November 17 meeting that lasted longer
than three hours, MFA North America Deputy Director Nikolay
Sofinskiy noted that the transit of lethal goods over Russia
to Afghanistan had the full support of POTUS and Medvedev.
The GOR and USG now had to work out the modalities to make
these flights occur regularly. The GOR said the second
transit flight request was more complete than the first
flight request, but still lacked information regarding the
packaging of the cargo, which, GOR noted, is important
information. In addition, the GOR indicated that if the
United States wanted to ship goods prohibited under ICAO
rules, then competent U.S. authorities must authorize the
flight. The USG replied that the main problem with the first
transit flight was a dispute over ICAO standards, which do
not apply to state aircraft, including military aircraft.
Further, flights carrying certain types of military cargo,
such as munitions and fuel, could not use ICAO standards
because they either prohibit or restrict transport of
hazardous materials. The United States ships cargo according
to its own guidelines, which are consistent with ICAO
standards, and adapted as necessary, for the transport of
hazardous cargo for military purposes. The GOR wanted the
United States to show how USG guidelines corresponded to
internationally recognized ICAO standards for each item
shipped, something that Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC)
indicated is not possible due to the significant time and
labor involved. Both sides agreed to exchange nonpapers
proposing a way ahead by November 24. In the meantime, the
GOR will continue to process USG flight requests on a
case-by-case basis. The United States also said it plans to
conduct about 20 to 25 flights by the end of the year. The
GOR said they would start receiving our requests via email,
and that flights may take place along any internationally
recognized route. The GOR also criticized a November 14 New
York Times article on Afghanistan air transit flights. End
summary.

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Our Presidents Want Lethal Transit
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2. (C) MFA North America Deputy Director Nikolay Sofinskiy
opened the November 17 session by reiterating that the
transit of lethal military equipment over the Russian
Federation to Afghanistan had the full support of POTUS and
Medvedev. Because all political decisions regarding this
matter had already been made, the meeting was to "discuss and
agree on technical procedures" and modalities to implement
the Afghanistan Air Transit Agreement, he said. He added
that the MFA's role was simply to coordinate this meeting of
technical experts. "The MFA knows nothing," he said.
Sofinskiy also posited that the agreement had already been
provisionally implemented and legislative ratification would
come later.

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ICAO Standards For All!
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3. (C) OSD Russia Country Director Michael Barnes said the
clearance request for the second Afghanistan air transit
flight (which took place November 18) was approved in a
smoother fashion than the request for the first flight (which
took place October 8),and added that the methods used to
obtain the second flight clearance should become the
standard. Head Specialist-Expert of the Aviation Transit
Section of Rosaviatsya's Department of Air Transit Dmitriy
Mirko said that the request submitted for the second transit
flight was more complete than that for the first flight.
Lacking in the request for the second flight, however, was
information regarding a "packaging instruction paragraph" for
the cargo. Mirko argued, "Full information about the cargo
should include packaging instructions," and would have helped
determine how hazardous the cargo was. He added that Annex
18 of the International Convention on Civil Aviation (the
"Chicago Convention") (which, together with its Technical
Instructions established ICAO standards for the transport by
air of dangerous goods) stipulated the safety requirements
for shipping hazardous cargo. ICAO standards are
internationally recognized, he said. "If the packaging was

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up to standard, the flight request should have reflected
this," Mirko argued. He also said the GOR would like flight
requests to include the net weight of each item to be
shipped.


4. (C) Mirko said that if the United States wanted to ship
something prohibited under ICAO standards, then the competent
U.S. authority should give permission to do so. For milair
flights, a military authority should provide this permission.
He added that military and civilian shipping standards
should agree.


5. (C) Barnes said that the main problem with the first
flight clearance was a dispute over whether the cargo was
shipped according to ICAO standards, and further that the
permission Mirko mentioned was contained in Air Force Manual
(AFMAN) 24-204. DoD Legal Counsel Derek Gilman then
indicated that the Chicago Convention and ICAO standards do
not apply to state aircraft. He said the Afghanistan Air
Transit Agreement said that shipments would be made
"consistent with," rather than "in accordance with" ICAO
standards. Military flights could not possibly follow ICAO
standards because under those standards the quantity of
hazardous articles that can be shipped is too small to
support military operations. "We cannot keep our troops
supplied if we can only send one gallon of gasoline on a
flight," AFMC representative Michael Wernecke said. The U.S.
military, Barnes posited, had strict standards for shipping
dangerous articles. These standards were spelled out in
AFMAN 24-204. He added that the U.S. Department of
Transportation confirmed that AFMAN 24-204 standards are
consistent with ICAO standards for safety. If articles are
shipped improperly, it is a criminal offense, Barnes said.
In addition, a plane can be permitted to fly only if it
follows the guidelines in AFMAN 24-204.


6. (C) Mirko agreed that Chicago Convention Article 3
provided that the Convention (and hence ICAO standards) did
not apply to state aircraft, but he pointed out that Article
3 paragraph c) provided that no state aircraft can fly over
the territory of another state without all parties agreeing.
Article 8 of the Afghanistan Air Transit Agreement, he added,
said that flights over Russian territory should be carried
out according to Russian law and ICAO standards. He said
that Russian civilian airports might be used if a flight
faced an emergency, and so ICAO standards should be used so
that first responders would know how to deal with the
situation. The GOR delegation did not raise Article 8 again
in the negotiations. The USG view, based upon the
negotiation of Article 8 earlier this year, is that reference
to ICAO in Article 8 does not pertain to cargo, but rather to
flight.


7. (C) Mirko said that Rosaviatsya needed to see confirmation
that AFMAN 24-204 and ICAO standards conform. When Gilman
offered to provide a letter stating this and Acting DATT
offered to include language in each flight request
reiterating this, Mirko replied that he would need to see how
AFMAN 24-204 safety codes for each item to be shipped conform
to ICAO codes for that same item. Nobody at Rosaviatsya was
familiar with AFMAN 24-204, he said, and so his colleagues
would not understand its code system. When Barnes offered to
pass a copy of AFMAN 24-204, Sofinskiy said that it was too
cumbersome and nobody would have time to read it. He added
the GOR does not doubt that the USG ships goods safely.


8. (C) Wernecke replied that it would not be possible to show
how AFMAN 24-204 codes correspond to ICAO codes using
established procedures, manuals, and software. The military
does not use ICAO codes at all, and so conforming the two
systems for each flight would have to be done manually.
Personnel would also need to be trained to use ICAO
standards. U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) operates
about 1,000 flights per day, and so too much time would have
to be devoted to the few Russian flights that take place to
make this practical. In addition, doing so would invite
human error as personnel try to assign ICAO codes to cargo
that would be prohibited under ICAO standards.


9. (C) Seeing that the meeting was deadlocked, Barnes read
the title of the Afghanistan Air Transit Agreement and
reminded the GOR representatives that the intent of the
Agreement was to permit the transport of hazardous cargo

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across Russia. At that point, Sofinskiy called for a recess
to consult with FM Lavrov. When he returned he said that
things were still at an impasse and "further discussion made
no sense." He proposed that each side draft a nonpaper with
its proposals for a way ahead. Sofinskiy and Barnes agreed
that the nonpapers would be exchanged by November 24. "It
will be difficult to reach an agreement, but we shall try,"
he opined. Sofinskiy said that, in the meantime, the GOR
would continue to process flight requests on a case-by-case
basis.

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U.S. Plans About Five Flights Per Week
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10. (C) When asked, Barnes said the USG would like to conduct
about five flights per week, for a total of about 20 to 25
flights before the end of the year. If POTUS decides to send
more troops to Afghanistan, he posited, the U.S. would like
the option of sending more flights over Afghanistan. Barnes
added that these flights will include both military and
commercial contract flights. When Sofinskiy said that the
GOR had concluded a similar agreement with NATO in April 2009
and not one NATO flight had transited Russia, Barnes said
"the U.S. is different," arguing that the USG would like to
"use the agreement more."


11. (C) In order to send such a volume of flights over
Russia, Barnes said that the U.S. would like to send flight
clearance requests to Russia via electronic mail. The
current system of communicating by fax was "cumbersome," he
argued. Sofinskiy replied, "We have no problem with that."
The GOR would set up a separate electronic mail account once
the volume of flight requests increases, he said.

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Quo Vadis?
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12. (C) When asked whence the majority of transit flights
would originate, Barnes said that most military flights would
come from Europe, although the most savings would be obtained
by sending planes over the North Pole. The USG, he added,
was currently working on entry and exit routes with
Kazakhstan to take advantage of the polar route. Commercial
contract flights, Barnes said, could originate from anywhere.
Manager of the Europe and America Section of
RosAeroNavigatsya's International Cooperation Bureau Natalya
Kirillova indicated this was fine as long as the aircraft
followed internationally approved routes. When asked, she
said that current USG plans did indeed call for the planes to
follow such routes.

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The Hazards of Press Freedom
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13. (C) Sofinskiy said that a November 14 New York Times
article which stated the GOR "insisted on charging air
navigation fees that the Kremlin had said would be waived"
had nothing to do with reality. He said the GOR had made no
demands of the United States to pay air navigation fees
related to the transit of lethal cargo to Afghanistan. He
said that about 10 different GOR entities were involved in
the implementation of this agreement, and unfortunately
delays in agreement on how to collect air navigation fees
from GOR entities had not yet been reached. "We hope to work
out our internal issues by mid-December," Sofinskiy stated.
When Barnes told Sofinskiy that attempts had been made by USG
officials to point out the inaccuracies in the story to the
journalist, but the article was published anyway, Sofinskiy
replied, "It is sometimes good to control the press."
Rubin