MFA SUGGESTS AFGHANISTAN AS A BACK-DOOR MEANS OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003103

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS AF IR
SUBJECT: MFA SUGGESTS AFGHANISTAN AS A BACK-DOOR MEANS OF
ENGAGING IRAN

Classified By: Acting DCM Susan Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Senior Advisor to U/S Burns, Stephen Mull,
met in Moscow with Zamir Kabulov, Director of the MFA's
Second Asia Division, to discuss developments in Iran.
Kabulov welcomed the change in American tactics to use both
dialogue and pressure, but was downbeat on the prospects for
success given the consensus inside Iran favoring its nuclear
program and the resistance to outside pressure. Despite
Tehran being a "difficult partner," Moscow sees no
alternative to the current regime and fears instability could
lead to a power vacuum. Kabulov suggested cooperation on
Afghanistan could improve U.S.-Iran relations, but warned
that the U.S. would need to pay a price for Iranian help.
End Summary.

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A Strong Iran as a Stable Neighbor
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2. (C) Kabulov praised U.S. efforts to establish a dialogue
with Iran to dispel the "Great Satan" myth, but said the
leadership and Iranian society are "consolidated" in on the
nuclear issue. Similarly, the factionalized Iranian elite
was divided internally but over domestic issues, not on the
nuclear question. Kabulov said that additional international
pressure would lead to a more strident reaction from Iran and
would likely not encourage Iran to take positive steps.
Indeed, placing more pressure on Tehran would likely
galvanize the more radical elements within the leadership and
allow them to tighten their control. Kabulov added the GOR
sees no viable alternative to the current regime and if a
power vacuum were created the outcome could be worse than the
status quo. Therefore, the GOR was cautious toward Iran,
because regime change could result in a less desirable
government and regional instability that could threaten
Russia.


3. (C) Ambassador Kabulov said Russia still views the
Iranian regime as the strongest in the neighborhood. Even
after the elections last summer, the Iranian leadership
retains tight control over the government, society and even
over the opposition. Kabulov agreed with Mull's observation
that the Revolutionary Guard was amassing more power and
influence with its expanding business empire, becoming
involved in the telecommunications and the oil/gas industry
as well as construction projects. Kabulov added the Iranian
leadership was watching the Guard's activities and recognized
the threat to itself if the Guard became too influential.

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They Listen But They Don't Hear
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4. (C) Kabulov confided that Iran was a "difficult partner"
for Russia. He complained that, although Moscow has been a
steadfast partner for Tehran, "they listen, but they don't
hear us." He said Russia was striving to remain cool and
consistent in the face of growing anti-Russian sentiment in
Iran stemming from Moscow's firm position on
non-proliferation issues. He lamented that President
Medvedev had sent private messages to Iran's president and
supreme leader last fall and had not yet received an answer.


5. (C) Kabulov said Russia was unsure about Iran's true
intentions for its nuclear program. On one hand, the GOI put
forward strong arguments that it is peaceful in nature. On
the other, he recalled that Iranians frequently complained
about the fact that Pakistan was the only Islamic country
"allowed" to possess nuclear capabilities and that Israel's
capability is unquestioned. He explained the
sometimes-conflicting statements coming from Tehran by noting
that, in the Shia tradition, clergy at different levels
frequently contradiction one another because information is
not shared vertically throughout the hierarchy.

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A Door to Engagement
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6. (C) Kabulov stressed that it was important to find
different avenues of engagement with Iran, aside from the
nuclear program. He stressed the importance of face-saving
measures that would allow Iran to back away from its previous
tough statements. He suggested that cooperation on
Afghanistan could be a "door to reciprocity" for the U.S. and
Iran because both had an interest in building stability
there. He offered Russia's assistance in building a bridge
for this relationship.

MOSCOW 00003103 002 OF 002




7. (C) Kabulov said that, in spite of comments from U.S.
military leaders, Iranians were not supporting the Taliban
and had no desire to see a Taliban-led government in
Afghanistan. He said Iranian leaders have a "paranoia" about
U.S. forces in Afghanistan, especially on the western border
with Iran. But Kabulov added that Iran believes the U.S.
needs Tehran's assistance in Afghanistan more than it needs
American support. As a result, Kabulov said the Iranians
would expect incentives to encourage their cooperation.
Kabulov offered no specific suggestions on what might bring
Iran to the table, but said ideas that offer economic
benefits felt by the people would probably be welcome and
would preempt the possibility of criticism from the
opposition.


8. (C) Comment: Kabulov's views are typical of Russia's
Iran watchers: growing frustration with increasing
Moscow-Tehran friction, yet skeptical that even unified
international pressure will alter GOI behavior.


9. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador Mull.
Rubin