MFA'S SPECIAL REP ON BIH, KOSOVO, EULEX

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000308

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV BH KV UN RS
SUBJECT: MFA'S SPECIAL REP ON BIH, KOSOVO, EULEX

Classified By: Acting DCM Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request, see paragraph 7.

Summary
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2. (C) The MFA Special Representative Botsan-Kharchenko told
us February 5 that Russia would be satisfied with a
technocratic replacement to Office of High Representative
(OHR) Lacjak to oversee what it expects will be the quick
closure of the OHR office. Botsan-Kharchenko recognized
Russia was unlikely to win European support in the Peace
Implementation Council (PIC) for closure of the OHR in March,
but warned against introducing constitutional changes as new
conditionality and downplayed concerns over RS PM Dodik.
Botsan-Kharchenko sought U.S. views on a replacement of the
PIC, following closure of the OHR. On Serbia,
Botsan-Kharchenko complained about the lack of dialogue
between Belgrade and the UN. Despite the hardships of the
gas crisis, Russia does not see any negative consequences in
relations with the RS or Serbia. End summary.

Replacing the BiH High Representative
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3. (C) In a February 5 meeting, Russian MFA Special
Representative for the Balkans Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko
told us that he expected the EU to provide the name of their
consensus candidate to replace outgoing High Representative
Lajcak the following week (February 9-13) . He shared the
GoR's assessment that the candidate "will not have political
weight" and said that it was "enough to appoint a technical
person" in order to see OHR through to closure and transition
to a reduced EU Special Representative. He underscored that
the GoR wanted the agreement of both the PIC and the UNSC on
the candidate for High Representative, and noted that it was
also important to get the agreement of the Bosnian parties.
He said that the "reshuffle" at the top of OHR should not be
used to delay its closure, while we countered that this
situation should not lead to a watering down of conditions or
a hasty move to shutter OHR.


4. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko agreed with us that the approval
process for the EU's proposed candidate needed to move
quickly, and he outlined two alternative processes to move
forward. Based on his recent discussions with the Germans,
he said that the EU might coordinate a conference call of PIC
members or a sub-set of PIC members to seek endorsement of
the EU's candidate. As an alternative, he understood that
the EU might seek a meeting of PIC ambassadors with EU SyG/HR
Solana. He noted, however, that whichever alternative was
chosen, the GoR would seek a visit by the candidate to Russia
before making its final decision.

5-plus-2 Conditions and Closure
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5. (C) While Botsan-Kharchenko argued that a breakthrough at
the Prud trio meeting in Mostar February 23 could justify a
decision to close OHR at the March PIC meeting, he conceded
that this would be too fast for the EU. A Prud breakthrough
"would build on" the agreements made on Brcko and state
property made at the January 26 Prud meeting in Banja Luka.
Saying that it was likely that the Bosnian leaders could come
to agreement on five-plus-two conditions, Botsan-Kharchenko
opposed making the constitution a part of the conditions,
"otherwise Bosnia will not achieve it".


6. (C) He dismissed our concerns regarding RS PM Dodik's
efforts to undermine the Federation, saying that the GoR was
aware of Dodik's statements after Kosovo's independence, but
that Dodik and the RS were "now fully in-line." In defending
Dodik, he said that many of Dodik's efforts were not to
undermine state institutions but "to maintain the
competencies of the Serb entity" for a future state.

Replacement for PIC
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7. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko sought U.S. opinion on a
replacement for the PIC after the closure of OHR. He said
that Russia would like to replace the body, but that such a
replacement must have "a voice and influence." Clearly
reflecting unease over ceding all Russian influence to the
EU, Botsan-Kharchenko requested U.S. opinions or proposals on
what, if anything, should replace the PIC as a forum for U.S.
and Russian views. He said that he was open to discuss our
ideas. (Note: Post requests guidance in response to the
Special Representative's request. End note.)

Serbia-Kosovo

MOSCOW 00000308 002 OF 002


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8. (C) The Special Representative said that Russia remained
concerned that there were no discussions between the UN and
Serbia after agreement on the six-points. He stressed that
dialogue between the two was necessary because Belgrade would
not engage directly with EULEX, as it is a part of the
Ahtisaari process. Botsan-Kharchenko assessed that Serbian
President Tadic had a balanced position that did not unduly
encourage Kosovar Serbs; nevertheless, Tadic had to operate
within Serbian domestic political constraints and engagement
with the Ahtisaari-organ EULEX was not politically possible.

Russia-Serbia
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9. (C) Following the gas crisis, Botsan-Kharchenko said that
the situation had not undermined Russia's relations with
Serbia or with the Republic of Srbska. "We are happy," he
said, "Tadic is developing relations with the EU and Russia
in parallel, as he promised he would." Russia is expecting
the visit of Serbian Foreign Minister Jeremic and
representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church February 20
for meetings with FM Lavrov and newly enthroned Russian
Patriarch Kirill.
BEYRLE