MEDVEDEV'S PROPOSED EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY: HOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003056

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019
TAGS: PMIL PREL MARR NATO OSCE RS
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV'S PROPOSED EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY: HOW
TO RESPOND

REF: A. MOSCOW 2906

B. MOSCOW 2781

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) After considerable build-up, President Medvedev
unexpectedly released a draft European Security Treaty on
November 29 and Russia introduced a parallel draft
NATO-Russia treaty at the December 4 NATO ministerial
(collectively the ESTs -- European Security Treaties). The
ESTs seek to redress Russia's grievances from the last 20
years over NATO enlargement and the Balkan wars and to
reestablish Moscow's role as a great power with influence on
par with any other Euro-Atlantic country. In reality, the
ESTs break little new ground conceptually, foundering on the
tension between progressive European ideals and Russia's
instincts to protect state sovereignty. The resulting text
tries to subordinate existing structures and norms to the
idea that one party to the treaty cannot take actions related
to security that "affect significantly" the security of other
parties. The purpose is to limit NATO's activities (e.g.
enlargement and exercises) and render redundant the OSCE's
conflict-prevention structures. Ru
ssia insists the new treaty must be "legally binding," but it
contains no enforcement mechanisms or sanctions provisions.


2. (C) While this draft is clumsy and tendentious, it is
another loud signal that Russia is interested in a serious
dialogue on European security. While recent Russian actions,
e.g. the war in Georgia, have made such a dialogue more
difficult, a rejection of Medvedev's proposal would further
alienate Russia from Euro-Atlantic institutions and
ultimately detract from regional security. With skillful
diplomacy, we can use Medvedev's proposal to try to overcome
deadlocks on CFE and A/CFE as well as enhancing transparency
measures. Engagement will also help preserve improved
Russian cooperation on Afghanistan and Iran. In the long
term, gaining Russian buy-in on incremental changes to
Europe's security architecture offers a way to build on the
successes of European integration and spread security and
prosperity to former Soviet countries. End Summary.

Now in Black and White
--------------


3. (C) President Medvedev announced Russia's intent to
spearhead a legally binding treaty on European Security in
June 2008. The impetus is the Russian perception that the
West in the 1990s failed to capitalize on the end of the Cold
War to build new European security structures inclusive of
Russia, but instead chose to humiliate Russia by enlarging
NATO and ignoring Moscow's objections to military
intervention in the Balkans. On November 29, Medvedev
abruptly unveiled a draft of his European Security Treaty
(EST),sending letters to President Obama and other leaders
and posting it on his website. While the timing seems to
have been intended to capture the agenda of the OSCE and NRC
ministerials, the lack of advance notice has undercut the
roll-out and Foreign Ministry contacts tell us some senior
officials there are unhappy with the draft and were reluctant
to release it in its current form.


4. (C) The treaty's stated intention is for parties (all
countries "from Vancouver to Vladivostok," probably meaning
current OSCE member-states) to cooperate on the basis of
principles of "indivisible, equal and undiminished security"
and agree to refrain from activities that affect
significantly the security of other parties to the treaty.
Moreover, parties that are members of military alliances
pledge to ensure those alliances will not take decisions that
affect significantly the security of others. This language
is apparently intended to subordinate NATO and other
organizations to a new code of conduct and provide redress
for parties that believe their security is being compromised.
While the broader treaty spells out OSCE-like consultation
mechanisms to deal with security threats, all decisions are
based on consensus and there are no enforcement mechanisms or
sanctions provisions.


5. (C) The broader draft as written would give Russia and
its allies a platform for opposing (but not stopping) NATO
enlargement, exercises, operations, and Partnership for Peace
activities. In addition, it could make the OSCE's role in
hard security redundant and could further reduce Russian
cooperation with the OSCE on the human and economic
dimensions. The draft is silent on the mechanics in

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confronting new threats and challenges from outside the
Euro-Atlantic space, arguably the issue creating the most
pressing need for alterations in existing structures.

The treaty that should have been...
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6. (C) The parallel "NATO Treaty" that Lavrov delivered at
the December 4 NRC ministerial echoes much of the language of
the Medvedev draft, but also includes provisions designed to
insulate Russia from NATO by limiting military deployments on
the territory of countries that joined the alliance after
1997, making legally binding the commitments undertaken in
the NATO-Russia Founding Act. The proposal suggests Russia's
threat perceptions are still focused westward notwithstanding
the NRC's professed goal of fostering cooperation. While the
MFA and Medvedev have highlighted the broader EST proposal,
they have made no public statements on the parallel NRC
proposal.

Mixed Response
--------------


7. (C) The response from Allied diplomats in Moscow to
Medvedev's proposal has been mixed. While French, German,
British, and Italian colleagues said the document was thin,
they called for a measured response so as not to injure
Medvedev's pride and to maintain the hard-won change in tone
in bilateral relations. Many Eastern European diplomats,
including those from the Czech Republic, Romania, and Poland,
remain suspicious of Russian motives and see the treaty as an
attempt to undermine NATO. They argue that European states
should ignore or publicly reject the document. Russian
commentaries have also given the proposal mixed reviews.
Russian foreign policy experts, including the Carnegie
Center's Dmitry Trenin and Russia in Global Affairs
Editor-in-Chief Fedor Lukyanov, while sympathizing with the
principles behind the document, acknowledge weaknesses in the
text and see it as a starting point for discussions.

The Ball is now in Our Court
--------------


8. (C) Medvedev's identification of the EST as his top
foreign policy objective clearly signals Russia's
dissatisfaction with existing structures. And Russia's
attack on Georgia last summer demonstrates the risks to the
existing regional security architecture. The successful
expansion of Europe's zone of stability and prosperity during
the last 20 years, achieved using the tools of NATO and EU
enlargement, has now reached a plateau. Continuing to follow
the policies used during the past two decades will result in
deadlock with Russia and insecurity in European regions that
seek, but have not yet attained, close integration with
European institutions. A new paradigm that gives Russia a
better sense of buy-in of European structures would create a
smoother pathway for achieving the goal of European
integration by former Soviet states and eventually Russia
itself.


9. (C) Rejecting the European security proposal out of hand
all but guarantees returning to the well-worn ruts at OSCE
and could reduce Russian willingness to work with us on
common security threats (Iran, Afghanistan,
counter-proliferation, and North Korea to name a few).
European security could be proposed as a major agenda item
for the OSCE's Annual Security Review Conference in mid-2010
to motivate meaningful interactions in the coming six months.


10. (C) On the tactical level, intensifying our dialogue
with Russia on European security could create opportunities
to overcome obstacles to reactivating the CFE Treaty and
resolving the A/CFE impasse. The draft treaty also opens the
door to discussions of new and stronger confidence and
security-building mechanisms that would avoid future
recriminations on the nature or purpose of NATO membership,
exercises or military facilities.


11. (C) An effort to elicit discussion on the EST by the
U.S. and Allies would help smoke out whether Russia's agenda
is sincere or focused on weakening a perceived adversary.
For example:

--Russia's demand for legally binding resolution mechanisms
could be explored for existing OSCE tools.

--If Russia wants beefed-up transparency/confidence-building
in NATO-Russia interactions, then we should explore a package
that includes Moscow ending its suspension of CFE and

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following through on its Istanbul commitments on A/CFE.

--In exchange for a definition of "substantial combat
forces," we could seek an expressed, written commitment that
neither NATO nor Russia poses a threat to one another,
requiring a tangible Russian demonstration that its doctrine,
training, exercises, and threat assessments no longer target
NATO and its allies. Such a demonstration could require
greater transparency measures and notification of Russian
deployments in "flank areas," thereby reinforcing A/CFE
commitments.

--Russia's essentially symbolic demands for the West to
engage with the SCO and CSTO could be linked to higher
priorities, such as assurances that all countries enjoy
freedom of association and that our respective alliances
remain open to new members.

The Domestic Angle
--------------


12. (C) American reactions will be closely monitored because
of the implications for Russian domestic politics. Engaging
seriously with Russia would reduce the amount of ammunition
available to Russian conservatives intent on demonstrating
that the West wants to undermine and weaken Russia and
refuses to treat it as an equal. While the struggle between
Russia's "siloviki" (officials from the military and security
services) and modernizers for the country's future will
ultimately be decided by Russians themselves, Medvedev's
proposal provides us the opportunity to influence one of the
core points of this debate: the intentions of the West.


13. (C) Finally, an effective response to Medvedev's
proposal should acknowledge Russia's apprehensions about the
status quo and European security and accept the possibility
of building incrementally on existing structures without
compromising the centrality of NATO and OSCE. This process
could advance the long-term goal of moving Russia from
"zero-sum" thinking to embrace more sincerely effective
partnership to confront common challenges.
Beyrle