SRAP HOLBROOKE'S STRATEGIC DIALOGUE IN RUSSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 003035

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/SRAP, SCA/A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS MCAP PTER AG RS
SUBJECT: SRAP HOLBROOKE'S STRATEGIC DIALOGUE IN RUSSIA

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (C) In meetings with Russia's Foreign Ministry and
Security Council, SRAP Holbrooke stated that "history and
destiny" have given the United States and Russia the common
problem of Afghanistan and it is time to use the new
relationship between Washington and Moscow to cooperate more
closely in Afghanistan. Each Russian interlocutor welcomed
the strategic dialogue on Afghanistan and sought more details
on American strategy, particularly the presence of U.S.
troops. The Russians expressed skepticism about the
prospects for reconciliation with the Taliban and therefore
urged caution in de-listing individuals from the 1267 roster.
The Russian Security Council representative voiced
skepticism that adding more ISAF troops would reduce the
insurgency and expressed deep concern that Pakistan's
military remains intent on undermining Afghanistan. The MFA
also embraced the idea of more international engagement on
Afghanistan. Holbrooke said the U.S. would consider Russia's
proposal to explore cooperation through the CSTO while Russia
continued to insist that OSCE activities stop at the Afghan
border. GOR officials also disagreed with the U.S. reversal
on poppy eradication as a tool in fighting the drug trade.


2. (C) Despite tactical differences, the highest levels of
the GOR have gone on record supporting U.S. goals in
Afghanistan and that message is being echoed by these key
interlocutors, who each called for more joint work on
counter-narcotics, economic development and military training
and assistance. Leveraging high-level Russian goodwill into
increased assistance on the ground in Afghanistan will
require extensive follow-up, including through the Bilateral
Presidential Commission. While on-the-ground assistance will
be modest at best, this type of high-level strategic dialogue
will pay dividends as diplomacy intensifies because if Russia
feels it is truly involved in decision-making it is far more
likely to play a constructive political role. End summary
and comment

U.S. STRATEGY, RUSSIAN REACTIONS
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3. (C) During a two-day visit to Moscow November 16-17, SRAP
Holbrooke held three separate strategic-level conversations
(totaling over six hours) with Deputy Foreign Ministers
Borodavkin and Sergey Ryabkov and Deputy Secretary of the
Security Council, Vladimir Nazarov. In each meeting,
Holbrooke underscored the U.S. strategic objectives of
defeating Al Qaeda (AQ),disrupting the Taliban and
strengthening Afghan institutions while also working
regionally to prevent hostilities between Pakistan and India.
He discussed the policy review now nearing conclusion in
Washington and said that, whatever the outcome, the U.S.
strategy will involve an increase of ISAF combat forces,
ramped-up training of Afghan military and police and a
long-term commitment to provide economic assistance. He also
noted that following Karzai's inauguration this week plans to
step up international diplomacy among Afghanistan's neighbors
and other key partners, including Russia. Holbrooke accented
the importance of U.S.-Russian cooperation, noting that
"history and destiny" had given our two countries unique
responsibilities in Afghanistan and we must never again
abandon that country.


4. (C) Borodavkin agreed with the focus on security-forces
training: "if we expect Afghanistan to be a state, it must
rely on its own security forces." In the meantime, he said,
Russia supports ISAF's presence and fully endorses the goal
of destroying AQ. Borodavkin also posed a series of
questions, which served to highlight the GOR's main areas of
concern: What are U.S. strategic goals and practical military
objectives in the medium- and long-term? Is there an exit
strategy? What is the vision for Afghanistan's international
posture following the withdrawal of foreign troops? Is the
U.S. planning to stand by the Karzai government? What is the
view regarding reconciliation with the Taliban? Is it true
ISAF forces have been in contact with them? What is the U.S.
position on an international conference on Afghanistan? What
would be the deliverables?


5. (C) Nazarov expressed interest in hearing Holbrooke's
views on an "exit strategy," which he said American officials

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had begun discussing publicly. Nazarov said he and his boss
(Security Council head Patrushev) did not agree with the
American idea that increasing troop levels would tamp down
the insurgency, warning they could instead feed it by stoking
enmity among more Afghans. Instead, Nazarov said an
anti-terror campaign should rely more heavily on special
forces and intelligence, using a range of methods, reliable
sources and cooperation with allies. Pressed, Nazarov
acknowledged population security is important and agreed
training of police and military is key.


6. (C) Nazarov expressed gratitude for Holbrooke's candor in
acknowledging the U.S. role in sponsoring mujahaddin in the
1980s that have since transmuted into terrorist groups now
fighting against the GOA and ISAF. Nazarov concurred with
Holbrooke's characterization of our countries' unique
responsibilities in this region, stating that cooperation in
Afghanistan would be one worthy way to build a post-Cold War
relationship.


7. (C) Borodavkin, Ryabkov and Nazarov each committed Russia
to continuing and expanding its cooperation with the U.S. in
pursuing its objectives and to exploring additional bilateral
assistance to Afghanistan's military, police and
counter-narcotics officials as well as to economic
development.

RECONCILIATION/RESOLUTION 1267
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8. (C) SRAP Holbrooke discussed, in hypothetical terms,
possibilities for bringing some members of the Taliban into
mainstream politics, stressing that such a process would be
Afghan-led, would require those involved to renounce violence
and would not include Al Qaida fighters. For example,
Holbrooke said if an individual Talib renounced Taliban
leader Mullah Omar, there should be some latitude for a
discussion. MFA Director Zamir Kabulov retorted that those
who renounce Omar are no longer Taliban members by
definition. Borodavkin also articulated the GOR position
that "there is no chance of peace with the Taliban -- they
are violent extremists." However, later in the conversation
he agreed with Holbrooke's assessment that the Taliban cannot
be defeated militarily and a political strategy is also
required. Holbrooke emphasized that contrary to rumors no
U.S. representatives, military or civilian, have any contact
with the Taliban.


9. (C) Holbrooke noted the international community is going
to need to help facilitate Karzai's interest in reaching out
to internal opponents. One element of this is improving the
1267 list by removing as well as adding names. He urged the
GOR to reconsider its refusal to remove names of people who
no longer fit the criteria and offered to provide full
details on the rationale for each case. . Borodavkin said
the Russian position is not "cast in stone" but that all
additions and deletions must be well founded. Holbrooke
promised to follow up and arrange a separate meeting on this
topic with appropriate officials in the future.

SCO/CSTO/OSCE
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10. (C) Officials at both MFA and the Security Council urged
greater international cooperation between the U.S.-NATO and
the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization). They
said CSTO is particularly active in combating narcotics in
Afghanistan's northern neighbors through its "Channel"
program, whose goal is to establish tighter law-enforcement
coordination among former Soviet countries along the northern
route. The participating countries (Tajikistan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Belarus and Russia) also exchange
information on financing. Canal organizes twice-annual
crack-downs on drug traffickers transiting Central Asia and
Russia en route from Afghanistan. This, according to
Nazarov, is the "single organized effort coordinated among
Afghanistan's neighbors." Nazarov said the CSTO is not
Russia-dominated; though its secretariat is located in
Moscow, the organization operates by consensus and "all
members are equal." Holbrooke said the U.S. would be willing
to explore project-specific cooperation with CSTO on topics
of mutual interest, such as Afghanistan. He noted this
administration had established U.S. relations with the SCO
(Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and plans to maintain
those ties.

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11. (C) On OSCE, Borodavkin declined to reconsider Russia's
refusal to support OSCE-sponsored projects inside Afghanistan
because it is not a member of OSCE. He said, however, that
Russia is ready to have more Afghans trained in Central Asian
countries. Holbrooke also requested Russian views on Kazakh
President Nazerbayev's desire to hold a summit meeting on
Afghanistan during Kazakhstan's 2010 tenure as OSCE Chairman,
noting the U.S. opposes the idea of an OSCE summit in 2010
but has not yet reached a position on a summit if it were not
associated with the OSCE. Borodavkin replied that Russia
would oppose an OSCE summit on Afghanistan for the reasons
cited above, but had not yet heard of the other proposal.

INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY
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12. (C) SRAP Holbrooke walked through U.S. intentions to
intensify international diplomacy following Karzai's
inauguration, specifically by improving communication among
his counterparts through the "SRAP Collective." Borodavkin
embraced the idea, noting that previous efforts to coordinate
the group had been haphazard. He said Kabulov, who just
returned from an assignment as Russian Ambassador in Kabul,
will assume the role of Russia's Afghanistan coordinator and
there are also plans to create an inter-agency group under
his leadership. Holbrooke welcomed this and said Russia's
participation sends a "powerful signal" to the world
community. Holbrooke also noted he plans to visit Central
Asia soon, but wanted to come to Moscow first.

PAKISTAN
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13. (C) Holbrooke emphasized the core role of Pakistan in
international terrorism, noting that two recently uncovered
plots in the U.S. both had links with Pakistan. He said the
GOP has improved its posture in fighting this menace, but
more is needed; hence continuous engagement, most recently
NSA Jones's visit there the previous week. Borodavkin said
Russia echoes these messages in its communications with
Pakistan.


14. (C) Nazarov expressed profound skepticism about
Pakistan's capacity to fight terrorism. He said the ISI and
other elements of the Pakistani army are still using
terrorist groups, including the Taliban, to conduct a
"private war" (against Kabul). He contended that some U.S.
military assistance to Islamabad ends up in the hands of
terrorists and that Pakistani intelligence supports linkages
among far-flung terrorist groups from Arab countries, Uighers
and Chechens. He also noted that a troop build-up will mean
additional convoys flowing through northern Pakistan and each
one will need to pay local war-lords for safe passage and
that that money will also end up supporting terrorist groups.
He urged additional intelligence exchanges on these
terrorist groups. Following Ambassador Beyrle's suggestion,
Nazarov and Holbrooke agreed such exchanges could take place
through the Bi-national Presidential Commission's
intelligence group.

NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
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15. (C) Russian interlocutors stressed their alarm at the
increase in heroin production and export since 2001. Nazarov
acknowledged that the last year had seen a slight
improvement, but still heroin production in Afghanistan has
increased by a factor of 40 since the beginning of the
decade. Nazarov added that the drug trade partially finances
terrorism, which could spread north into Central Asia and
even southern Russia.


16. (C) Holbrooke outlined the rationale for the USG
reversing the policy of eradication of poppy fields: the
eradication affected only a small percentage of the
cultivated area and it drove poor farmers into the hands of
the Taliban. In addition, the policy inadvertently made the
U.S. take sides in local battles among drug-lords. By
focusing on shutting down drug bazaars, arresting drug barons
and putting more energy towards interdiction, the U.S. is
seeing some positive results while, according to
intelligence, Taliban leaders are displeased.


17. (C) Nazarov appreciated Holbrooke's presentation, but

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maintained that the U.S. approach is a comprehensive strategy
with a missing piece -- eradication. "It is difficult to
explain to the Russian public why you eradicate in Colombia
but not in Afghanistan." (Note: while Nazarov disagreed with
Holbrooke, he is clearly more open to a discussion than the
head of the Federal Narcotics Control Service, Viktor Ivanov,
who categorically stated that eradication is the only way to
deal with the problem. If Russian officials such as Nazarov
can be persuaded that the new approach is reducing the flow
of recruits to the Taliban and reducing the flow of
narcotics, it may be possible to change the GOR position.)

Beyrle