SRAP HOLBROOKE - MOD DIR GORBUNOV NOV 16 MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003007

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/SRAP, SCA/A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS MCAP PTER AG RS
SUBJECT: SRAP HOLBROOKE - MOD DIR GORBUNOV NOV 16 MEETING
ON AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: SRAP Ambassador Holbrooke met Russian MOD
Director for International Cooperation Gorbunov to discuss
the U.S. strategic approach in Afghanistan. Holbrooke said
security was a precondition for the success of U.S. and
international efforts at the reconstruction of Afghanistan
and outlined U.S. plans for creating effective Afghan
security forces. Gorbunov and his uniformed colleagues
expressed some skepticism over the viability of the U.S.
plans, and wondered if the U.S. would ever withdraw from the
region. Gorbunov added that further Russian support for
training and equipping Afghan security forces would require
political direction from President Medvedev. End summary.


2. (C) U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke met November 16 with
Russian Ministry of Defense Director of International
Cooperation Alexander Gorbunov. Ambassador Holbrooke
outlined the U.S. strategic approach in Afghanistan and the
congruence of U.S. and Russian interests in the long-term
stability of Afghanistan and the region. Holbrooke stressed
that he wanted to intensify our bilateral dialogue on
Afghanistan and Pakistan.


3. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke explained that the U.S. was in
Afghanistan simply because of September 11 and the resulting
need to destroy Al Qaida. He said neither the U.S. nor NATO
are seeking a permanent base, citing U.S. public opinion in
support of withdrawal from the region at the earliest
opportunity. The U.S. is determined not to abandon
Afghanistan as it did in 1989 and almost did again in 2004.


4. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke said the U.S. strategy was to
destroy Al Qaida and, to the extent it supported Al Qaida,
the Taliban. This strategy provides the Afghanistan national
security forces (ANSF) and government the time and space to
become strong and self-reliant. Ambassador Holbrooke said
that President Obama had not yet decided how many additional
U.S. troops to send to Afghanistan. The U.S. goal was to
increase, train and strengthen the Afghanistan National
Police and Army so that these institutions would be able to
successfully counter a low-level insurgency. Our goal was to
do this by 2013, though Ambassador Holbrooke acknowledged the
enormous difficulty of achieving this within such a short
time frame.


5. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke said a strong and reliable Afghan
security force would allow the U.S. and NATO to withdraw
combat forces, leaving behind some troops to conduct
training. International economic assistance to Afghanistan
would need to continue for several years, the Ambassador
stressed. We would not abandon Afghanistan as we had in

1989. Throughout history, a weak and unstable Afghanistan
had drawn destructive interference from outside powers. With
Al Qaida entrenched in North Waziristan and poised to return
to Afghanistan, the United States had no option but to make
every effort to assist the Afghan Government to establish a
stable and independent state.


6. (C) Gorbunov noted U.S. success in the rebuilding of the
post-war economies of Germany and Japan, as well as some of
the Persian Gulf states. When, he asked, did the U.S. expect
Afghanistan to become self-sufficient? If this did not
happen within the next few years, who would continue to
support Afghanistan?


7. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke noted the differences between
Germany and Japan, who had both started World War II as
modern states with cohesive societies and high literacy
rates. In contrast, Afghanistan, had only a 20 percent
literacy rate. The U.S. did not expect Afghanistan would be
able to pay for its security forces any time soon. The U.S.
believed it and the rest of the international community would
have to foot the bill, which was in their collective
interest. Ambassador Holbrooke said the cost of the U.S.
military effort was one million dollars per soldier per year,
meaning the cost for current U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan
was between 100 and 150 billion dollars per year. By
comparison, the cost of training and equipping the ANSF was
six to eight billion dollars per year.


8. (C) Paul Jones, S/RAP Deputy, recounted his recent
experience with U.S. marines in Nawa, a town in the heart of

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"Taliban country." Despite continuous skirmishing and
several U.S. wounded, security had been established in the
area and troops and townspeople were now able to move about
freely. Jones noted that the Afghans had only two requests:
security and assistance with agriculture. After that, they
wanted the Americans to leave.


9. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke said Jones' experience was a good
example of the U.S. civil-military approach in Afghanistan,
but the real problem was the sanctuary in Pakistan for
Taliban and Al Qaida. There, the only weapon at hand was the
missile-armed Predator drone, which the U.S. and allies had
to pretend did not exist, although everyone knows of it.


10. (C) Gorbunov said that Russian support in Afghanistan for
the training and equipping of ANSF would depend on political
decisions made at a high level, likely by President Medvedev.
His job, and that of his colleagues at the table, would be
to provide advice and formulate recommendations. Colonel
Melkov of the MOD Main Directorate for International Military
Cooperation asked how the U.S. security plan linked to
economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. Ambassador Holbrooke
responded that while security was not the only need, it was a
precondition for fulfilling others like the rule of law, good
governance, demining, prisons, agriculture, and
counter-narcotics. The U.S. had over 20 individual plans
addressing these issues, Ambassador Holbrooke said, but at
the MOD it was important to focus on the U.S. concept for
providing security.


11. (C) Major General Sukhov, deputy head of the MOD Main
Directorate for International Military Cooperation, conceded
that U.S. military could defeat Al Qaida and the Taliban, but
added that history suggested a U.S. military presence, once
established, is not quickly abandoned. If the U.S. really
planned to withdraw from Afghanistan, what were its
geostrategic aims there beside the destruction of Al Qaida?


12. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke, terming Sukhov's question
"fascinating," asked Sukhov if he personally believed the
U.S. intended to stay in Afghanistan. When Sukhov explained
that he wanted to express his doubts about the likely success
of U.S. plans, Holbrooke countered this was a different
issue. If the U.S. succeeds in building ANSF that can
provide security, then U.S. combat forces will withdraw,
leaving troops only for training and reconstruction.


13. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke said U.S. presence in
Afghanistan had nothing in common with Germany and Japan,
citing the German government's request to have U.S. troops
remain. While understanding Russian concerns about
encirclement based on his experiences with NATO enlargement
while Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs,
Ambassador Holbrooke said U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan
did not pose any threat to another country, whether Russia,
China, or Iran. Sukhov replied that it was not clear to him
whether it was in Russia's interest for the U.S. to withdraw
or remain in Afghanistan. Ambassador Holbrooke said that the
hope was for most of the Allied combat forces in Afghanistan
to be gone by 2013.


14. (C) Colonel Musk, also of the MOD Main Directorate, asked
what role the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the
South Caucasus played in U.S. civil-military plans.
Ambassador Holbrooke noted that he had not yet visited any of
these countries, although he had been invited by all of them
except Kyrgyzstan, because he wanted to discuss U.S. plans in
the region with Russia first. While noting that General
Petraeus was developing northern supply routes into
Afghanistan with some of these countries, Ambassador
Holbrooke said he was not working on this or related issues,
such as the air base at Manas. He did plan to visit Georgia
in the near future as it was sending a battalion to
Afghanistan and the Georgians had invited him to inspect it.


15. (C) Colonel Melkov asked if the U.S. feared that the arms
it was providing to Afghanistan might fall into the hands of
the Taliban, or that the ANSF, once trained and equipped,
would act counter to U.S. interests. Ambassador Holbrooke
agreed these were real worries, but said the immediate
concern remained whether the Afghan government could create a
capable ANSF. In 2010 the U.S. plans to turn over
responsibility for the security of some provinces, as it had
been doing in Iraq, to the ANSF. This would be a real test

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for the Afghans. The U.S., Ambassador Holbrooke added, was
very aware that it had supported attacks on the Soviet army
in Afghanistan by groups whose children were now attacking
U.S. and NATO forces.


16. (C) Gorbunov thanked Ambassador Holbrooke for his visit,
and assured that Russia will remain a reliable and effective
partner. The rest, he said, will remain with our political
leaders. NOTE: Gorbunov was relieved of his office in early
December and replaced, for the time being, by Maj Gen Sukhov.
No official explanation for Gorbunov's departure has been
given. End note.
Beyrle